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Abstract 
This thesis examines the strategic motivation for international strategic alliance (ISA) 
formation and partner selection criteria, and the factors influencing knowledge 
acquisitions and performance, in a sample of 134 Saudi ISAs using questionnaire data 
obtained from Saudi partners. The highest-ranked strategic motives of the Saudi firms 
are to enable diversification of products or services, establish presence in the market, 
and enable faster entry to the market. Market entry and establishing business 
successfully in Saudi were the top foreign firms’ motives. Furthermore, the study’s 
findings show that the task-related selection criteria are determined by the strategic 
motives for ISA formation than are the partner-related selection criteria. Knowledge 
acquisition by Saudi partners is negatively related to the extent to which the knowledge 
of foreign partners is tacit, and is positively related to the extent to which there is a 
higher level of communication between partners. Interestingly, expatriate number 
working in Saudi ISA partners and the levels of trust between top managers of Saudi 
firms and foreign partners are found to have no impact on knowledge acquisition. The 
study also examines the effects of trust dimensions (trust, distrust, and competence 
trust) on the performance of ISAs within the Saudi context. The results show that 
personal and competence trust influence performance positively, while distrust has a 
negative influence. It was found that trust dimensions plays significant mediating and 
moderating role. This study finds that cultural distance has a positive effect on ISA 
performance, contrary to the general assumption of negative effect. Cultural distance 
reflects positively on learning, hence on performance. Understanding of a partner’s 
culture shows a positive relationship with ISA performance. It also explains the 
relationship between cultural understanding communication, and performance. It shows 
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Study 
1.1. Introduction 
The pace and the cost of technological developments have created an uncertain 
environment for firms. Intense global competition has placed a lot of pressure on firms 
to acquire new skills, and to be more innovative, efficient, and flexible. The pressure is 
higher in technology-dependent industries. This has forced managers to think of ways to 
cope with these developments, in order to strengthen and sustain their competitive 
advantage (Young and Wierseman, 1999; Inkpen, 1998). Firms in some cases lack the 
internal flow of new knowledge needed in this environment (Park, 2011). Therefore, 
firms seek to acquire it externally as a quick way to get hold of these capabilities 
(Hamel, 1991; Lane, Salk and Lyles, 2001; Lyles and Salk, 1996). There are different 
modes and choices which firms can adopt to acquire those capabilities. These include 
equity joint ventures (EJV), and non-equity (contractual) alliances (NEA) (Glaister and 
Buckley, 1996). A firm seeking to launch a business outside of its local market will try 
to choose the best mode with which to enter an international market (Young and 
Wierseman, 1999). 
This, of course, is not the only reason why strategic alliances (SAs) are playing a more 
noticeable part in the modern economy. Firms form or seek ISAs for a variety of other 
motives; including, risk sharing, product rationalization, economies of scale and scope, 
diversifying risk, overcoming entry barriers, transfer of complementary technology and 
exchange of patents, shaping competition, conforming to host government policy, 
facilitating international expansion, establishing vertical linkages, and overcoming 
“xenophobic” reactions when entering foreign markets (Luo and Park, 2004; Sirmon 
and Lane, 2004; Hennart, 1988; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Napier, 1989). Moreover, 
it provides an opportunity to a firm that wants to expand in a lucrative yet unfamiliar 
business. The alliance will provide the firm with an opportunity to enter this business 
with a more experienced partner. This will subsequently lower the set-up cost and the 
chances of failure (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). Furthermore, through SAs, partner 
firms can be quicker and more efficient in learning new skills and technologies and 
developing new products or services than could either firm alone (Beamish and Lupton, 
2009; Luo and Park, 2004; Sirmon and Lane, 2004; Damanpour, et al., 2012). All these 
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reasons and facts have pushed firms to what Roy and Oliver (2009) have described as a 
“compelling strategic option” to form international joint ventures (IJVs).  
Many theories have emerged which attempt to explain and analyse the expansion 
strategies of firms and the formation of strategic alliances. Examples of such theories: 
transaction costs economics, competitive strategy, resource dependence, organizational 
learning, social exchange, political economy, and the resource-based view of the firm 
(Tsang, 1998). 
Nielsen and Gudergan (2012) have defined SAs as follows: “a strategic alliance 
involves two or more legally distinct organizations (parents), each of which actively 
participates, beyond a mere investment role, in the decision-making activities of the 
joint venture (JV).” For a SA to be considered international, “at least one partner is 
headquartered outside the venture’s country of operation or the venture has significant 
levels of operation in more than one country” (Nielsen and Gudergan, 2012). It does not 
matter whether the form is equity or non-equity “contractual” (Silva, Bradley and 
Sousa, 2012).  
Internationalisation offers firms opportunities that may not exist in the local market. 
Combining experiences and resources in ISAs can help overcome obstinate problems 
that cannot be solved by confrontations or competitions (Roy and Oliver, 2009). Hence, 
they have grown exceptionally and steadily in terms of frequency and magnitude since 
the 1970s (Beamish and Lupton, 2009; Das and Teng, 1998; Park, 2011; Damanpour, et 
al., 2012; Roy and Oliver, 2009). For emerging economies, ISAs are very important, 
with a contribution of more than 60% of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the last few 
decades (Damanpour, et al., 2012). However, with opportunities, risks and challenges 
exist (Sirmon and Lane, 2004; Park and Ungson, 1997); whether during the formation 
or post-formation phases (Damanpour, et al., 2012).  
SAs are a source of expansion for many companies. Nevertheless, they present many 
managerial challenges due to their complicated nature (Tsang, 1998). Despite the 
increasing number of alliances, many are still failing to meet their partners’ expectations 
(Gill and Butler, 2003). High SA failure rates have been deliberated over in the 
literature for over three decades (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Pak, Ra and Park, 2009; Silva, 
et al., 2012), and are still unsolved. This problem is more apparent in international 
alliances due to, for example, lack of trust (Das and Teng, 1998; Ring and Van de Ven, 
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1994), opportunism (Das, 2005), poor organizational integration (Gulati and Singh, 
1998), strategic incompatibility (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998), or cultural distance 
(Brown et al., 1989; Lane and Beamish, 1990).  
International alliances entail different partner objectives, and cultural backgrounds, 
which creates difficulties for firms in achieving the required level of coordination (Das 
and Kumar, 2010). 
The popularity of SAs has encouraged many researchers to investigate the factors that 
lead to their success or failure. A review of the literature has revealed some of these 
factors; SA motives (e.g. Das and Teng, 2000; Kaplan, et al., 2001), environment (e.g. 
Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999), asset specify and perception of opportunistic 
behaviour (e.g. Judge and Dooley, 2006; Parkhe, 1993; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 
1999), partner selection (e.g. Robson, 2002), interdependence between alliance partners 
(e.g. Mohr and Spekman, 1994), trust, commitment and communication between supply 
chain partners (e.g. Das and Teng, 1998; Kwon and Suh, 2005; Mohr and Spekman, 
1994), and culture (e.g. Beugelsdijk, et al., 2006; Sambasivan and Yen, 2010). 
The successes of ISAs have been the centre of much debate in the literature. Some 
academics have argued that one success factor is a firm’s possession of alliance 
capabilities (Adnan and Khanna, 2000). As result of the increasing importance of SAs 
to firms’ strategies, many authors believe that alliances capabilities are now seen as a 
source of competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Ireland, Hitt and 
Vaidyanath, 2002; Schreiner, Kale and Corsten, 2009). This has resulted in a push 
towards more research on the area of alliance capabilities (Schreiner, et al., 2009).  
Despite the wealth of articles addressing the management of ISAs, there are still calls 
for more research. Brouthers (2013) have called for further research to improve our 
understanding of “…what works, where, and why”. The objective is to provide 
“empirically backed recommendations” that will allow managers to effectively manage 
their international business (Brouthers, 2013). It is a call joined by Damanpour, et al. 
(2012); as well as Beamish and Lupton (2009), who affirmed the need to better 
understand the reasons behind alliances’ success and failure. Furthermore, they have 
urged researchers to focus on the issue of post-formation management, and expansion 
from the formation phase. They argue that continuous sharing of resources, capabilities 
and knowledge is important for ISAs to be successful.  
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In the rest of this chapter, we will talk about the research aims, objectives and questions. 
After that, we will explain the structure of thesis, and provide brief descriptions of each 
chapter. 
1.2. Research Aims, Objectives and Questions 
The previous section has summarized some of the gaps in ISAs literature. Saudi firm 
motivations and their partner selection criteria are largely unknown, aside from 
speculations in various articles. Whilst the motivations of firms from developed 
countries have been extensively studied in the literature, the perspectives of firms from 
developing countries have been largely neglected (although there has been a limited 
emergence of articles looking into this area). The findings of these studies cannot be 
generalized, given the different economical and geopolitical reality of these countries. 
The roles of cultural factors have been controversial topic in the literature, with mixed 
results. This study takes a step towards understanding the causality between cultural 
factors and learning and performance in general. It provides some of the information 
needed to understand performance determinants. There is a lack of knowledge regarding 
the state of ISAs in Saudi Arabia in terms of their management, performance, obstacles, 
and success factors. A country with over three thousand ISAs and which is part of the 
G20 are in a serious need for empirical studies. The local context is of extreme 
importance in international business research; MacDuffie (2011) argues that it is best to 
provide country-specific as well as general hypotheses where the data allows for testing 
both types.  
Sekaran (2006) defines a research problem as "any situation where a gap exists between 
the actual and desired state" (p. 112). In this case, there is certainly a gap which needs to 
be filled. Saudi Arabia is not merely an unexplored context; it represents a place and a 
region dominated by strong culture and tribal codes. The data from this study represents 
a valuable addition to the literature in terms of understanding the influence of some 
cultural elements on the performance of ISAs. Furthermore, it will be an opportunity to 
understand how Saudi firms failed over 40 years to reduce their reliance on foreign 
technical competencies; Saudi firms are still heavily dependent on their foreign partners. 
This research aims to identify some of the causes for this apparent failure. Moreover, 
the area represents a unique economic context; that of a wealthy developing economy.  
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There are many possible reasons for the dearth of research into ISA management and 
management in general in Saudi Arabia. There is a lack of research culture and weak 
output from the country’s universities. This has created a poor research foundation and 
lack of data regarding any existing field. Saudi’s position and its aspiration to be a 
developed economy cannot be achieved without a research culture and rigorous analysis 
of existing problems surrounding the country. The study aims to contribute to bridging 
the existing gaps and provide a better understanding of ISA management in Saudi 
Arabia. The primary data will provide a foundation for future research and a stepping-
stone towards enriching international business research in general, and Saudi Arabia in 
particular.  
The thesis has two main aims. The first is to understand Saudi firms’ motivations and 
selection criteria. The second is to understand the factors affecting the management of 
ISAs. The following research questions were the primary guide for this research. The 
study aims were to answer the following questions: 
 Question 1: What are the main motivations for engaging in ISAs in Saudi 
Arabia?  
 Question 2: On what basis do firms select their partners? How far are their 
decisions influenced by their motivations?  
 Question 3: What are the factors affecting learning within ISAs?  
 Question 4: How far do cultural factors affect the performance of ISAs? 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) addresses Questions 1 and 2. The second 
empirical chapter (Chapter 5) addresses Question 2. Finally, the third and fourth 
empirical chapters (Chapters 6 and 7) address Question 4.  
The first empirical chapter complement the existing research on ISA motivation and 
selection criteria. It offers an extension to the existing knowledge by arguing that the 
motivation of Saudi firms will be different from those identified in the literature. The 
first empirical chapter in this thesis contributes to the ISA motivation and selection 
criteria literature by illustrating that the motivation of Saudi Arabian firms is different 
from the motivations of the emerging market firms identified in previous studies. 
Consequently, the chapter investigates the ISA motivation and selection criteria of 
Saudi firms.  
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Many scholars have urged researchers to look into the perspectives of emerging market 
firms, a call that was answered by Dong and Glaister (2006). However, we argue that 
not all emerging markets share the same motives and selection criteria. Despite this, we 
acknowledge that firms from developed economies do share similar motives, but that 
local firms will have different motives, due to the various micro and macro 
“institutional” factors. The results have supported our hypothesis, which adds new 
knowledge to the literature on wealthy developing economies. 
The Saudi pursuit for knowledge and complementary resources, which is considered 
one of their main motivations in establishing an ISA, illustrates that knowledge 
acquisition is an important factor for the success of an ISA. Therefore, in the second 
empirical chapter, we attempt to identify some of the factors affecting knowledge 
acquisition from the Saudi firms’ perspective. Since no previous studies have looked 
into the factors affecting knowledge acquisition in Saudi Arabia, linking some of the 
Saudi specific factors to the rate of knowledge acquisition will provide valuable 
information for researchers and practitioners.  
There are many factors that affect the transfer of knowledge in an ISA. These factors 
include absorptive capacity (Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001; Mowery et al., 1996), 
learning capacity (Simonin, 2004), equity arrangements (Mowery et al., 1996), 
organizational characteristics (Lyles and Salk, 1996; Pak and Park, 2004) and 
knowledge traits, such as ambiguity (Simonin, 2004), tacitness (Dhanaraj et al., 2004), 
and stickiness (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004; Pak et al., 2014). 
This study analysed four factors (tacitness, level of communication, trust, and number 
of expatriates) that could influence knowledge acquisition. These four factors are not all 
inclusive, but they do lay a basic foundation for extensive future studies that focus on 
the factors that influence knowledge acquisition.  
This chapter aims to answer the third research question. Consequently, the factors that 
affect knowledge acquisition from the Saudi partner perspective were identified. The 
results of this chapter are of great importance, as they highlight the part that tacit 
knowledge and communication play in improving knowledge acquisition. Although the 
results from the trust and expatriate numbers were rather surprising, this information 
enabled us to reach important conclusions that are of great importance to practitioners 
and policy-makers to improve the capacity of the country to acquire knowledge.  
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Trust is an important factor in international interorganizational relationships; it is 
influenced by the home country of both partners (Ertug et al., 2013). Previous studies 
have classified trust as a single construct. This study, however, has classified trust into 
three constructs: personal trust, distrust, and competence trust. As such, the role of each 
dimension on the performance of ISAs is tested. In addition, the moderation and 
mediation role of each one of the dimensions is also tested.  
The results offer a significant contribution to the current body of literature in terms of 
furthering our understanding of the role of trust (and other mediators) on ISA 
performance. The analyses included looking into how precisely each construct effects 
performance and how other factors might moderate or mediate the relationship. 
The fourth empirical chapter looks into the role of culture in a country heavily pinned to 
its cultural heritage. More specifically, culture is looked at from a different perspective, 
as cultural distance has, in this context, a positive influence on ISA performance.  
Cultural distance, as a source of ISA success, has recently received some support. Malik 
and Zaho (2013) found that cultural distance in learning alliances (high-technology 
sector) contributes positively to the duration of the alliance. We argue that cultural 
distance has a positive effect on knowledge acquisition. The learning that takes place in 
the ISA enhances the alliance performance (Pak et al., 2014). Hence, we have attempted 
to explain the role of cultural distance, since the literature is full of conflicting results. 
In addition, we illustrated when and where the cultural distance has a positive effect. 
A number of scholars have suggested a causal relationship between cultural 
understanding and ISA performance. However, little or no empirical evidence have 
been provided, especially in the Saudi Arabian (developing countries) context. As such, 
the findings in this study establish the causal relationship between cultural 
understanding and ISA performance. We hope that this information can motivate 
managers to invest more in cultural understanding training.  
1.3. Originality and Contributions of the Thesis 
 
This study is exploratory in nature; the literature described the factors in this thesis as 
key factors in affecting ISA performance. However, as of yet, few studies have offered 
a clear framework for the conditions where these factors have an effect on the ISA in 
terms of performance and knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, no studies have 
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attempted to explore the successful factors of ISAs management in the Saudi Arabian 
context, and the gulf countries, in general. 
The motivation of this study is a need for a better understanding of the management of 
ISAs. The primary focus of the study is the investigation of the motivation of ISAs in 
the Saudi Arabian context. This includes a better understanding of some of the variables 
affecting knowledge acquisition and a better understanding of how soft factors can 
affect ISA performance. There is a lack of research which integrates these factors. 
Hence, this study employs the perceptual measures for these variables, of which there is 
a current gap in the literature. As such, we attempt to fill these gaps by collecting data 
directly from the directors of firms involved in the ISAs. 
This study focuses on several variables, among them, communication has been 
highlighted by researchers as affecting ISA performance. Communication is an integral 
part of culture; the way in which business organisations communicate, both internally 
and externally, is a culturally defined process.  
This research is the first investigative study to explore the role of soft factors on the 
performance of ISAs within the Middle East.  
This study will attempt to contribute to a better understanding of ISAs in Saudi Arabia 
by the introduction of rare data. In this study, we do not claim that one factor alone 
affects the performance of ISAs. Decades of ISA research have proven that a pot of 
factors form a force that affects the performance in a certain direction. As such, in this 
study, we identified these factors, hypothesised their relationship with each other and 
with their performance in the Saudi Arabian context. In a way, we call for looking at 
each context differently and take the institutional factors into account, as the same factor 
could react differently in different contexts.  
The intentions of this study are not to develop a new theoretical perspective of ISA 
management and performance, but rather to work within the context of the existing 
theoretical views. Chapter 4 builds upon existing literature; it examines similar 
hypotheses, but with an extension to a different dataset.  
Drawing on theoretical rationales for ISA, this study engages in empirical research in 
Saudi Arabian firms engaged in ISAs. It attempts to further our understanding of ISAs 
based on the differently characterized developing economy context. This study makes 
the following contributions to the theoretical debate by extending the current knowledge 
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and theories into new and unexplored context. The study offers an integrative 
framework of trust and culture as the antecedent factors in ISAs performance. These 
factors have been previously investigated, however, they need to be viewed and 
conceptualized as an integrative framework, not as a separate phenomena. One of the 
study contributions is to provide structure as to when these factors can affect ISA 
performance.  
Our other literature contribution is providing the empirical results of ISAs in a 
developing economy with unique institutional and economic characteristics. Previous 
research has focused on developed economies; however, the current research primarily 
focused on China and the Far East. It rarely, if ever, looked at the Middle East, and the 
gulf countries, in particular.  
This study provides some empirical findings based on the Saudi Arabian context. The 
empirical findings illustrate that some of the western theories might not be applicable to 
every context. The findings of this study are important in relation to providing useful 
insights into an established and growing ISA in a wealth emerging economy context. 
The focus of the study is on culture, trust, and communications between ISA partners 
and the performance of ISAs. The study builds upon the existing literature by 
examining new data and providing new empirical insights. The data was collected by 
means of an e-mail questionnaire. 
What distinguishes this study from others is that it examines the perspectives of the 
respondent firms on how "soft" variables influence ISA motivation, selection criteria, 
knowledge acquisitions, and performance.  
A major contribution of this study has been the identification of the areas not previously 
explored. There are new variables that have been suggested as affecting ISA 
performance. These are the three trust construct variables: personal trust, distrust, and 
competence trust. 
This study has also contributed to a better understanding of ISA performance by 
focusing on the soft variables suggested in the literature as having an influence on ISA 
performance (e.g. culture, trust, and communication). The literature has looked at these 
variables previously, but has not investigated the relationship between these variables 
and how they react with each other in relation to ISA performance.  
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Trust in alliance has received increasing attention in the literature. However, little 
systematic research has been done in the ISA context. Hence, trust "remains an under-
theorized, under-researched, and therefore, poorly understood phenomenon" (Child, 
2001, p. 274). In this study, we provide a framework of trust dimensions and how these 
dimensions react with other variables and with each other in relation to ISA 
performance. The objective of this study is to further our understanding of ISA trust and 
provide more empirical evidence. 
On a final note, the study substantially contributes information to scholars and 
practitioners interested in an ISA performance antidote in developing economies; this is 
particularly for the case of Saudi Arabia. The difficulty and the lack of the research 
concerning this area means that this data is rare. Despite the data being rare, in this 
study, we achieved the research objectives. 
The thesis faced many obstacles in order to collect the necessary data to conduct this 
study. There were no currently available databases to withdraw data from. Hence, I built 
a database from scratch following the “the literature counting method”. 
By explaining and experiencing the difficulties, this will aid researchers in future 
studies on Saudi Arabia and help them to avoid some of the associated difficulties faced 
by this particular researcher. The suggestion for future studies can be of great help for 
researchers interested in doing their studies in Saudi Arabia in the context of an ISA.  
In the next and last section of this chapter, we explain the structure of the thesis in more 
detail.  We also explain the function of each subsequent chapter.     
1.4. Structure of Thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter starts with background 
information highlighting the research problems and gaps that motivated the study. 
Furthermore, it discusses the aims and objectives of the study and its research questions, 
and demonstrates how the study progresses beyond previous research in various ways. 
The chapter ends by explaining the thesis structure.  
As the main purpose of this research is not to develop new theories, it was thus 
important to conduct an extensive review of ISA literature. Chapter 2 therefore presents 
a comprehensive literature review of ISA research, and an overview of the Saudi 
context. The chapter consists of five sections. The first section starts by defining 
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selected internationalization theories, transaction cost economies, the resource-based 
view, and organizational learning and its applicability in ISAs. The second section 
reviews the role of culture in strategic alliances. The third section discusses learning 
determinants in strategic alliances, and the relationship between learning and ISAs. The 
fourth section is an overview of ISA performance and performance measurement. The 
last section provides the background to the Saudi demographic, economic, political, and 
social culture, which can affect the success of ISAs.  
Chapter 3 discusses research methodology and the methods employed. The chapter 
explains in detail the research design, research strategies, sampling procedures, data 
collection, and data analysis. It makes a detailed consideration of the use of surveys and 
the rationale for using the survey method in this study. These are discussed with a focus 
on the issue of data quality, reliability, and validity.  
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 are the core of the thesis, and contain the empirical findings of 
the study. Inevitably, they are long and detailed, and each chapter provides a 
combination of theoretical review and methodological evaluations of the ISA concept, 
followed by hypotheses development. The second part of each of the two chapters 
begins by explaining the variables, instruments, and statistical analysis employed. 
Finally, the empirical results are presented, and are followed by an evaluation of the 
study’s results in relation to the research problem and objectives. The study’s 
limitations and implications are considered, and recommendations are made for future 
studies.    
Chapter 4 investigates partner selection criteria in ISA formation. The study 
differentiates between task-related and partner-related selection criteria. The findings 
from this study give a rare insight to the thinking, motivation, and partner selection 
criteria of Saudi firms. This chapter answers the first and second research questions of 
this study: (1) What are the main motivations for engaging in ISAs in Saudi Arabia? (2) 
On what basis do firms select their partners? How far are their decisions influenced by 
their motivations?  
Chapter 5 examines the effect of several factors on knowledge acquisition. It first 
considers the role of knowledge tacitness, numbers of expatriate, levels of 
communication, and personal trust on knowledge acquisitions. This chapter primarily 
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answer the third research question: (3) What are the factors affecting learning within 
ISAs?  
Chapter 6 examines the effects of three trust dimensions (personal trust, distrust, and 
competence trust) on performance. The study has responded to calls from researchers 
for an in-depth study on trust. By breaking the concept of trust into different dimensions 
and testing them, the study has made a valuable contribution to the existing literature. 
This chapter partially answers the fourth research question: (4) How far do cultural 
factors affect the performance of ISAs? 
Chapter 7 investigates the effects of culture on ISA performance. It tests the influence 
of factors like cultural understanding and communication on ISA performance. This 
chapter, along with Chapter 6, contributes to answering the fourth research question (4) 
How far do cultural factors affect the performance of ISAs? 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It begins by summarizing the study’s findings and 
contributions, and reflects on the study’s contribution to ISA research and practice. 
The following chapter provides a review of the primary theoretical perspective on ISA 
formation transaction cost economies, the resource-based view, and organizational 
learning. Then, it reviews the role of culture in strategic alliances, and discusses the 
learning determinants in strategic alliances, as well as the relationship between learning 
and ISAs. This is followed by a discussion on ISA performance and performance 
measurements. The chapter concludes by providing a detailed review of the study 
context. The review is both general and theoretical in nature; note that other key areas of 
the literature are reviewed more thoroughly in Chapters 4 to 7.  
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Chapter Two: Literature review 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section 2.1 looks into the theoretical 
perspectives on ISAs (ISAs) formation. The second section 2.2 reviews the literature 
and the theories on culture and cultural differences in ISAs. The third section 2.3 will 
review some classic literature on organisational learning. Furthermore, it explains some 
organisational learning concepts like absorptive capacity, explicit and tacit knowledge. 
The fourth section 2.4 is a review of some of the classic literature on measures of 
performance in ISAs. Classic measurement such as objective or subjective measures of 
performance is examined in detail. The last section 2.5 is background information about 
this study context Saudi Arabia. It includes details information about its’ economy, 
business environment, institution, and culture.  
 
2.2. Theories of Strategic Alliances Formation 
2.2.1. Introduction 
ISAs have gained increasing popularity across all sectors, especially in ‘knowledge 
intensive’ industries, in recent years (Chen and Chen, 2003). Firms have found that SAs 
could provide them with the “flexible and less binding relationships” that are needed in 
an uncertain environment. At the same time, it will allow them to respond to 
competitive changes and pursue new technological development, products, and markets 
to create desired synergy by combining resources and spread out fixed cost (Young and 
Wierseman, 1999; Ohmae, 1989; Chen and Chen, 2003).  
Previously firms engaged in SAs only to access new markets, especially in countries 
where they have strict laws against foreign investment. At present with the changes in 
market conditions, it can be noticed that firms seek to form alliances, even with their 
direct rivals (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). The major American firms, including IBM, 
GM, General Electric, have set up many agreements with their international and local 
rivals (Hennart, 1988). 
External diversification (through acquisitions and SAs) is an important tool for 
managers to add up to their existing know-how and knowledge, widening their economy 
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of scale, growth, and spreading risk. It helps them to achieve their desires to ''bridge'' the 
distance between their current knowledge and the one they aspire (Pennings, et al., 
1994; Parkhe, 1991; Hamel, 1991). Furthermore, collaboration between firms provides 
an opportunity for organizations to improve their position through internalizing the 
skills of the other partner (Hamel, 1991). 
This section will discuss the theories of ISAs formation. It will start by discussing 
transaction cost theory; secondly, it will discuss the resources based view; lastly, we 
will discuss the organizational learning theory, before we conclude the section.   
 
2.2.2. Transaction Cost Theory 
In transaction cost theory (TCT), the economic transaction is the focus of the analysis. 
Glaister (1996) described a transaction as an exchange of goods and services between 
two parties. Oxley (1997) claimed that the transaction analysis is "aligned with 
governance structures".  
Williamson (1975, 1985), who first proposed the theory to explain transaction costs, 
divided transaction costs to ex ante and ex post costs. Ex ante refer to “the costs of 
drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement” (1985: p. 20). While ex post costs 
include “(1) the maladaptation costs incurred when transaction drifts out of alignment; 
(2) the haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post 
misalignments; (3) the setup and running costs associated with the governance 
structures (often not the courts) to which disputes are referred; and (4) the bonding costs 
of effecting secure commitments” (Williamson, 1985: p. 21).  
They key question in the TCT is, what is economically more valuable to undertake 
market or hierarchy (internally within the firm)! The answer depends on the cost of the 
transaction; if the cost of the transaction via the market is higher, then it is more 
economically valuable for the firms to 'internalize' the transaction within the firm 
(Glaister, 1996). 
There are factors that lead to market failure and force firms to resort to more 
hierarchical mode of organizations. These include institutional factors, like economic 
uncertainties, and human factors like bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 
1975; Glaister, 1996). 
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2.2.2.1. Transaction Cost Rationale for Strategic Alliances  
The basic concept of TCT of SAs is to minimize the transaction cost and production 
cost under certain circumstances by regarding the SAs as a kind of organization form 
(Chen and Chen, 2003; Das and Teng, 2000; Hennart, 1988). The TCT has been used to 
determine the best cross border entry mode strategy based on economical reasoning 
(Williamson, 1985). The firms usually have a choice between wholly owned 
subsidiaries (hierarchy), joint ventures (hybrid mode), and licensing (market 
transaction) (Glaister and Buckley, 1996).  
The presence of inefficiencies in the intermediate markets encourages the formation of 
JVs, because they can be used as a device to bypass market inefficiencies (Glaister, 
1996). Furthermore, the TCT emphasises on the use of alliance as a means to reduce 
costs, especially transaction costs related to technology transfer, and the costs of 
extending vertical links (Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Hennart, 1988; Glaister, 1996). It 
tends to focus on explaining the structures of organization, and how it can be structured 
more efficiently in governing the economic activities of the organization, whether 
through contractual or equity share agreements (Chen and Chen, 2003).  
The favourite form of governance according to TCT perspective is the form that enables 
the firm to save more, whether that is an acquisition, JV, greenfield, or any other form 
of alliances (Chen and Chen, 2003).       
The choice between JVs, acquisition or wholly owned subsidiary (WOS), is down what 
is economically more valuable. WOS were thought to be superior to JVs because it 
allows the firm to maximize the returns, without the need to share it. However, Hennart 
(1988) argues that setting up a WOS to replicate a particular asset is more expensive 
than sharing use of the asset at low or zero marginal costs. Beamish and Banks (1987) 
argued that despite transaction costs associated with enforcing agreement, well-executed 
JVs can provide a better solution. JVs when established in 'a spirit of mutual trust and 
commitment', can easily overcome the conditions causing market failure (Glaister, 
1996). The other option is a full take-over. However, this option is less efficient in 
comparison with SAs, especially when the wanted assets cannot be separated from the 
unwanted ones. This will force the acquirer to enter unwanted fields, and cause 
managerial problems as a result of the sudden expansion (Glaister, 1996).  
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Hennart (1988: p. 34) argues that there are four cases when forming JVs is better. The 
first case in which JV represents superior solution is when the required products or 
knowledge is easier to acquire from the JV comparing to the market. The second 
situation is when firms enter a new market. Firms entering a market for the first time 
lack local market knowledge, which increases the transaction cost. Thirdly, when the 
local firms control resources, especially natural resource, JVs represent an optimal 
solution. Lastly, particular resources, e.g. know-how, infer high transaction cost. In this 
case, by combining firms’ complementary resources, JVs can help firms overcome the 
uncertainties surrendering these resources. 
 
2.2.2.2. Behaviour Uncertainty 
There are some risks when two companies engage in an alliance involving particular 
assets, especially for the firm who contributes such an asset. The risk spur from partner 
firm acting in an opportunistically and seeking its own interests (Chen and Chen, 2003). 
According to TCT, it is assumed that SAs partners will behave in an opportunistic way 
(Young and Wiersema, 1999).   
The need for a SA increases when relying on independent suppliers involves excessive 
transaction cost (Hennart, 1988). Therefore, firms engage in a contractual relation, in 
the form of a SA, to protect itself from the supplier’s price control. SAs limit the 
opportunistic behaviour of the other partner, because it aligns the incentives of both 
parties (Hennart, 1988).    
Furthermore, there are risks associated with inter-firm alliances that involve technology 
transfer. It is obvious when the nature of technology and related knowledge ‘know-how’ 
is difficult to be specified in contracts. Thus, making the prescribed activities difficult to 
monitor; hence increasing the chances of one partners acting opportunistically. These 
hazards are magnified due to ‘tacit knowledge’ weak property rights. Thus, firms have 
developed a strategy in forming SA to govern the cooperative efforts in creating or 
exploiting technologies (Oxley, 1997). This explains why SAs, rather than technology 
transfer through licensing, are the favourite mode of transaction when transaction costs 
are high.  
Additionally, according to the TCT, one of the motives to form SAs is to create 
“hostages”. Hostages, according to the TCT, are types of safeguards to curb the 
opportunistic behaviour of partners (Young and Wiersema, 1999). Creating a hostage 
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mode will facilitate “ex ante screening of targets and ex post enforcement of contracts” 
(Chen and Hennart, 2004). 
Organizations that form several SAs with partners create what is called “mutual 
hostages” arrangements. This means that the failure of one alliance may threaten the 
strength of the others; therefore, this arrangement will strengthen and protect the 
stability of the focal SAs (Young and Wiersema, 1999). 
 
2.2.2.3. Technological Uncertainty Efficiency of Acquiring ‘Tacit’ Knowledge 
There are two types of functional alliances: technological and marketing alliances. The 
technological alliances involve cooperation in upstream value chain activities, for 
example R&D, engineering and manufacturing. It, also, involves production and 
knowledge sharing (Das, Sen and Sengupta, 1998).     
The technological uncertainty has risen due to the pace of innovation in technology. A 
new technology can challenge any technological development project taken by an 
organization. As a result, the firms have taken measures before engaging in any 
technology dependent projects that carry high uncertainty. These projects raise the 
transaction costs. Thus, alliances tend to be chosen as more hierarchical form of 
governances (Chen and Chen, 2003).  
Some type of knowledge cannot be written down and difficult to codify. These types of 
knowledge is firm specific asset (i.e. those cannot be acquired separately), like 
marketing or production know-how (Hennart, 1988); hence, it cannot be patented. This 
kind of knowledge is called 'tacit knowledge', it represented by the firm's experience in 
manufacturing and marketing products, the knowledge of local customers, markets, and 
policies. This kind of knowledge cannot be embodied in designs, specifications, and 
drawings. Instead, it is embodied in the individual and can only be exchanged through 
"intimate human contact" (Glaister, 1996). Therefore, the exchange of patents in this 
type of knowledge will not yield any results, unless it's accompanied by personnel 
transfer (Hennart, 1988; Glaister, 1996).       
The cost of transferring know-how and tacit knowledge is high, and when it comes to 
tacit knowledge it is almost impossible for both parties to know or assess the value of 
knowledge transfer. The buyers do not know what they are buying, and the sellers do 
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not know how much it will cost them to affect the transfer. Many human and technical 
problems will arise after the contract is signed.  
The sellers after being paid have a little incentive to provide continuous support, and the 
buyers may misrepresent its needs or capacity to absorb the knowledge.  
Therefore, common ownership, such as SAs as a form of hierarchical coordination will 
be the best choice to effectively, and efficiently transfer the knowledge (Glaister, 1996, 
Hennart, 1988). It provides parties with fewer incentives to cheat. Both parties are now 
rewarded by their obedience to managerial directives, not by amount of information 
transferred (Glaister, 1996).  
There is an extra motive for technology dependent start-ups and young firms to form 
SAs. Since, they have no track records, it is difficult and costly to get the fund needed 
for their risky ventures, for example, R&Ds (Hennart, 1988). Small R&D dependent 
firms engage in SAs with a larger firm to finance projects they cannot fund internally or 
through capital market (Hennart, 1988). Thus, SA is more efficient and less costly 
methods for funding their risky projects. 
 
2.2.2.4. Complementary Resources Reduce Costs 
Combining resources and the possibility to realize synergy by pooling their 
complementary resources have been considered as a driver for the formation of many 
SAs (Das, et al., 1998; Chen and Chen, 2003). When the resources of both partners 
complement each other, it reduces the risk of exploitation. Their interdependency to 
each other resources will make their partnership work better and reduce the rivalry risk. 
Therefore, the partnership can work with a minimum level of control and costs (Chen 
and Chen, 2003).    
In order for a producer to lower their transaction cost when entering a new market, they 
tend to enter an agreement with a local distributor. They have the physical capital and 
local market knowledge, which will lower the cost of setting up distribution channels 
from the scratch (Hennart, 1988). 
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2.2.3. A Resource Based View of Strategic Alliances 
The resources of a firm play a significant role in laying down the foundation of the 
firm’s strategy (Glaister, 1996). The resources and capabilities of the firm, as the 
primary source of profit, are the firm's strength. They use them to implement strategies 
that improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). There are 
direct links between resources and profitability, which increases the importance of 
strategically managing these resources (Grant, 1991). This happens through 
economizing the use of resources by maximizing its productivity, especially tangible 
resources; or/and employing existing assets in more profitable use, which will generate 
substantial returns (Grant, 1991). 
Firms’ resources consist of its all asset of physical, human, and organizational capital 
resources, which include, for example, knowledge, organizational structure, experience, 
connections, copy rights, culture …etc. (Barney, 1991; Tsang, 1998). 
Creating capabilities requires coordination between people and people and other 
resources; the mere assembly of a set of resources will not create a capability (Glaister, 
1996; Grant, 1991). 
Resource based view (RBV) aims to analyse and explain the reasons behind SAs 
formation (Lubatkin, 1983). According to the theory, firms engage in SAs to find 
valuable resources they lack, and gain or preserve control over certain resources (Chen 
and Chen, 2003). It argues that the motives for forming alliances are to create value by 
pooling the resources of the firms (Chen and Chen, 2003). 
 
2.2.3.1. Resource Based Rational of Strategic Alliances 
Das, et al. (1998) suggested that firms forming alliances to access innovative 
technology usually have limited options. Thus, they are more dependent on the 
alliances. Some scholars Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996), and Das and Teng (2000) 
have found that these form of alliances are likely to occur when both partners in need 
for resources “vulnerable strategic position”. Or else, when they are in socially strong 
position, and possess valuable resources and intent to share and utilize it. Scholars have 
recognized that no firm can create all resources needed in order to grow and prosper. It 
has become more important for the firms to collaborate with other firms that hold 
complementary resources in order to develop, and even survive. Combining resources is 
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a valuable tool for organizations to exploit new business opportunities (Dussauge, 
Garrette and Mitchell, 2000).   
Economic reasons are not the only rational for SAs. Other rationale is to create value 
from pooling the resources together to have access to valuable resources that cannot or 
expensive to be obtained through market exchange (Das and Teng, 2000). 
The characteristics of the resources, such as imperfect mobility, limitability, and 
substitutability, play a vital role in alliance formation (Das and Teng, 2000). According 
to the organizational learning, JVs are a vehicle for firms to “learn or seek to retain their 
capabilities”. Knowledge cannot be diffused easily across firms. It is more costly to 
acquire it through licensing and it is not always successful. This is because ‘tacit 
knowledge’ is an organization embodied. Thus, SAs in the form of EJVs are the best 
way to transfer this kind of resources (Kogut, 1988). 
 
2.2.3.2. Creating Synergy  
The resources based view emphases on the process of maximizing the value of the firm 
through pooling and utilizing valuable resources. A firm in possession of valuable 
resources, not possessed by competitors, will have a competitive advantage if they 
engage in value creation strategy (Das and Teng, 2000). 
Firms engage in SAs to have an opportunity to combine their resources. The combined 
resources have the potential to create synergy and create valuable, unique, and difficult 
to imitate resources. These resources will improve the firm performance and create 
competitive advantage. Moreover, it will provide opportunities for the firm to enhance 
their learning experience and develop new capabilities, which will help the firm to 
sustain its competitive advantage for a longer period (Harrison, et al., 2001).   
 
2.2.3.3. Sustain Competitive Advantage and Developing Resource Base 
The essence of strategy formation, according to resource-based view, is to set strategies 
that efficiently use the firm's resources and capabilities. Moreover, for the firm to 
sustain its competitive advantage and remain competitive, it should focus its strategy on 
developing the firm's resource base, not only on utilizing the existing resources 
(Glaister, 1996).   
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According to the resource-based view of organizational strategy; strategies primary task 
is not restricted to maximize rents using existing resources. But, also, developing the 
firm resource by “filling the gaps” and upgrading its capabilities to sustain the firm’s 
competitive advantages. Such ‘upgrading’ requires a clear strategic direction on how to 
develop the capabilities that form the base of the firm’s competitive advantages. 
It might be necessary for the firms to acquire external complementary resources to 
improve its competitive advantage for the future (Grant, 1991).     
RBV view of sustained competitive advantage explains that firms cannot obtain the 
necessary resources from open markets; but rather from a firm that already controls it. 
The reason is these resources are ''rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable'' 
(Glaister and Buckley, 1996).  
Barney (1991) argues that RBV is based on two different assumptions: resources 
heterogeneity and immobility. They are both related to the concept of sustained 
competitive advantage. According to Barney (1991: p. 206), “A firm is said to have a 
sustained competitive advantage when it is implementing a value creating strategy not 
simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors and when 
there other firms are unable to duplicate the benefit of this strategy”.   
The returns from the firm’s resources and capabilities depend on its ability to sustain its 
competitive advantage (Grant, 1991). A firm's strategy can create competitive 
advantage if current or potential competitors do not implement the same. These 
competitive advantages can be sustained only if a competitor cannot replicate them 
(Barney, 1991). ''Firms sustain competitive advantage by constantly improving and 
upgrading the source of advantage'' (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). This is linked to the 
heterogeneity and immobility of the resources. 
Many companies may possess valuable resources; though, valuable resources alone 
cannot be sources of competitive advantage. Valuable resources along with other 
attributes, like rarity, inimitability, and non-substitutability can then be qualified as a 
source of competitive advantage or sustain competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Grant, 
1991; Glaister and Buckley, 1996). SAs are formed to create new capabilities. The 
existing resources of the two firms separately could be insufficient to produce the 
needed new capabilities. Therefore, firms combine their resources and, through the 
synergistic process, they develop the required capabilities (Glaister and Buckley, 1996).   
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2.2.3.4. Expansion and Diversification of Resource Usage and Creating Rent  
The companies undertake greater risk if they try by themselves to diversify into another 
business. They will face greater difficulty, which includes set up cost, lack of 
managerial experiences, and many technical problems. Therefore, forming strategic 
alliances with more experience firms in other industries is much easier and safer. Firms' 
combined resources are more likely to create synergy compared if going solo. The same 
logic applies if the company wants to expand internationally in the same industry for 
bigger market share. It is faster and safer to utilize the existing resources internationally 
through SAs. In both cases if the firm decided to rely on itself, it will lose the efficiency 
required to utilize fully the potential of its ‘unique’ resources (Tsang, 1998; Markides 
and Williamson, 1996; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992).  
In finance, it is suggested that risks can be minimized by diversifying the assets 
portfolio. This is common in businesses that require constant innovation, like 
pharmaceutical and technology dependent industries, who aim to diversify their 
resource usage. The rising cost of R&D and the speed of technology development have 
encouraged firms to spread their fixed cost over bigger market base (Ohmae, 1989). For 
example, the cost of R&D for pharmaceutical companies is high, and there is no 
guarantee that the outcome product can be commercially viable or that they are the first 
to introduce it. Therefore, many companies tend to have SAs with other companies to 
spread the cost and risk. In addition, it is notable that the same trend has taken place in 
technology dependent industries. A company like IBM has struck many partnership 
deals with many companies, including direct competitors (Tsang, 1998).  
Rents can be defined as ‘the generation of above-normal rates of return’ (Mahoney and 
Pandian, 1992). Maximizing rents is one of the main targets of RBV to strategy 
formation (Grant, 1991). It is well known that firms try to increase their long-term 
profits, and try to react to every opportunity present. Therefore, firms try to put their 
idle resources into use; especially scarce resources, for instance, new technology, lands, 
locational advantages, patents and copyrights (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Lubatkin, 
1983). More so when supply cannot meet the demand. Some resources have the ability 
to provide at least one productive service simultaneously, and due to the constant 
changes in technology, it is very important for the firms to squeeze as much benefit as 
possible within a short time. Therefore, firms always try to expand the usage of these 
resources and generate rents (Tsang, 1998).  
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Rents can be generated from the ability of an individual resource or a combination of 
resource that together create a scarce resource; even if individually are not scarce 
resources (Tsang, 1998). 
 
2.2.4. Organizational Learning 
The intensive global competition has increased the importance of timely acquisitions of 
crucial skills. Collaboration between firms provides an opportunity for organizations to 
improve their strategic positions through internalizing the skills of the other partner 
(Hamel, 1991). In the last few decades, inter-organizational learning among other 
motives has become an important motive for creating ISAs. In ISA the two firms 
forming the alliance seeks to learn from each other, as learning becomes essential for 
surviving (Lane, et al., 2001). Firms engage in these alliances to create economic value 
and acquire knowledge via socializing, internalization, or combining different kinds of 
explicit and tacit knowledge to create new knowledge to enhance their competencies 
(Kumar and Nti, 1998; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Lyles and Salk, 1996).  
Scholars have defined organizational learning as the successful restructuring ‘by 
individuals’ of organizational problems and understanding of growing insights. This 
coupled with the aim to improve actions through better knowledge and understanding 
(Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Parkhe, 1991). Hayward (2002) 
defines organizational learning as a process in which firm engage in action, draws some 
conclusion, and finally uses these insights to guide future experience.  
Knowledge is associated with human action. Individuals create knowledge, while 
organizations build the platform for individuals to create knowledge (Lyles and Salk, 
1996). However, it should be noted that organizational learning is not primarily the 
cumulative result of individual learning. Organizations learn from history that defines 
their routine, and includes culture, rules, procedures, norms, strategies, and conventions. 
It also includes frameworks, paradigms, codes, and beliefs. Routines are transmitted 
through different means, including SAs, M&A, socializations, and imitations (Levitt 
and March, 1998; Fiol and Lyles, 1985). 
Organizations have adopted different methods to gain and increase their knowledge, 
such as learning from experience, learning by observing other companies, and grafting 
(Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1998). Grafting can be done in small scale by 
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acquiring individuals, or large scale by acquiring a whole company. A clear example is 
when General Motors acquired Ross Perot’s corporation, EDS. The motive behind the 
acquisitions was to attain EDC expertise in information systems (Huber, 1991). 
The next sections will focus on how learning, from the perspective of organizational 
learning theory, can shape up firms’ expansion strategies. 
 
2.2.4.1. Organizational Learning and Expansion Strategies 
The firms in standard microeconomic theory are characterized by a ''production function 
or production set''. These functions are considered implicit because the knowledge can 
be articulated and written in a symbolic form ''book blueprints''; and therefore they can 
be replicated or eliminated with more ease (Glaister and Buckley, 1996).     
On the other hand, some of the intangible resources of an organization, such as style, 
values, traditions, and leadership, are in whole part of organizational routines. This 
‘tacit’ knowledge makes the firm’s capabilities difficult to articulate (Grant, 1991). 
Many authors and scholars have considered organizational theory as a primary motive 
for the formation of SAs (Kogut, 1988; Hamel, 1991; Glaister and Buckley, 1996).  
Considering the market failure when it comes to knowledge transfer because of the 
difficulty and ambiguity of knowledge transaction, SAs are considered as an excellent 
tool to acquire 'tacit' knowledge (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). 
Individual knowledge (in form of know-how and skills) are tacit knowledge, and cannot 
be articulated. Kogut (1988) argues that among the methods of transferring tacit 
knowledge, such as licensing, JVs are the best; the reason in not due market failure or 
high transaction cost, as transaction cost theory explains, but because simply the target 
knowledge are organizational embodied. Therefore, it is the best way, or it could be the 
only way to transfer 'tacit' knowledge perfectly (Glaister and Buckley, 1996) 
Kogut (1988) argues that firms may opt to form JVs even if the cost of supply 
agreement is less; the reason according to Kogut is that the firm wants to learn from the 
partner superior production technique and exploit the capability in the future.  
According to organizational learning, firms engage in SAs if both firms have the desire 
to learn from each other know-how. Alternatively, a firm seek to benefit from the other 
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firm's knowledge and cost advantage, while maintaining the firm capabilities (Glaister 
and Buckley, 1996). 
Some scholars argued that organizational learning could have a direct effect on a firm’s 
decision to transfer technology abroad; as after the firm learns about a certain 
technology, it is most likely that the firm will leverage that knowledge across border 
(Martin and Salomon, 2003). International growth requires replication of the firm’s 
exciting knowledge in different locations and, at the same time, creating and 
accumulating knowledge (Martin and Salomon, 2003). 
Diversification is an important tool for the managers to add up to their exciting know-
how and knowledge, widening their economy of scale, growth, and spreading risk. It 
helps them to achieve their desires to ''bridge'' the distance between their current 
knowledge and the one they aspire (Pennings, et al., 1994; Huber, 1991).  
 
2.2.4.2. Enhancing Future Performance 
The organizational learning theory claims that previous experience plays a vital role in 
the success of a relationship; especially if it is combined with high levels of training 
provided by the current parent. Prior experience helps the firms to gain the skills needed 
to engage successfully in a relationship (Hayward, 2002; Lane, et al., 2001). One of the 
success factors according to Pennings, et al., (1994) and Makhija and Ganesh (1997) is 
firms' diversification experience; the greater the experience, the greater the chances that 
the expansion will succeed. 
The ISAs can help create the desired inter-firm diversity, which is needed for future 
strategic alliances. Each partner will try to “learn through the alliance”, and access the 
skills and technology they lacked at the beginning of the alliances (Parkhe, 1991). 
Although, learning from previous experience is not associated just with ‘quantity’, 
rather with the quality of the experience (Hayward, 2002). 
 
2.2.5. Conclusion 
Firm resources play a vital role in forming SAs. However, despite the ‘obvious’ 
importance of resources, the conventional theories on SAs have a different view. Those 
theories have focused on the organization structural elements, such as “market 
imperfection” or “control mechanism” which are both connected to transaction cost 
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theory. The market imperfection stresses that it is not efficient to obtain the desired 
resource from the market, in comparison to other form of resource sharing schemes, 
while “control mechanism” shows the best way to allocate and own resource is within 
the firm (Chen and Chen, 2003). 
In general, there are four main objectives for establishing SAs, which are; first, 
achieving economy of scale and diversifying risks. Second, overcoming new markets 
entry barriers. Third, using the alliance as device to pool or exchange complementary 
resources. Finally, avoiding the nationalistic reaction that sometimes triggered when a 
multinational firm enters a developing country’s local market (Hennart, 1988). 
There are some differences between the resource-based view and transaction cost 
theory. The main assumption of the ‘resource based’ theory is that the firm can 
maximize its long-term profit through using and better utilizing its resources (Tsang, 
1998). In contrast, transaction theory focuses on trying to reduce the production and 
transactions costs (Tsang, 1998). However, it can be noted from the prior literature that 
the discussed theories have some overlapping reasons explaining the firms’ motives for 
engaging in strategic alliances. Besides the motive for acquiring knowledge and 
learning, other motive is improving the organizational performance in general (Lyles 
and Salk, 1996).   
The corner stone of resource-based view to strategy formulation is to understand the 
relationship between resources, capabilities, competitive advantage, and profitability. 
Also, understanding the mechanism of which competitive advantage can be sustained 
through exploiting the existing resources (Grant, 1991). 
 
2.3. Culture in Strategic Alliance Context 
2.3.1. Introduction 
This section will first explicate the meaning of culture, and cultural differences at 
national, organizational, and occupational level. The second part will talk about the 
effect of cultural differences on ISAs. The final part will focus on the issue of managing 
cultural differences in ISAs. 
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2.3.2. Culture 
Culture affects all aspects of life; it influences how people and group interact with each 
other (Very, et al., 1998). The way people greet, eat, feel, etc... . Culture is learned from 
one's social environment. People from different cultures have different symbols, heroes, 
rituals, and values form each other; and each of them carries a different meaning from 
one culture to another (Hofstede, 1991). These differences have resulted in the failure of 
many relationships (business, or any), because partners have failed to interrupt or 
understand each other thinking (Hofstede, 1991).  
Hofstede (1984) defined culture as “collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one human group from another”. Culture includes 
knowledge, belief, art, moral, law, custom, and habits of a particular group (Buno, 
Bowditch and Lewis, 1985). 
Culture is the personality of a community or a group. When we talk about culture, we 
usually refer to societies or “nations”, ethnic or regional group. However, the same is 
applied to other collective groups, like organizations, or even family (Hofstede, 1984).   
Cultural differences vary in distance between each other; some cultures are more distant 
than others (Barkema, et al., 1996). Cultural differences are not just between nations, 
but also among groups within nations (Hofstede, 1991). 
It is a complicated task to work around partners’ differences; various collaborations 
have failed because partners have found it difficult to work together (Sirmon and Lane, 
2004).  
The rest of this chapter will discuss in details the different cultures (national, 
organizational, and occupational) and its effect on organizations.  
 
2.3.2.1. National Culture 
There is no agreed upon definition of national culture. Porter and Samovar (1994: p. 11) 
described national culture as “…ubiquitous, multidimensional, complex, and all 
pervasive”.  
Das and Kumar (2010) argued that culture conceptually consist of two dimensions: 
cognitive and behavioural. The first dimension focuses on “…the meaning that the 
different situations hold for actors”, while the later focuses more on “interactional 
patterns extant in a particular culture” (Das, and Kumar, 2010: p. 24). They argued that 
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all culture definitions contain an element of these two dimensions, although they might 
contain different aspects of culture. National culture is the set of shared norms, values, 
beliefs, and priorities in the nation or country. It is guidelines for the individuals of a 
society, not necessary strictly followed by everyone, on how things should be done, and 
what is and not acceptable (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).  
It is acquired early in life through socializing with family and friends, and schools 
(Sirmon and Lane, 2004). It is very powerful, and has an impact on people perception, 
values and believes. 
National culture forms the employee understanding of the work, their approach to it, 
expectations, and preferences (Newman and Nollen, 1996). Some studies have found 
out that that there are noticeable differences in the behaviour of employees from 
different cultures working for the same multinational company (Alder, 1983; Hofstede, 
1980). In fact, differences in national culture are the reason behind 50% of the 
differences in values, and beliefs among managers, despite working in multinational 
companies (Hofstede, 1991). Laurent (1993) has argued that every manager has his own 
management theory that guides his behaviour in the organization. These theories have 
been affected by their national culture, which determined their ideology. Studies show 
that national culture affects the behaviour of the managers and the JVs performance 
(Park and Ungson, 1997). Moreover, there are indications that differences in national 
culture will lead to differences in the organizational culture (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). 
Hofstede (1984) argues that national cultures differ on five main dimensions; Power 
distance, Uncertainty avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity, and long-term orientation.   
Power distance is how different societies behave and find solutions for inequalities. The 
level of the distance in power between boss and subordinate will vary between 
organizations depending on their national culture (Hofstede, 1984).  
The second dimension of national culture is uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty about 
the future varies between different nations. Every culture copes with uncertainty 
through the use of technology, law, and religion (Hofstede, 1984). 
The third of national culture dimensions is individualism. The level of individualism/ 
collectivism in a society will have an effect on the organization and on the way its 
member act and work with each other (Very, et al., 1998; Hofstede, 1984). 
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Schwartz and Rubel (2005) argue that there are gender differences in value priorities, 
and these differences vary cross cultures. Men tend to emphasis on self-enhancement 
values and achievement. While women, on the other hand, focus more in 
‘transcendence’ values. Furthermore, there are differences between males and females 
work goals (Hofstede, 1984).   
Hofstede's fifth dimension is long-term orientation or (Confucian dynamism); it 
measures the “extent to which people have future oriented perspective rather than 
focusing on the present” (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). 
 
2.3.2.2. Organizational culture  
Every successful organization has some uniqueness in their strategy. It includes 
organization structure, management systems, and its employee; this is known as “style” 
or “culture”. Every firm has, especially the well run, different culture of business 
management, which involves different ways of making decisions, relation with 
superiors, and hiring processes (Schwartz and Davis, 1981; Nahavandi and Malezadeh, 
1988). Organizational culture has been cited as the reasons for the success of many 
companies, and as the glue that holds the organization together (Nahavandi and 
Malezadeh, 1988; Schweiger and Goulet, 2005). 
Schweiger, et al., (1987) described the organizational culture as “The unwritten rules 
are combined with the written to generate a culture in the eyes of the employee”. It is a 
shared belief and values of the senior managers regarding the business approach and 
management practice (Weber, Shenkar and Raveh, 1996), and the beliefs and 
expectations shared by the organization’s members. It is known to be very difficult to 
change (Schwartz and Davis, 1981). 
Organization has both subjective and objective cultures. Subjective culture is the 
organization members' shared beliefs, and expectations. It includes the “managerial 
culture”, which refers to the leadership style, decision making, and problem solving 
process (Buno, et al., 1985). 
Objective organizational culture refers to the materialistic assets and artefacts; e.g. 
equipment, and facilities (e.g. restroom areas, coffee room) (Buno, et al., 1985). 
However, subjective culture is ‘unique’ because every organization culture is being 
shaped by the shared history and experience of its employee; while objective 
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organizational culture can be similar across organizations (Buno, et al., 1985; Schweiger 
and Goulet, 2005). 
The members of an organization do not sometimes recognize the power and the 
influence of their organizational culture have on them. The reason is that the firm's 
culture is ‘embodied’ in their culture. However, when two distant cultures are forced to 
combine during a JV, or M&A, the organizational culture differences can be clearly 
seen (Buno, et al., 1985). 
Although national culture influences organizational culture, not all the organization 
within certain societies shares the same culture. Even within the organization, there are 
many subcultures, across different occupations and personalities (Very, et al., 1998; 
Nahavandi and Malezadeh, 1988). 
Changing organization culture can take place by changing “staff, reward systems, 
mission, strategies, and products” (Schweiger, et al., 1987). Organizations have 
different approaches to human resource management in term of “job grading, training, 
performance appraisal, and career development” (Mirvis and Marks, 1992). 
It is been argued that organizational culture and national culture are different with 
separate constructs in attitudes and behaviour. National culture represents ‘deeper layer 
of consciousness” and is harder to change comparing to organizational culture. In 
addition, it creates greater difficulty to integrate different organizations successfully 
(Stahl and Voigt, 2008). 
 
2.3.2.3. Occupational Culture 
Occupational culture exists when “group of people who are employed in a functionally 
similar occupation share a set of norms, values and beliefs related to the occupation” 
(Sirmon and Lane, 2004: p. 311). It develops through socialization between the 
individuals during their occupational training and education. This, with experience, 
develops to convention on how their profession should be carried (Sirmon and Lane, 
2004). 
Some scholars Trice and Beyer (1993: p. 178) cited in (Sirmon and Lane, 2004), have 
argued that professional culture is the most highly organized subculture in organization. 
The source of professional culture usually starts form the education and training system. 
The culture is developed away from the organizations and the members can develop it 
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before joining any organization. Thus, it dismisses the claim that occupational culture is 
a subculture of the organizational culture (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).  
Professional or occupational culture is considered as another type of culture that can 
affect ISA; however, it received less attention from scholars in comparison with 
organizational culture (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).  
Some studies have suggested that, in the long run, it might be easier to accommodate 
intra-industries cultural differences than inter-industry differences; professional 
differences still present problems hard to overcome (Buno, et al., 1985). 
There is a parallel relationship between national culture and organizational culture, and 
between organizational culture and professional culture. The differences in national 
culture increase the differences between the partners’ organizational culture; and the 
differences in organizational culture increase the differences between the partners’ 
employees’ professional culture (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). 
 
2.3.3. Culture Impact on ISAs 
Most of the culture conflicts that take place in many JVs are down to two reasons; the 
incompatibility of national culture, and the incompatibility of organizational culture 
(Brown, et al., 1989). 
Combining two cultures is not an easy mission either for the managers, or for the 
employees. It causes what known in the literature as “acculturative stress”, which is a 
stress felt by member of one culture when they are told that they have to interact with 
another culture and learn their way (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Very, et al., 
1998). The stress increases if the differences between the two cultures are vast. The 
acculturative stress triggers “cultural clashes”, and form a barrier to implement strategic 
changes. It is also been linked to “lower commitment and cooperation of the acquired 
employees, increased turnover among acquired executives, and lower financial success” 
(Very, et al., 1998; Badrtalei and Bates, 2007). 
Cultural differences can create barriers to the success of any joint collaboration between 
two distant cultures. It hinders the flow of information, and creates communications 
difficulties; that will make the transfer of management practices and technologies very 
costly. Moreover, it increases the transactions costs by adding the cost of monitoring 
and controlling the action of the partner, or those as result of employee resistance to 
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change (Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006; Anderson and Gatingnon, 1986; Chakrabarti, et 
al., 2009; Park and Ungson, 1997). 
 
2.3.3.1. National Culture 
National culture differences result in a lack of shared norms and values in ISAs. 
Therefore, it, as some authors argue, disturbs the learning and collaboration, hinder the 
advancement of the relationship between partners, and stop the firms form integrating 
effectively (Sirmon and Lane, 2004; Lam, 1997). Cultural distance will most likely 
increase the role conflict and increase role ambiguity. The conflict occurs as a result of 
managers or employees receiving contradicting messages, different expectations due to 
the differences in culture (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). 
Some cultural backgrounds are more difficult to combine than others are; and some 
differences are easier to overcome than others are. Language is recognized as one of the 
most common and important predicaments to overcome, along with differences in work 
ethics, management practice, and customer orientation (Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006).  
Differences in power distance, masculinity, and individualism (has an effect on 
individuals personality) can be easily overcome (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997).While 
differences in uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation (which affects the 
strategic planning) may have a negative impact on the success of the JVs. The 
differences will generate great disagreement in the strategic planning of the firm and 
may cause tension and conflicts (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). 
 
2.3.3.2. Organizational Culture 
Pothukuchi, et al. (2002) claim that "....the presumed negative effect from partner 
dissimilarity on IJV performance originates more from differences in organizational 
culture than from differences in national culture". Differences in organizational culture 
have a devastating effect, especially when related to the primary value creating 
activities (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). 
Social identity theories suggest that member of organization are bias to each other, and 
hold negative views about the ‘new’ group. They tend to team up against the ‘others’ 
(Stahl and Voigt, 2008). Moreover, this feeling of distance and rivalry will increase if 
the firm management adopts an attitude of superiority towards the employee of the other 
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firm. These problems will have negative effects on the sociocultural integration (Stahl 
and Voigt, 2008).  
Weber, et al., (1996) found that differences in organizational cultures between firms 
decrease the cooperation between the top management, and increase the negative 
attitudes. One the other hand, similarities of organizational culture have the opposite 
effect. It increases partners learning, and effectiveness of the integration (Sirmon and 
Lane, 2004). 
The differences in organizational culture can lead to challenges, and limit the realization 
of synergies. Moreover, it was found that it is responsible for creating split between the 
members of partner firms top management team by creating “polarization, negative 
evaluations of counterparts, anxiety, and ethnocentrism” (Schweiger and Goulet, 2005). 
 
2.3.3.3. Occupational culture 
Differences in professional culture are the most difficult to overcome, and it is more 
difficult when it is related to the value creating activities. These difficulties are because 
individuals from different occupational cultures do not share the basic knowledge and 
lack the experience of communicating with ‘outsider’. As a result, it creates another 
obstacle in the way to achieve effective cooperation between two different cultures 
(Sirmon and Lane, 2004). 
 
2.3.3.4. The positive impact of culture on ISAs 
Most of the literatures have suggested that cultural differences create barriers and 
prevent the firm from achieving synergy. However, the counter view argues that cultural 
differences can become a source for "value creation and learning", create synergies, and 
a source of competitive advantage (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Chakrabarti, et al., 2009).  
Culture has always been blamed for the failure of many partnerships. The fact that the 
cultures of two organizations are different does not automatically trigger conflict. 
Cultural distance does not mean ‘incongruence’; congruence can be achieved between 
distant cultures by achieving complementary, not similarity (Weber, et al., 1996). In 
fact, it appears that the compatibility of organizational culture is more important than 
the similarity of national culture (Brown, et al., 1989). 
Some studies have argued about the possibility to gain from cultural differences. It can 
be, from the resource-based perspective, a source of competitive advantage for the firm. 
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From the organizational learning perspective, cultural distance can spur innovation and 
learning by helping “break rigidities”. It opens new windows of opportunities for 
structure development and learning (Chakrabarti, et al., 2009; Stahl and Voigt, 2008). 
Furthermore, it gives the firm access to unique capabilities that are embodied in another 
organization culture (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). For example, there are potential gains 
from combining partners from masculine and feminine cultures; it combines one partner 
with aggressive attitudes and focus into achievements and performance with another 
partner with a focus on relation building (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). 
Chakrabarti, et al., (2009) argue that cultural distance between two parties comes from 
“the distrust arising from unfamiliarity”. However, unfamiliarity may not be a negative 
thing. The unfamiliarity and culture distance will promote better due diligence, 
screening, evaluation, higher communication and corporation, and higher standard of 
“expected synergies” (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).   
 
2.3.4. Managing Cultural Differences 
One of the reasons individuals of the target organization have chosen to work with the 
organization is due to the shared value; which creates hard to break "psychological 
bond" (Very, et al., 1998). Therefore, the buyer intention to change the structure of the 
firm will be faced by strong resistance. The degree of the resistance will depend on the 
strength of the ‘bond’ between the individuals and the culture (Very, et al., 1998).   
In order for the ‘marriage’ between organizations to work, they need to be culturally 
compatible; being compatible does not mean being similar (Cartwright and Cooper, 
1993). The firms must integrate effectively in order to share and leverage their 
complementary resources, which includes tangible and intangible assets (Sirmon and 
Lane, 2004). Firm need to develop a well plan executed integration process to achieve 
the desired synergies. The plan should aim to reduce the “inter-organizational and 
intercultural friction” and develop a sense of shared identity and positive attitudes 
towards the new venture. Furthermore, it should replace the previously shared 
experience by new shared beliefs. Additionally, develop new identities and values based 
on the best of all members of which will ‘glue’ the members of partner firms’ together 
(Buno, et al., 1985; Alder, 1983; Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Barkema, et. al., 1996).  
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Managers should understand “No single management practice is superior to another 
with respect to performance outcome” (Newman and Nollen, 1996: p. 755). Across 
national culture, there are different managerial practices, attitudes, values, behaviours, 
and efficacy. For example, ‘pay for performance’ schemes are very popular and widely 
accepted in the Anglo Saxons countries (US and UK); however, it does not receive the 
same enthusiasm in the rest of the world (Newman and Nollen, 1996). Therefore, some 
policies and practices should be adopted to suit the local culture; what works in a certain 
culture or setting does not necessary works with the same effectiveness in another 
culture (Hofstede, 1980). Managers must have professional and managerial skills, 
personal and social skills, and cross-cultural and international skills, which will reduce 
the tensions and possible conflicts (Alder, 1983; Dong and Glaister, 2009).   
Although, the general perception that people will oppose any change, the literature 
suggests that the majority of people will accept and welcome the change if they 
understand the need for it. Employee needs the feeling of belongings in order to reduce 
their tension and uncertainties (Buno, et al., 1985; Alder, 1983).  
The potential problems can be overcome when faced early and discussed openly. 
Moreover, these communications will increase top managers’ commitment and 
productivity (Badrtalei and Bates, 2007; Mirvis and Marks, 1992; Nahavandi and 
Malezadeh, 1988). 
One way firm can anticipate clashes and develop strategies is by assessing the culture of 
the partner firm. This can be done by asking the individuals of the partner firm about 
their culture. Then, the executives can develop a culture profile of their partner that will 
help them to identify the areas of possible cultural clashes. Knowing that in advance can 
help managers develop a strategy to minimize the risks of cultural clashes (Schweiger, 
et al., 1987; Hofstede, 1991; Dong and Glaister, 2009). 
Selection criteria are very important, not all the employees have the ability to adopt and 
adjust to different cultures. Firms can offer its' employees Cross-cultural training (CCT) 
to develop the manager confidence, and “self-interaction skills” (Black and Mendenhall, 
1990; Dong and Glaister, 2009; Mendenhall, et al., 1987). Senior management play an 
important role in shaping the organization culture; they create the values and transmit it 
to the other members (Weber, et al., 1996). Studies have showed that employees’ 
behaviour is influenced by the behaviour of their top management. This shows that 
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changing top management behaviour will facilitate the change across the organization; 
change should start from up to bottom (Schwartz and Davis, 1981). 
The root of most of the cultural conflicts is traced to the lack of knowledge and 
understanding of each partner values, cultures, and concerns (Schweiger and Goulet, 
2005). Introducing the employee to the practices adopted by the other partners, can help 
to reduce the gab and create a shared culture; which in return will help to achieve 
synergies (Schweiger and Goulet, 2005; Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006; Brown, et al., 
1989). 
Arrogance (managerial, cultural, and interpersonal) is one of the reasons behind 
triggering cultural clashes. This involves changing or altering practices adopted by the 
partner firm which means a lot to them and symbolise their organization. These 
inconsiderate acts may turn things to a matter of pride and initiate resistance instead of 
cooperation (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Badrtalei and Bates, 2007). The employee 
learning and awareness of their culture first, and then developing empathy and 
understanding of the other culture will bridge cultural differences between the two 
organizations more efficiently (Schweiger and Goulet, 2005). 
 
2.3.5. Conclusion 
Scholars disagreement on whether cultural differences is a good or bad and the 
contradicting conclusions might be an indication that it is a managerial issue not an 
absolute fact (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).  
Some scholars have argued that the ability of national culture to disturb alliance's 
performance has been overstated. Most studies have failed to prove the influence of 
organizational culture differences; which is more embodied to the organization practice, 
comparing to national culture (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). It has been argued that 
organizations can learn about culture differences, and turn them to their favour (David 
and Singh 1993, cited in Schweiger and Goulet, 2005). 
The effect of cultural differences on synergy's realization can go in two opposing ways. 
It depends on the degree of the cultural differences and relatedness. First, it can 
negatively hinder the integration process; second, it can give the firm access to valuable 
and unique resources, and capabilities embodied in other organization culture (Stahl and 
Voigt, 2008).  
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There is ‘psychological’ attachment from the employee towards their organizational 
culture, and the risks of losing it create some tension (Schweiger, et al., 1987). 
However, findings suggest that well planned, and good communication reduces the 
negative feelings and increase satisfactions, especially among the employee who have 
good attitudes (Napier, 1989). 
 
2.4. Learning in ISAs 
2.4.1. Introduction 
Scholars have recognized that no organization can create all resources needed to grow 
and prosper. It has become more important for firms to collaborate with other firms that 
hold complementary resources to develop and even survive. Combining resources is a 
valuable tool for organizations to exploit new business opportunities (Dussauge, et al., 
2000). 
Inter-organization learning in SAs can be achieved in two ways: either by transferring 
the ‘existing’ knowledge from one organization to another; or, creating new knowledge 
by pooling the existing knowledge of both firms (Larsson, et al., 1998). The condition 
for learning to take place is that both partners must be transparent (Larsson, et. al., 
1998). There are factors that affect learning levels; e.g. knowledge nature, ISA 
performance and timing of the experience (Hayward, 2002).      
Furthermore, there are different factors affects the learning outcome in SAs. For 
example, the partners’ characteristics, intent, receptivity, and transparency, affect their 
learning rate. Other factors, includes the partner prior experience, cultural factors, and 
attention to human resource management (Hamel, 1991; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997). 
Cultural (national, organizational) factors are very powerful, and have an effect on 
people's perception, values and believe (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). Studies have showed 
that national culture is the reason behind 50% of the differences in values, and beliefs 
among managers, despite them working for multinational companies (Hofstede, 1991). 
The differences between partners are not something easy to work around and should not 
be underestimated. Numbers of international collaborations have failed because partners 
have found it difficult to work together (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). 
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This section will first discuss learning in ISAs. After that, it is going to talk about the 
culture influence on the learning process, and knowledge transfer. The section will 
conclude by assessing the effect of these factors on performance. 
 
2.4.2. Learning and Performance Relation 
Firms’ resources consist of all its' assets, knowledge, organizational structure, 
experience, connections …etc. (Tsang, 1998). Barney (1991) has categorized the 
company resources into three categories: physical capital resources, human capital 
resources, and organization capital resources. The physical resources include tangible 
assets, like lands, equipment, and goods. In addition, it includes intangible assets, e.g. 
copyrights, and patents. The human resources include skills, relationships, education, 
training, and staff experience. Finally, organizational resources, which includes 
cooperate culture, rules, organizational structure and procedures, and it’s' relationship 
with other organizations. These resources combined represent the firm capabilities 
(Tsang, 1998). 
There are direct links between resources and firm's profitability. Thus, it increases the 
importance of strategically managing these resources. This can be done either, through 
economizing the use of resources by maximizing its productivity, especially tangible 
resources; or/and employing existing assets in more profitable use, which will yield 
substantial returns (Grant, 1991). Knowledge acquisition is linked to firm performance, 
‘new knowledge’ give's firms basis to sustain its' competitive advantage (Inkpen, 1998). 
ISAs performance improves every time knowledge absorbed from the foreign partner 
(Lyles and Salk, 1996). Learning and internalizing the foreign partner skills and 
capabilities can create competitive advantage for the firm (Lane, et al., 2001).  
The knowledge learned (based on trust and the absorptive capacity), will influence the 
alliance performance. This shows that learning in alliance is a major indicator to the 
success of the partnership. The acquired knowledge from an ISA contributes positively 
to the building of the firm capabilities, which enhance the performance of the firm 
(Dhanaraj et al., 2004). 
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2.4.3. Learning ISAs 
Inkpen (1998), argue that learning in alliances is very difficult, and creating a successful 
learning environment is more complex. Learning between organizations in SAs can 
effect alliance longevity (Parkhe, 1991), and the knowledge gained through learning 
reflect positively on the alliance performance (Lane, et al., 2001). 
There are four constructs in the literature related to organizational learning; knowledge 
acquisitions, information distribution, information interpretation, and organizational 
memory. The one most related to SAs is knowledge acquisitions. The knowledge can be 
acquired through various methods; e.g. learning from experience, learning by observing 
other organizations, and grafting (Huber, 1991).  
According to the resource-based theory, firms engage in SAs to access valuable 
resources they lack, and gain or preserve control over certain resources. It is a vehicle 
for firms to “...learn or seek to retain their capabilities” (Kogut, 1988; Lane, et. al., 
2001; Chen and Chen, 2003; Lubatkin, 1983). SAs give the firm a chance to learn 
different ways of doing things. This will strengthen the firm's knowledge base, and 
improves the technological capabilities, increase productivity, and encourage innovation 
(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Kumar and Nti, 1998; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; 
Lyles and Salk, 1996). 
 
2.4.3.1. Knowledge Type and its effect 
There are different kinds of knowledge; most notable are explicit and tacit. It is acquired 
from ISAs via socializing, internalization, or combining different kind of explicit 
knowledge to create new knowledge (Lyles and Salk, 1996).  
The rest of this section will start by providing detailed descriptions of tacit and explicit 
knowledge. Then, it will talk about absorptive capacity role; and how it affects learning.   
 
2.4.3.1.1. Tacit and Explicit knowledge 
Tacit knowledge is represented by the firm's experience in manufacturing and marketing 
products, knowledge of local customer, market, and policies. This knowledge cannot be 
codified in designs, specifications, and drawings. Instead, it is embodied in the 
individuals and can only be exchanged through "intimate human contact" (Glaister, 
1996; Kogut, 1988). On the other hand, explicit knowledge is "the simple knowledge"; 
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it can be codified and can be easily transferred in written format, like the quantifiable 
technology and product development (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004; Bhagat, et al., 2002).  
The process of transferring tacit knowledge, which can be called the "complex 
knowledge", is complicated. It gets more complex when there are cultural differences 
involved. Tacit knowledge has a certain ambiguity; it is embedded within “individuals’ 
cognitive processes”, or rooted in the routines of organization culture (Bhagat, et al., 
2002). Hence, that made it difficult to learn and absorb; and, more costly to transfer 
(Kogut and Zander, 2003). Lam (1997) in her study of a collaborative venture between a 
British and a Japanese firm, have found that knowledge that socially embodied, ‘tacit’, 
along with the organizational system have an impediment effect on a JV. It negatively 
affects the transfer of knowledge, and technology across culture. Tacit knowledge is 
transferred by closely and directory monitoring the ‘knower’ doing what they do best, 
interacting with them, and analysing their actions (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004). 
SAs are considered as an excellent tool to acquire 'tacit' knowledge; taking into account 
the market failure when it comes to transferring ambiguous knowledge (Glaister, 1996). 
However, there are conditions for a successful learning from SAs. Some of them are the 
possession of absorptive capacity, and most importantly the intent to learn. Firms must 
be eager to learn from the alliance, the absence of the intent to learn ‘in form of 
arrogance’ will negatively affect the outcome (Mowery, et al., 1996). 
 
2.4.3.1.2. Absorptive capacity   
Engaging in SAs is not sufficient for firms to learn and acquire new knowledge. They 
need some necessary skills to learn from the alliance. These skills are what known as 
the “absorptive capacity” of the firms (Simonin, 2004; Kim and Inkpen, 2005; Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive capacity is “a firm ability to value, assimilates, and 
utilizes new external knowledge” (Lane and lubatkin, 1998).  
Absorptive capacity had been described variously in the literature. Simonin (2004) has 
described the absorptive capacity as "learning capacity" of the firm; while Hamel (1990) 
has defined the partners capacity to learn from each other as "receptivity". Zahra and 
George (2002) argue that absorptive capacity has four dimensions; acquisitions, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation.  
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Absorptive capacity is not the process of knowledge transfer; it is the firm employees' 
ability to utilise the learning and the knowledge transferred into useful output. The lack 
of absorptive capacity is “the most important impediment of knowledge transfer” 
(Minbaeva, et al., 2003). Transferring partner firm capabilities does not mean a 
successful exploitation of these capabilities. In order to reach the desired outcome, firm 
must possess the absorptive capacity that allows them to put the acquired capabilities 
into use (Mowery, et al., 1996). The existence of an absorptive capacity will improve 
the learning between partners, and contribute positively to the transfer of capabilities 
(Lane, et al., 2001). The level of absorptive capacity affects the amount of knowledge 
transferred (Minbaeva, et al., 2003; Dhanaraj, et al., 2004). 
Prior experiences and the previously accumulated knowledge play an important role in 
improving the absorptive capacity of individuals and organizations, it helps them 
assimilate and use the new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Prior experience 
and knowledge facilitate the learning of new knowledge, but that does not mean that 
without prior experience learning will not take place e (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Individual absorptive capacity influences the organization absorptive capacity. 
Nevertheless, the organization absorptive capacity is not the sum of the individuals’ 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
 
2.4.3.2. Effect of Culture Differences on Learning and Performance       
There are different kind of culture that affects learning between partners in ISAs: 
national, organizational, occupational, and small group cultures (Levinson and Asahi, 
1995).  
Cultural differences affect sociocultural integration, synergy realization, and 
shareholder value in two ‘opposing’ way, depending on the degree of the cultural 
differences and relatedness (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). 
In the coming section, we are going to talk first about the impeding effect of culture on 
learning in ISAs; and how in return that can affect the performance of the alliance. 
Then, we will discuss the counter arguments, which claim that cultural difference had 
an enriching effect on learning and performance. 
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2.4.3.2.1. The Impeding effect on Performance  
A large proportion of ISAs suffered from performance problems that lead them to fail. 
Cultural factors have been considered as the main factor behind the poor performance 
behind many of them (Pothukuchi, et al., 2002). Cultural differences have a strong 
effect on alliances; integration costs have been inflated substantially due to the 
mismatch between organizations (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Very, et al., 1998; Barkema 
and Vermeulen, 1997). 
Parkhe (1991, 1993) argues that national cultural differences will negatively affect the 
performance and the success of the alliance, especially their ability to benefit from 
‘knowledge spillover’. National cultures differences can hinder the advancement of the 
relationship between partners. The lack of shared norms and values reduces the 
communication between partners (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).  
Cultural distance has been regarded as “hindrance” factor to the performance of the 
ISAs (Shenkar, 2001). It creates distinctive "psychological environment"’, which 
influence the performance negatively (Pothukuchi, et al., 2002).  
Brown, et al., (1989) argue that cultural compatibility will positively affect the 
performance of the ISA. Although, some scholars, e.g. Fey and Beamish (2000), found 
that cultural distance has no effect on the performance of ISAs.  
Other problem that emerges because of cultural differences is performance 
measurement. Every culture has its own way of assessing the performance that 
sometimes completely differ from the other culture. Japanese, for example, do not look 
for an immediate result and look always for long-term performance. The American, on 
the other hand, values immediate results more, and it is their main indicator to wither 
the partnership is a success or not (Pothukuchi, et al., 2002). 
 
2.4.3.2.1.1. Learning  
When firms cooperate with each other in SAs, difficulties arise due the differences in 
corporate and national culture. It hinders the decision making process, and firms’ effort 
of promoting social integration (Tsang, 1998; Zahra and George, 2002). Absorptive 
capacity is not enough for the firms to acquire the required knowledge; they need first to 
overcome the social barriers (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004). Cultural distance can weaken the 
absorptive capacity of the organization (Bjorkman, et al., 2007).  
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Sirmon and Lane (2004) argue that the organizational culture similarities will positively 
contribute to the learning between partners, employee satisfaction and interactions, and 
communication. The Shared values and systems, and mutual trust play a vital role in 
facilitating learning and knowledge transfer between organizations. Trust leads to 
shared understanding, which in return facilitate access to resources and promote 
cooperation between the different parties (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004).   
Therefore, researchers argue that firms are better able to acquire and learn new skills 
from the alliance if they have competence base similar to the one they are looking for. It 
means similar “operational priorities”, and compatible values and norms (Lane, et al., 
2001). Thus, alliances between competing firms are more likely to favour inter-firm 
learning; because competing firms have a lot in common in the way they both operates 
(Dussauge, et al., 2000). Furthermore, similarities will enable the ‘student’ to learn 
‘absorb’ more, increase inter-partners learning, and the effectiveness of the integration 
(Lane et al., 2001; Sirmon and Lane, 2004).  
Cultural conflict and misunderstanding between partners will reduce the trust. This in 
return will limit information sharing, raise the cost, and have a negative effect on the 
learning outcome between partners (Lane, et al., 2001; Doney, et al., 1998; Parke and 
Ungson, 1997). Therefore, some predicted cultural differences have an impeding effect 
on learning, or at least decrease the positive outcome (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).  
Differences in culture create ‘uncertainty’; it inflates the cost of negotiation and 
complicates the transfer of firm’s specific management practices and technologies 
(Pothukuchi, et al., 2002). Furthermore, it hinders the learning of tacit knowledge 
especially, which requires trust, interaction, and exchanging of ideas. It, also, increases 
the negative attitude and slows down the integration process because trust is replaced 
with suspicions (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004; Kedia and Bhagat, 1988; Weber, et al., 1996).  
Transparency is an essential condition for learning to take place; especially if the 
required knowledge is tacit “sticky”, and socially embedded. Cultural differences may 
restrict any effort from firms to be transparent. Differences in language, customs, and 
tradition will hinder the communication between partners, and can turn the well-
codified knowledge hard to get (Larsson, et al., 1998; Simonin, 1999). As the cultural 
distance between partners’ increases, so does the knowledge ambiguity; which in return 
has an impeding effect on the transfer of knowledge (Simonin, 1999). 
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Another issue that might disrupt any attempt for collaboration between firms is the lack 
of motivation to collaborate. Some organizational culture does not encourage or support 
learning and critical thinking. It encourages the act of taking more and giving less. They 
develop a reward systems based on this culture. Therefore, members of this kind of 
organizations are not motivated to ‘give’ in such collaboration (Larsson, et al., 1998; 
Simonin, 2004). 
 
2.4.3.2.2. The enriching effect on performance and learning 
Most of the literature argued that cultural differences create obstacles and hinder 
performance. However, the counter view argues that cultural differences can become a 
source for value creation, learning, and achieving synergies. The differences can be a 
source of competitive advantage, because it gives the firm access to unique capabilities 
that are embodied in another organization culture (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Vermeulen 
and Barkema, 2001; Morosini, Shane and Singh, 1998). The differences may alert 
managers about the difficulties they might encounter. As a result, it will push partners to 
collaborate and communicate better with each other’s, which in return will contribute 
positively to the performance of the alliance (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).   
According to the study of Chakrabarti, et al., (2009) acquisition that involves culturally 
disparate companies perform better in the long run; regardless to the fact that 
‘announcement affect’ reaction shows otherwise. Morosini, et al., (1998) claimed and 
proved in their study that the greater national culture distances, the greater post-
acquisitions performance. Their rational is, differences will give firms the opportunity 
to access set of routines and repertoires different from the one they were used to. This in 
return, will enhance the ‘combined performance in the long run.  
Firms’ managerial ‘practice’ is usually a developed routine from the history of the 
organization. The majority of these routines are not ‘unique’ and can be easily imitable. 
Therefore, they cannot be a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Morosini, et 
al., 1998). Although, these studies focused on M&A, their findings can be linked to 
ISAs; since both involve collaboration between two or more different culture. 
From the organizational learning perspective, partnership between culturally different 
companies can spur innovation and learning by helping to break rigid routines 
(Chakrabarti, et al., 2009; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Some national cultures have 
a tradition of doing things in a certain way; collaborating with firms from different 
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culture may encourage the firm to learn new ‘ways’ of doing things (Morosini, et al., 
1998). Dealing with different culture gives the firm knowledge and experience on 
dealing with different cultures. This experience will enhance the performance of future 
ISAs (Barkema et al., 1996). 
Moreover, exposing both companies set of rigid routines can improve their 
performance. However, all these assumptions have not been supported empirically 
(Chakrabarti, et al., 2009).    
Reus and Lamont (2009) argued that cultural differences are not directly associated with 
positive performance in acquisitions. It provides a platform to learn, and the firm should 
have the necessary capabilities to explode these opportunities.   
Finally, many scholars agreed that the literature lacks large-scale data that test the 
relation and the effect of cultural differences on the ISAs performance. 
 
2.4.4. Conclusion 
Successful learning in ISAs does not take place by only transferring the knowledge, 
technology, or practice from one organization to another. It can only be called a success 
if the firm manages to exploit it and put it into use. The firms should create an 
environment of ‘give and take’ in order for the learning to take place; contractual 
obligations will not help firms to learn from each other (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004).  
The firm's ‘paradigm’ is excellent in creating shared view and values among the 
organization members, and it is a useful tool for keeping the company coherent.  
However, one of the reasons that hinder the learning is when firms are being held 
hostage to their routines and culture. They feel comfortable and secured; hence, they 
lose their desire to learn as it means change; a freighting idea to some people (Simonin, 
2004). In order for the firm to learn new routines, technology, procedures, and 
strategies, they must break out of their old culture, routine, and procedures (Barkema 
and Vermeulen, 1998).  
Some scholars have argued that the ability of a national culture to disturb alliance's 
performance has been overstated. Most studies have failed to prove the effect of 
organizational culture differences, which is more embodied to the organization practice 
than national culture (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). 
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The differences itself does not have a hindering effect on the learning between partners; 
it is the nature of the culture that either facilitate or hinder the learning. If the nature of 
the culture encourages and embrace change, then it will be a facilitating factor. 
Conversely, it will has hindering effect if the nature of culture is ‘close’ and look to 
their current culture as a ‘core’ value of the organization and cannot be change 
(Levinson and Asahi, 1995).  
The fact the scholars have disagreed on whether cultural differences ‘good’ or ‘evil’, 
might indicate that it is a managerial issue more than an absolute fact (Sirmon and Lane, 
2004). It is a two sword edge, if it handled well, organization can get positive results; 
but, if it handled bad the effect can be shattering (Reus and Lamont, 2009). 
 
2.5. Strategic Alliance Performance Measurement 
2.5.1. Introduction 
There are many difficulties associated with the study of alliances performance. In the 
literature, there is no consensus on the appropriate measurement “...the lack of 
consensus around a typology of collaborative agreements, diversity in firms' strategic 
intents in pursuing alliances, and the lack of objective performance data” (Zollo, et al., 
2002), or IJVs performance definition (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
Gulati (1998) acknowledged that it is very complicated to recognize the factors 
affecting the performance of alliances. He argues that performance is one of the most 
‘exciting’ and unexplored areas in the SAs studies. The performance of ISAs has 
received less attention due to different obstacles facing the researchers when measuring 
the performance of alliances. These barriers include ‘logistical challenges’ in collecting 
the necessary detail data for this type of research (Gulati, 1998). Moreover, the 
ambiguity of performance measurement makes it difficult for researchers to study 
alliances; it also make it more difficult for firms to learn from alliances (Zollo, et al., 
2002). 
Using ‘wrong’ or inaccurate tools to measure SA performance is very vital for its 
survival; it might lead to premature termination of SAs, or making decisions not for the 
interest of the SAs (Anderson, 1990). 
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ISAs have always encountered performance problems. The performance has been 
defined in different ways, and the estimation of unsatisfactory performance has ranged 
from 37% to 70% (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
This section will start by highlighting firms’ objectives for engaging in ISAs. Then, it 
will discuss in details the alliances performances and the different approaches used to 
assess the performance. After that, it will discuss the relation and the possible cultural 
influence on performance measurement. Finally, we present the different arguments 
about the limitation of some of the assessment methods used to measure the 
performance, followed by a conclusion. 
 
2.5.2. ISAs Performance Measurement 
Arino (2003: p. 68) defined SAs performance as “the degree of accomplishment of 
partners’ goals, be these common or private, initial or emergent”. Yan and Beamish 
(2004) defined performance of JVs as the venture managers' satisfaction about the 
overall performance. 
Common goals are the goals shared by both partners in SAs. However, every partner 
has specific goals of their own, which is called ‘private’ goals. Both the shared or 
private goals can change over time and be called ‘emergent’ goals, which are different 
from the ‘initial’ goals (Arino, 2003). 
There is no universal approach to measure the performance of SAs (Lunnan and 
Haugland, 2008). There are many difficulties in measuring a SA. It is not as clear as 
some might think. The intention of some of these ventures is, as we stated earlier, can 
be to enter market, block a competitor, or open new opportunities. The question is how 
can we measure these objectives accurately! 
Many firms fall in the trap of measuring the performance of SAs the same way they 
measure any of their ‘internal’ divisions. Anderson (1990) called for using different 
measurement indicators than the one used for measuring divisions.  
SAs require patient, and it is rare to see a venture generating some profits in the first 
two years of its creation. Some ventures need years before positive returns on 
investments can be seen (Anderson, 1990). 
There is an ongoing discussion on the issue of whether the performance of the SA 
should be measured separately from the parents. Other issue is how to measure the 
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performance of a risky JV, where no positive results to be expected at early stage. 
Finally, some ventures objectives are direct monetary returns, especially in SAs that 
intend in exploiting new technology (Anderson, 1990). 
Measurement of alliances will vary according to the objectives. Each method is used in 
a particular context, and it depends on the alliance goals (Artisien and Buckley, 1985; 
Arino, 2003). 
There are different methods used to evaluate the performance of SAs. Lunnan and 
Haugland (2008) have divided measurement methods into financial, operational, and 
effectiveness. On the other hand, Geringer and Hebert (1991) have classified the 
approaches into subjective, like the financial indicators, profitability, growth, and cost 
position; and objective, such as the survival of the JVs, its duration, and stability. 
Financial measures are common methods and used when there is an “explicit” financial 
goal that includes profitability, growth, and cost position (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; 
Arino, 2003). Operational measures are based on stability measures, e.g. longevity, 
survival, and contract stability are used when the focus is on key operation factors 
fundamental in generating financial returns (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Yan and Zeng, 
1999; Arino, 2003). The most common, and probably the most popular method is the 
organizational effectiveness. It measures the firm SA performance satisfaction, and 
looks to the degree the SA managed to fulfil the alliance initial goals (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991; Parkhe, 1993b; Arino, 2003).  
In this section, we will discuss the subjective and objective performance measurement 
in details. 
 
2.5.2.1. Objective Measurement  
Economic data are widely adopted to measure the performance of SAs; it is mostly 
“output-oriented” and aims to evaluate the ‘value’ of the partners. Therefore, 
evaluations are based on financial indicators, such as free cash flow, return on 
investment, net yearly profit, increase in shareholders’ value, or ‘and’ productivity 
(Buchel and Thuy, 2001).  
There are different financial indicators used to evaluate the financial performance of 
firms or units. For example, sales growth, net income growth, return on investment 
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(ROI), return on asset (ROA), and return on sales (ROS) (Venktraman and Ramanujam, 
1986; Yan and Beamish, 2004; Morosini, et al., 1998). 
The parent firms can generate financial returns from SAs in many ways, not just from 
dividends. However, it is not usually “incorporated” when calculating the financial 
performance of the SA. It includes “supply contracts, management fees, technology 
licensing fees, royalties, and transfer pricing” (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
Some scholars have measured the performance by measuring the reaction of the parents 
firms share prices to the announcement of the alliance formation (Reuer, 2000). Stock 
market reaction is a common method used by some managers to measure the 
performance of M&A, or SA, especially to measure short-term performance. Some 
researchers argue that relying on publicly published data may help researchers to reach 
a ‘meaningful comparison’ between short-term and long-term strategic goals. They 
measure the long-term performance of firms by monitoring the changes in market share, 
sales, intrinsic profitability, and relative profitability (Capron, 1999). However, in the 
case of SAs there is more need to obtain some primary data to reach a meaningful 
conclusion about the performance of the venture (Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Lunnan 
and Haugland, 2008).   
Other way to measure the performance is using profitability as an indicator. Profitability 
is the most used performance measure and the most quoted in the literature as well 
(Artisien and Buckley, 1985). However, Anderson (1990) thinks that profitability 
‘alone’ is a poor measurement tool. Lecraw (1983) in his study of the transactional 
corporation’s performance, have used seven variables to measure the profitability. 
These are market concentration, the firm’s market share, growth, ownership complexity, 
R&D and advertising intensity, import penetration and tariff rate, and capital intensity. 
Woodcock, et al., (1994) assessed the performance through a combination of financial 
measurement and subjective assessment to avoid irregularity of using different 
accounting approaches 
Operation measurements are linked to the duration, longevity, termination, and stability 
of the alliances (Lunnan and Haugland, 2008). Geringer and Hebert (1991) think that 
survival, as an ‘objective’ measure, is the most suitable to measure the success of a SA 
in the absence of survey data. Barkema, et al. (1996), and Harrigan’s (1988) in their 
studies of the success factors of JVs have considered longevity and stability as the best 
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indicator to the success of the JV and a sign of positive performance. There is a positive 
relation observed between longevity and financial performance (Geringer and Hebert, 
1991; Barkema et al., 1996; Barkema, et al., 1997). 
Moreover, Parkhe (1993) found that the “durability” of the alliance is positively related 
to profitability, and in return to performance. It is a key indication to the SA success and 
effectiveness; it is a reflection to the SA stability. 
There are other “output-oriented” factors than economic approaches, which are more 
long-term oriented and strategic in nature. The criteria used to measure the performance 
is company size, product-market combinations, market share, and ‘or’ the competitive 
position of the firm. A strategic approach focuses in core competencies, like 
safeguarding specific recourses, access new technologies, increasing the company’s 
competitive strength, and unique know-how (Buchel and Thuy, 2001). Boateng and 
Glaister (2002) have assessed the SA performance based on rating number of different 
factors that include mix of “traditional business and human resources performance 
measures”. These factors were sales level, market share, profitability, share price, labour 
productivity, extent of technology transfer and overall performance of the SA. 
 
2.5.2.2. Subjective Measurement  
Subjective measures are common method to assess the performance of ISAs. Some of 
the qualitative methods are used by directly asking the directors of the parent firms 
about their opinion of the performance of the alliance. In order to reach more accurate 
conclusion, the answer of this question should be collected from more than one 
respondent (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
Datta (1991) measured the performance of an acquisition is his studies using five 
performance criteria, ROI, EPS, stock price, cash flow, and sales growth. These 
variables were measured by asking respondents, using five Point Likert-type scales, to 
evaluate the performance of acquisition and wither it achieved its prior expectation. 
Each one of these variables was given a different weight depending on its perceived 
importance.  
Yan and Gray (1994) relied on partners’ perception to the extent the venture had 
achieved the ‘initial’ objectives, and long-term goals. Zollo, et al., (2002) used different 
indicators to measure the alliances performance in high-tech industries “biotechnology”. 
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The indicators were the respondents’ satisfaction about the accumulated knowledge, 
their indication of the extent new opportunities were created, and finally their 
satisfaction about achieving the alliance objective.   
There are other approaches that do not focus on the output criteria, but rather on the 
process within the SA. It assesses the company’s “internal transformation” (Buchel and 
Thuy, 2001). Indicators of that are development of trust, commitment, transparency, 
clear responsibility, the ability to deal with conflict, and continued survival (Buchel and 
Thuy, 2001).  
Effectiveness is the most commonly used measurement to evaluate the performance of 
alliances. It looks into the fulfilment of strategic goals, both initial and emergent 
(Lunnan and Haugland, 2008). It assesses the level of goals fulfilment, and their 
satisfaction of overall performance (Arino, 2003; Parkhe, 1993b).  
Killing (1983) have used the management assessment of performance, along with the 
‘liquidation’ and ‘reorganization’ as a sign of failure.  
Learning could be an assessment tool; it combines both output-oriented and process 
approach. It takes into consideration knowledge acquisitions and the attainment of 
learning goals; conversely, it takes into account the learning process. The acquisitions 
of technological know-how, market know-how, or management know-how are 
assessment used to measure learning (Buchel and Thuy, 2001).  
Firms usually use a combination of mixed methods, looking into growth, profit, high 
return, consist avoidance of losing, improvement in operating results, and stable 
management. This “package” approach uses a mix of financial factors and non-financial 
(stable management); although most of the factors are results oriented. However, it can 
be considered as subjective and focus on long-term performance (Anderson, 1990).  
To measure the performance of IJVs in their study, Gong et al., (2005) asked the CEO 
of the IJVS about their evaluation of the performance. They used the following criteria, 
using a five points Likert scale: “(1) sales level, (2) market share, (3) profitability, (4) 
cost leadership, (5) management of the venture, (6) technology development, (7) 
product design, (8) quality management, (9) labour productivity, (10) marketing, (11) 
distribution, (12) customer service, (13) reputation, and (14) attainment of parent 
involvement”. 
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2.5.3. Culture and the Performance 
As in many firm's operation, performance evaluation is not immune to the influence of 
national culture (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Firms from a similar culture will mostly 
have similar performance evaluation. Differences in culture are likely to lead to 
difference in objectives and evaluation measurements (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
Cultural distance has been regarded as “hindrance” to SAs performance (Shenkar, 
2001). Parkhe (1991, 1993), argues that national cultural differences will negatively 
affect the performance and the success of the alliance, especially their ability to benefit 
from ‘knowledge spill-over’.  
Other problem that emerges because of cultural differences is performance 
measurement. Every culture has its own way of assessing the performance that 
sometimes completely differ from the other culture. Japanese and many European firms, 
for example, do not look for an immediate result and are more ‘strategic’; they look 
always for long term, less financially focus approach to assess the performance. On the 
other hand, the American firms tend to use financial criteria, and value more the 
immediate result, and it is the main indicator to wither the operation is a success or not 
(Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Pothukuchi, et al., 2002). 
 
2.5.4. Limitation and Problems Facing Performance Measurement 
The variation between different SAs performance measures can create a mixed 
outcome. In implementing a particular measure, a SA may look as a success, while 
applying a different measure can show the SA as a failure (Geringer and Hebert, 1989). 
This shows the importance of implementing a standard measure for each alliance, drawn 
from their objectives.  
One of the problems in measuring the performance of SAs is the conflict of interest 
between the venture and the parent(s). There is an argument going in whether the 
venture should act for the best interest of the ‘parent’ or the venture best interest; 
because some actions or projects might proof useful for the parents but not profitable 
for the venture (Anderson, 1990).   
Many factors make the mission of measuring the performance of SAs a difficult one. 
The first is the different corporate context; a cooperative JV involves different partners 
where each of them has different interest, different technological capabilities, and 
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different management style. These differences complicate the mission, because it is 
difficult to have an assessment tool that takes into account all these differences (Yan 
and Gray, 1994; Buchel and Thuy, 2001). The second barrier derived from the unclear 
objectives of partners; they have objectives but usually not clearly defined (Buchel and 
Thuy, 2001). Lastly, there are uncertainties surrounding SAs operation in developing 
countries; especially, regarding technologies, markets, and products (Buchel and Thuy, 
2001; Yan and Gray, 1994).  
Some financial indicators, especially stock market reaction, have a limitation. It is a 
reflection to the parent firms’ performance, not the alliance or the JVs (Lunnan and 
Haugland, 2008). 
Some scholars have argued against the use of stability as a performance measure. As 
Yan and Zeng (1999) argue that stability and performance are different. Alliances in 
some cases, they argue, are terminated ‘prematurely’ because it achieved its initial 
goals, and there is no point of continuing the relationship. Hence, in this case it is a sign 
of success. On the hand, longevity might be a sign of poor performance, especially 
when the ‘exit barrier’ is high (Gulati, 1998; Parkhe, 1991; Pearce, 1997).  
Without knowledge of the initial alliance goals, longevity is not valid performance 
measure (Arino, 2003). The same argument can be extended to other methods, 
ownership, contractual changes, and survival. With no knowledge of the initial goals, 
these measures ‘alone’ cannot reflect the actual SA performance (Arino, 2003). 
To avoid the limitation of subjective measure or the objective measure, some scholars 
used mixed methods of subjective and objective measurement in attempt to have an 
accurate assessment of the ventures (Yan and Beamish, 2004). Bleeke and Ernst (1991) 
have used a mixed approach to assess the success of the alliance. They looked if the 
objectives, e.g. market share, new products development...etc., of both partners were 
met, and if they recovered their financial cost of capital before calling the alliance a 
success. 
Some have suggested the use of cash flow analysis (DCF); however, Anderson (1990) 
argued that it is an inadequate tool to use, especially for risky and uncertain projects. 
DCF overlooks some ‘strategic concerns’, such as technological changes.  
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In general, Anderson (1990) argues that financial indicators might not be reliable and 
does not convey the ‘real’ progress towards the long-term goals of the venture, 
especially if the venture goals are not financial in nature. 
 
2.5.5. Conclusion 
In some cases, even the use of subjective and objective measures combined can fail to 
reflect the SA accomplishment of short or long-term objectives. There are some goals, 
like developing new technologies and entering new markets, when subjective or 
objective measurement fails to fully capture the performance of the venture and wither 
it met its goals, especially if it is used to measure short-term objectives (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991). Sometimes the SAs succeed in accomplishing its objectives (access to 
new market, develop new technologies), but the parents fails to capitalize, or later found 
that it is not as profitable as they thought. In this case, the alliance should be considered 
a success because it met its objectives.   
From the previous discussions, we can notice that organizational effectiveness measures 
are the most “comprehensive” (Arino, 2003). It can reflect all firms' goals, financial and 
non-financial. 
The venture interests ‘some times’ is different from the parent(s) interests, and in this 
case the venture should be assessed separately. There is always the possibility of a 
conflict of interest between the venture and one of the parents. Therefore, to avoid the 
risk of alienating partners’, SAs should not be assessed as a division (Anderson, 1990).  
Judging the performance of the SA should not be based on short-term ‘profits’. SAs are 
far more complex than divisions because the different objectives and stakeholders, 
which raises the possibility of interest conflict. Many studies have showed that short-
term ROI indicators do not reflect the performance of the SA, even if the ROI in the 
short term is positive (Anderson, 1990).   
Measuring the financial return only is not sufficient to measure the performance of a 
SA; it covers only one “dimension” of the performance. There is a necessity to use 
qualitative measures to evaluate the SA performance adequately (Geringer and Hebert, 
1991). 
Alliance's objectives and assessment methods should be explained in details before the 
alliances starts, so firms can measure the performance correctly. Objectives should be 
66 | P a g e  
 
the centre of assessment, and the measurement should focus on whether the objectives 
have been met or not. Financial indicators should be ignored; unless the objectives of 
the alliances or the venture are generating profit, increasing sales...etc.  
Transparency regarding the objectives will help the parents firms when setting up the 
alliance. Then, the alliance can be managed in a way that serves both partners 
objectives. This will reduce the tension costs and the fear of opportunistic behaviour, 
and limit the overlapping of tasks that might take place later. 
In chapter 6 and 7, we will extend the discussion, and talk more critically about ISAs 
performance measurement in relation to our study.  
 
2.6. Saudi Context 
2.6.1. Introduction and Background Information 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comprises about 80% of the Arabian Peninsula; the rest 
is shared between Yemen, Oman, Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia 





almost double the size of the UK, France, and Spain combined (CDSI, 2012). Saudi 
Arabia is bordered on the west by the Red Sea, on the south by Yemen and Oman, on 
the east by the Arabian Gulf, Bahrain, Qatar and Emirates, and on the north by Kuwait, 
Iraq, and Jordan. It has a population of 29 million, of which over 9 million are 
foreigners. The population is growing by 2.21% per year (CDSI, 2012). 
Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, and is the home of the two holy mosques in 
Mecca and Medina. The Saudi state was founded in 1932, after 30 years in civil war, 
attempting to unify the Arabian Peninsula. The kingdom is an absolute monarchy, and 
the King is the prime minister. The king rules by issuing royal decrees. Saudi Arabia 
has The Basic Law, the closest to a written constitution, which highlights the 
relationship and the responsibility of the King.   
Saudi Arabia is considered according to the International Monetary Fund as a 
developing economy (IMF, 2012). Despite this fact, the Saudi economy is the largest in 
the Middle East (USSABC, 2008). Saudi Arabia has the world’s largest oil reserve, and 
a wealth of gas and minerals. The oil reserves, 25% of the world’s proven oil reserves, 
place the country in the map of world economy as an important player. 
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Education has been key in Saudi Arabia with the number of universities in Saudi Arabia 
jumping from 7 in 2005 to 34 in 2013. This is not surprising as Saudi Arabia is the 
world’s 7th largest spender in Education (SAGIA, 2012).  
This section will start with an overview of the social and cultural background of Saudi 
Arabia, and then discuss in more detail the economy of Saudi Arabia. Finally, it will 
consider the effect of culture and social background on business and management in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
2.6.2. The Social and Cultural Aspects of Saudi Arabia 
Generally, there is a lack of cultural studies in the Arab world and in Saudi Arabia 
specifically (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). However, there is a highly agreed upon view of Saudi 
society; it is highly personalized and kinship, friendship, and regionalism significantly 
affect individual actions and behaviour (Ali, 2009). 
According to Hickson and Pugh (1995), four powers have influenced Arab values. 
These are foreign power, the western quest for oil, Bedouins/tribal traditions, and Islam 
(Robertson, et al., 2013). The Bedouins and tribal heritage have a strong influence on 
the people of Saudi Arabia, with codes of loyalty and honour that date back to pre-Islam 
(Hickson and Pugh, 1995; Al-Rasheedi, 2012). This has created a strong patriarchal, 
top-down authoritative structure, referred to as “Bedo-aucracy” or “Sheikocracy” 
(Kassem and Habib, 1989; Robertson, et al., 2001).  
Saudi society is considered a convergent one, and such societies try to preserve their 
culture from outside influences (Al-Khatib, et al., 2004). Saudi has a homogenous and 
collective society with a loyalty and commitment to the group, whether family or works 
(Al-Anazi and Rodrigues, 2003; Ali, 1993; Ali, et al., 1997). There is more emphasis on 
the role of the group and less on the individual’s role, obedience to seniors, and the 
importance of connections and networks (Kassem and Habib, 1989). Saudi has never 
been colonized and this makes Saudis conscious and vigilant in relation to any outside 
influence (Robertson, et al., 2001). A person’s word is as good as written commitment 
in the Saudi culture; trust and honour are key pillars of Islamic culture (Mababaya, 
2002; Rice, 2003). 
Saudi society places a strong emphasis on the role of relationships (Farh et al., 1998). 
This is something akin to the concept of Quanxi in the eastern context. The role of 
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relationships has a strong effect on organizational culture in a way not comprehended 
by Western organizations (Farh, et al., 1998).  
Hofstede (1980) has not singled out the culture of Saudi Arabia; rather it was largely 
studied as part of the wider Arabic context (Noer, et al., 2007). The study included 
seven Arabian countries. The group scored highly in power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance, and low in individualism and masculinity (Robertson, et al., 2013). In the 
latest study by Hofstede and Minkov (2010), a new dimension, “long term orientation”, 
has been added; Saudi has a low score in this dimension (Cassell and Blake, 2012). 
What does this mean? People who score highly in power distance (80 in the case of 
Saudi) are showing “deep divisions of wealth and power, limited interaction and 
movement between social classes” (Al-Khatib, et al., 2004), and are hardworking and 
obedient (Rawwas, 2001). Scoring highly (68) on uncertainty avoidance means “rules 
and procedures are designed to limit uncertainty and intolerance for abnormal ideas and 
behaviours” (Al-Khatib, et al., 2004). Scoring low on individualism indicates “tight 
social frameworks, loyalty to family, friends, and the organization”. Finally, Saudi 
scored an average score on masculinity (50). This means, “Competition and 
performance are somewhat valued” (Al-Khatib, et al., 2004). 
A study by Ronen and Shenkar (1985) which looked into the culture in Middle East, 
Saudi Arabia was also grouped with a cluster of six Arabic countries where the 
researchers found similar cultural traditions (Robertson, et al., 2013). There is no single 
study that has investigated the Saudi culture alone.  
There is a conflict in Saudi Arabia between the modernisation movement and 
conservative powers that for decades have affected the development of the country (Al-
Ajmi, 2003). 
Despite the resistance from a fraction of the society, modern technology and the contact 
with the West has successfully managed to deeply and continuously influence Saudi 
traditional culture (Elmusa, 1997; Idris, 2007). Modern technology, especially the 
internet, has had a large influence on opening the gates to the outside world 
(Teitelbaum, 2002). 
The Saudi government, through sets of rules and legislation, in order to preserve the 
Saudi culture from foreign influence, has limited the interaction of low skilled foreign 
workers with the locals (Glasze, 2006). Highly and medium skilled expatriates reside 
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mostly in closed compounds, creating social living similar to that which they experience 
in their home countries. This limits their interactions with the locals (Glasze, 2006). 
This might explain why a country with a large foreign presence is not considered as 
multicultural society.   
Saudi Arabia is an Islam dominated country, which strongly influences the cultural 
aspects and traditions. Saudi is the birthplace of Islam and has the two holy custodians 
in Mecca and Medina, which is a destination of millions of Muslims each year. Thus, 
Saudi has the assumed responsibility of religious leadership for Muslims, which in 
return has resulted in imposing strict control over social and moral values in strict 
adherence to Islamic teachings (Robertson et al., 2013; Hickson and Pugh, 1995).  
No one can underestimate the influence of religion on a country’s culture (Hickson and 
Pugh, 1995; Hofstede, 2001; Rice, 2003). It is evident in Saudi Arabia where Islamic 
teaching is apparent in many social aspects (Alanazi and Rodrigues, 2003; Mababaya, 
2002; Rice, 2003). Thus, as the birthplace of Islam, religion’s relevance in the lives of 
the people of Saudi Arabia is greater than in any other Islamic nation (Hickson and 
Pugh, 1995; Mababaya, 2002; Robertson, et al., 2001). This, as some authors (Ali, 
1990; Mababaya, 2002; Al-Rasheedi and Rice, 2003) argue, has influenced the business 
dealings and management of organizations in Saudi Arabia. 
 
2.6.3. Saudi's Economy and Business Climate 
Saudi Arabia’s economy is the largest in the area, and it is a G20 country holding a 25% 
share of total Arab GDP (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2013). It has a GDP of 727.307 
billion dollars and GDP per capita of 25.084 thousand dollars (IMF, 2012). Saudi 
Arabia is growing at a rate of 5.13% per year. The continuous demands on oil have 
made it possible for the kingdom to finance various development programs (Kassem, 
1989). However, there is huge dependency of the Saudi economy on the world 
economy; the Saudi economy is classified as a “one-crop economy”, although there are 
serious attempts to change this fact and break the link between the Saudi economy’s fate 
and the fluctuation of the oil market (Abu-Musa, 2006; Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2013). 
The private sector contribution to GDP is around 57.57% (CDSI, 2012). Alnatheer and 
Nelson (2009) have pointed out that the goal of the economic plan is to reduce 
dependency on the oil sector and encourage the private sector to take a more prominent 
role in the economy. The Saudi government, for its part, is trying to improve the 
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business environment to achieve prosperity, and to raise the productivity of all sectors. 
The Saudi government’s spending plays an important role in driving the economy and 
this role is not likely to decline any time soon (Ali, 2009).  
Saudi has been trying for years to diversify its economies from oil dependencies, by 
launching industrialization projects, adapting modern technologies, and fostering and 
supporting high intensive industries, and finally by increasing the role of the private 
sector and ensuring less reliance on the government as the sole driver of the economy 
(Schliephake, 1995; Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2013). In the 1970s, different plans were 
adopted to diversify the economy, including moving into transforming iron ore into 
steel and hydrocarbons into petrochemicals (Auty, 1988). The establishment of two 
industrial cities, Jubail and Yanbu, to support petrochemical and oil-intensive heavy 
industries was not enough to diversify the economy (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2013). In 
addition, Saudis have focused on improving the financial sector and transforming it into 
a developed asset that finances economic activity in Saudi Arabia (Samargandi, et al., 
2013). Now Saudi is pursuing a new strategy focusing its effort on replacing natural 
resources with the knowledge economy (Alshumaimri, et al., 2012; Samargandi, et al., 
2013; Shin, et al., 2012b). The accession into world trade in 2005 has opened the 
country’s economy, and as result the country’s laws and regulations have begun to 
conform to international standards (Idris, 2007). This has given the legislator an 
opportunity to liberalise and reform the Saudi economy (Arab Law Quarterly, 2001; 
Merdah and Sadi, 2011). Saudi has come a long way in improving its market state; 
Saudi was ranked 11
th
 for ease of doing business according to the Doing Business 2011 
report (Cassel and Blake, 2012). However, as a developing country, Saudi Arabia has 
faced considerable challenges in adapting to the new economic policies (Marar, 2004).  
There is a pressing problem facing the Saudi government, as is the case in many 
countries, of youth unemployment. Saudi unemployment has reached 12.10% (CDSI, 
2012), with the rate being higher for youth aged 20-24 (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2013). 
The demographic trends in Saudi Arabia could magnify current problems; 80% of the 
population is under 30, and 60% is under 20. This is pushing the government to 
accelerate the building and the establishment of educational institutions and universities 
and to keep or increase the current growth rate (Al-hazmi, 2010; Al-Filali and 
Gallarotti, 2013). Since the 1970s, the Saudi economy has been relying heavily on 
foreign work force (Ali, 2009). Currently public organizations are employing 70% of 
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the Saudi workforce (Al-Yahya, 2009), while 80% of the private sector workforces are 
comprised of foreign workers (Fanack.com, 2013). The dependency of the private sector 
on foreign labour has hindered the development of a local skilled workforce, as Saudis 
could not compete with foreign workers, whether on skills or salaries (Al-Kibsi, et al., 
2007). This has resulted in Saudi Arabia facing a shortage of skilled local human capital 
in many advanced technologies (Abu-Musa, 2006; Curry and Kadash, 2002; Idris, 
2007). 
Therefore, the Saudi government has vigorously engaged into a process called 
“Saudiziation” a job localization program (Sadi and Al-Buraey, 2009). The aim of the 
program is to reduce the country’s dependency on expatriate and replace them with 
local citizen to reduce an unemployment rates (Sadi and Al-Buraey, 2009). Foreign 
firms started to feel the heat, and the Saudi government have introduced new tough 
quotas for the number of Saudis employees (Williams, 2009). This means firms in 
private sector will have to hire and train a Saudi staff or risk facing penalty; which is 
something not common in Saudi Arabia (Williams, 2009). 
These facts have slowed Saudi Arabia in its attempt to make the transition to a 
knowledge economy (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2013). Saudi Arabia has a good 
information-technology infrastructure, ranked as 21
st
 in the world (World Bank, 2012); 
it has the largest and fastest growth in the Middle East (Alghamdi, et al., 2012). 
However, it needs to improve its human capital to complement the development in the 
infrastructure.  
The Saudi economy is undeveloped in some parts, as it is lacking professional analysis 
and financial databases, which are essential components for the healthy business 
environment (Al-Razzen and Karbhari, 2004). Furthermore, despite attempts to present 
the firms as professionally managed, most family firms are still led by family and 
founders’ ideologies and strategic decisions (Robertson, et al., 2013). 
Saudi businessmen and the private sector are facing some obstacles that are causing 
concern, including lack of financial facilities, lack of skills, dependency on a foreign 
workforce, bureaucracy, poor procedures and legal policies, and lack of information 
(Looney, 1991; Merdah and Sadi, 2011). 
Moreover, the still-developing information technology capabilities make the Saudi 
market immature compared to more developed markets (Alnatheer and Nelson, 2009). 
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It is imperative for foreign firms to take account of the culture of Saudi Arabia when 
operating. Things like prayer times, days of rests, and fasting are important times in the 
normal Saudi calendar (Cassell and Blake, 2012). 
Saudi Arabia is considered as an attractive place to invest for many international firms; 
it allows them to access a new market with good spending power, and to access raw 
materials such as crude oil and natural gas. There are also tax benefits, tax holidays for 
firms and no income tax for individuals (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). Saudi Arabia is equipped 
with a developed infrastructure with ports, airports and roads accompanied by 
considerably lower labour costs (Al-Rasheedi, 2012).  
The economy in Saudi Arabia has a very large scope for growth with potential for 
increasing demand in all sorts of services (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). The economy is the 
largest in the Middle East (SAGIA, 2013).  
Saudi family firms are now entering a new phase, forming ISAs and internationalising 
in an attempt to utilise their competitive advantage (Williams, 2009; Jasimuddin, 2001). 
The liberalization of the Saudi market, which made it easy for foreign firms to enter the 
Saudi market, has pushed Saudi firms to change (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). In SAs, the 
technical capabilities and competencies of foreign partner are coupled with local 
knowledge and the connections of the local partner to give the ISA a competitive 
advantage (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). Although some firms choose to licence their technology 
to the Saudi partner or collaborate through other forms, SA is still the preferred method 
for both parties (Williams, 2009).  
Foreign firms have favoured ISAs to enter the Saudi market, due to various reasons. 
William (2009) and Mababaya (2002) have cited indirect government sanctions as a 
reason. The government is favouring the formation of joint ventures, as they allows 
local firms to interact and become directly involved with the work of foreign firms 
(Williams, 2009). The government does not force foreign firms to form JVs, but 
encourages them by offering incentives to IJVs with Saudi partners. For foreign firms 
entering into SAs with Saudi partners, it offers tax-holidays, interest-free loans, and 
foreign firms have a stronger chance of winning government contracts if they are part of 
a JV (Mababaya, 2002). Of course, no one can neglect the fact that differences of Saudi 
society culture and tradition and local firms, along with their strong local networks, will 
help foreign firms to overcome any difficulties (Al-Rasheedi, 2012).  
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Many businesses operating in Saudi Arabia or wishing to operate have their doubts 
about the effectiveness of the Saudi legal system. Saudi Arabia is controlled by two 
legal systems; one is based on Islamic teachings, and the others is based on secularized 
laws (Kwong and Levitt, 2009; Marar, 2004). This duality of legal systems is apparent 
in financial sectors where there is a need to adapt the system to current market 
economies and at the same time face the challenge of adhering to Islamic teachings 
(Marar, 2004). 
The legal system in Saudi has been a centre of the fight between traditionalist and 
modern movements (Al-Jarbou, 2007). Thus, it is common to see some regulating 
bodies having their own laws and dispute committees that rule differently from the law 
practised in Saudi courts (Wapler, 2001; Marar, 2004). The regulating body for foreign 
investment is the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) (SAGIA, 
2013).  
 
2.6.4. Culture and Business Management in Saudi 
Several authors (Ali, 1995; Assad, 2002; Rice, 2004) have highlighted the influence of 
traditional Islamic, tribal, and family values on the management culture of Saudi 
Arabia. Loyalty and obedience are of paramount importance in the Gulf, and children 
are taught these values from a young age. The importance of the group welfare and its 
harmony in society has been reflected in how business is conducted in the Gulf (Al-
Khatib, et al., 2004). The influence and importance of trust in the Gulf is not restricted 
to social relations; it extends to organizational and transactional relations as well 
(Shane, et al., 1995). Thus, personal reputation and image, which includes trust, 
sincerity, and worthiness, is important (Ali, 2009). 
The culture in Saudi Arabia has been cited as a hindrance to the improvement and 
adaptation of new technology. Alnatheer and Nelson (2009) have reported that national 
culture in Saudi Arabia has been an obstacle in the adaptation of information security 
practices.  
Idris (2007) has discussed the cultural barriers that stand in the way of improving 
organizational performance in Saudi Arabia. First, collective thinking is affecting 
business dealings, as it dictates relationships. In addition, Idris advocates the studies that 
show that organizations’ performance in developing countries, like Saudi Arabia, 
cannot improve if not accompanied with changes in culture. The culture is the main 
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challenge facing Saudi organizations transforming their local employees into 
competitive advantage. 
The importance of kinship over business has been cited as a hindrance in managing in 
Saudi Arabia. It made the organizations less rule-bound, decisions were not based on 
merits, and nepotism had greater effect on business and management (Al-Aiban and 
Pearce, 1993).  
Saudi is lacking a managerial skilled workforce and management know-how (Yavas, 
1998; Merdah and Sadi, 2011). The predominant style of leadership and decision-
making in Saudi Arabia is consultative; although the use of participative leadership has 
increased and there is a change of attitude towards more participative leadership (Al-
Yahya, 2009). Some of the managerial problems in Saudi have been attributed to the 
presence of “tribal mentality” which hinders the development of institutionalism, 
initiatives, and professionalism (Ali, 2009).  
Another interesting social factor affecting the business dealings in Saudi is 
accountability; mistakes are attributed to fate and accountability is weak (Bhuian et al., 
2001). This can take us to Walker et al. (2003), who analysed the role of “fatalism, or 
the belief that ultimate control lies in the hand of God” in Saudi culture and its existence 
in the workplace. It is used as a way to justify things going wrong or being delayed, and 
blaming fate instead being accountable to their actions. Tuncalp (1988) has pointed to 
the fact that Saudis attribute their misfortune to fate due to their deep sense of fatalism.  
The Saudi has preferences to managerial jobs; this is because labour jobs are not looked 
at favourably among the people (Cassell and Blake, 2012; Idris, 2007). Saudis are 
motivated by status and positions (Idris, 2007). This has resulted in a large shortage of 
technical and labour workforce and has increased reliance on foreign workers (Idris, 
2007). 
Saudi, as a country with high power distance, is accordingly making decisions 
autocratically and paternalistically (Cassell and Blake, 2012). The Saudi score on 
masculinity is reflected in hiring and firing practices. It is rare to witness a termination 
of a contract due to poor performance (Idris, 2007).  
That being said, some authors claim that countries in the Middle East, despite sharing 
Arabic and Islamic identity, are different when it comes to their managerial practices. 
For example, Ali and Al-Shakhis (1989) have found that Saudi managers, compared to 
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Iraqis, are less egalitarian, individualistic, and less humanistic. Moreover, Robertson, et 
al. (2001) points out that despite the collectivist nature of Middle Eastern countries, 
Saudis come out slightly more individualistic in the workplace than other countries. 
They also add that Saudis’ work beliefs are unique and independent of the beliefs of 
Kuwaitis and Omanis, despite them sharing many attributes with them.   
Robertson, et al. (2001), also thinks that Saudi managers are more resistant to outside 
influences compared to other Islamic cultures. However, despite the influence of the 
traditional culture, Ali (1995) has a different opinion; he thinks that Saudi culture is 
participative, egalitarian, and sensitive to others’ beliefs. He adds that Saudi 
management culture has been “polluted” by outside, foreign, influences.  
Ali (2009) points out that the rising middle class business people are showing levels of 
sophistication and objectivism. They make their judgments based on facts and hard 
figures more than on emotion and subjective inclination (Ali, 2009). 
There are notable differences between west and east, and managers from multinational 
companies should take note of these differences. According to Al-Khatib, et al. (2004) 
individuals from Eastern cultures show higher level of opportunism comparing to 
individuals from Western cultures. Moreover, the typical Western separation between 
personal and professional holds no ground in Saudi Arabia (Ali, 2009).  
There is a Saudi reliance on and infatuation with Western management literature and 
understanding, especially American (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). Arabians are in general 
fascinated by the American way of conducting business (Ali, 2009). Most of the 
management books and theories taught at universities are foreign material (Idris, 2007). 
Furthermore, private organizations, which are driven by efficiency and profits, are more 
flexible and willing to change (Al-Aiban and Pearce, 1993). Despite that, Saudi 
business and management education is recent, and is thus not completely influenced by 
modern management (Bhuian, et al., 2001). It has been argued that management and 
leadership are influenced by accumulated traditions and values (Idris, 2007). This fact 
has created a blend between traditional culture and modern techniques of management, 
which has made Saudi Arabia unique (Abu-Musa, 2006).  
The advice in the literature for international managers to reduce transaction costs when 
operating in the Gulf, according to Al-Khatib, et al. (2004), is to build a trustworthy 
relationship with their respective business partners. Saudi businessmen tend to take their 
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time before doing business with someone. This is because of the value of trust and 
relationship; businessmen prefer to build some sort of relationship and mutual trust 
before starting a business (Harris, et al, 2004; Niblock and Malik, 2007). 
In this chapter, we reviewed the main theoretical perspectives regarding the formation 
of ISAs; we also reviewed the literature regarding learning, culture, and performance of 
ISAs. The chapter concluded by providing detail overview of the study (Saudi) context. 
The third chapter sets out the research methods employed to collect the data for 
undertaking the empirical analysis. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
Business research is categorised into applied research and fundamental research 
(Sekaran, 2006). The aim of applied research is to investigate a specific problem 
experienced in a company or sector, while fundamental research provides a more 
general overview. It aims to generate knowledge and understanding about certain 
phenomena being experienced in a certain settings.  
The way research is conducted and the research instrument utilized is dependent on the 
research goals (“objectives”) and questions. The research might also be influenced by 
the researcher’s philosophical stance. This study examines ISA formation motives and 
success factors of the management of ISAs in Saudi Arabia, from the perspective of 
Saudi partner.  
Despite the global interest in investing in the Saudi market, there is a huge shortage of 
academic studies relating to ISAs in the Saudi context. The country has received little 
management research attention, even in comparison with other Middle Eastern countries 
(Dedoussis, 2004; Noer, et al., 2007; Alnatheer and Nelson, 2009). This has resulted in 
a shortage of data concerning many business and management areas (Alnatheer and 
Nelson, 2009; Al-Yahya, 2009; Al-ajmi, 2003; Al-Khatib, et al., 2004), including 
studies on organizational performance and the effects of culture on business in Saudi 
Arabia (Idris, 2007). However, these apparent difficulties are what make Saudi Arabia a 
unique place to conduct this research, which will fill the identified research gap and 
enrich the existing body of literature.   
The absence of similar studies made it difficult for the researcher to recognise the scale 
of research difficulties, especially those related to the data collection phase, which will 
be considered in further details later in this chapter.  
The aims of this chapter are to: 
 Explain the research strategy and methodologies used. 
 Identify the research instruments used.  
This chapter begin with a brief description of the research questions, and the research 
hypotheses. The chapter will then give a detailed explanation of the research method of 
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this study; followed by explaining the process of research design, with emphasis on 
questionnaire development, sample selection, and distribution methods. Finally, we 
conclude this chapter by explaining the statistical analysis tools that have been used in 
this study. 
 
3.2. Research Questions and Research Hypothesis 
Any research study starts by identifying a problem statement and then defining the 
relationship between the investigated variables in a logical manner (please sees section 
1.2 to view the research questions). After that, a process of hypothesis development and 
testing begin. To check whether the hypothesis can stand under logical reasoning, data 
is collected from a proper sample and used for testing (Sekaran, 2006). It should be 
noted that the process of formulating a hypothesis provides the researcher with a clear 
framework when collecting, analysing, and interpreting the data. Consequently, the 
hypothesis contains a possible solution to the research problem, and is then either 
verified or rejected after the data is gathered and analysed (Sarantakos, 1998).   
There are no conditions regarding what form the hypothesis should take, except that it 
should not be in the form of a question. The hypothesis can be formulated in descriptive 
or rational form. In the first case, it describes events, while in the second it establishes 
relationships between variables. In addition, a hypothesis can be formulated in 
directional, non-directional or null form. A directional hypothesis, which refers to the 
relationship between variables, can be generally positive or negative. It is positive if the 
cause and effect are in the same direction, and negative if the cause and effect are in 
opposite directions (Trochim, 2000).  
Non-directional hypotheses claim a relationship or differences, but unlike directional 
hypotheses, they have no direction. Thus, the research may not state whether the 
relation is positive or negative (Sekaran, 2006). A summary table of the research 
hypotheses can be viewed at the conclusion chapter, section 8.4.  
There are certain criteria that hypotheses should meet, although methodologists disagree 
on whether all these criteria should be met or whether only a few of them are necessary. 
The criteria that hypotheses should demonstrate are as follows:  
 Empirically testable. 
 Clear, specific and precise. 
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 Statements should not be contradictory. 
 Describe variables or establish a relationship between variables. 
 Describe one issue only (Sarantakos, 1998). 
The next two sections will explain the research method of this study; then it will explain 
the process of designing the research. 
 
3.3. Research Design 
Research design is the process and plan that guides the research into collecting the 
necessary data to test the hypothesis. Research design aims to ensure the best possible 
answers for the research questions. It is a strategy that includes data collection, 
sampling methods, and empirical data analysis techniques, while taking into the account 
resource limitations, time frame, and other external factors.  
Research studies vary according to purpose; they can be exploratory, hypothesis testing, 
or both. Few research studies have been conducted which look into the issues of 
strategic motives, learning, trust, and culture holistically as success factors in the 
management of ISAs, especially in the Saudi context. 
An extensive review of the literature was conducted to identify the success factors. 
After that, hypotheses were developed that predicted the firms’ motivation and selection 
criteria which to be addressed in chapter 4, learning which to be addressed in chapter 5, 
and the effect of trust, communication and cultural factors on performance which to be 
addressed in chapters 6 and 7. This study has undertaken a statistical quantitative 
approach to test them.  
One of the most important steps when conducting research is to identify the unit of 
analysis. That is the body (subject) in the study. The unit of analysis can be individuals, 
organizations, artefacts, or social phenomena. The researchers determine the units they 
intend to analyse in their studies depending on the research questions and the level at 
which research results are to be generalised (Judd, Smith and Kidder, 1991). In this 
research, the units of analysis are the managers and executives of Saudi firms. Given the 
nature of the information being sought, the sample unit should have had some first-hand 
experience in managing or negotiating ISAs in Saudi Arabia. More details about 
sampling are included in section 3.3.2. 
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Studies can be cross-sectional or longitudinal. A cross-sectional study takes place at a 
single point in time, while a longitudinal study takes place over time. In longitudinal 
studies, the unit of analysis is measured at least twice over time. This study has taken a 
cross-sectional approach; the survey stage of this research was carried out in Saudi 
Arabia between January and May 2012. The researcher interference in this study was 
minimal. 
In the coming section we will discuss in the research method, sampling, questionnaire 
design, pilot study, the use of web survey, and the response rate and data characteristics.  
 
3.3.1. Data Collection Method 
This section, through the following discussion, justifies the selection of this study 
method and why it is seen as the most appropriate for this research. This study adopts a 
questionnaire survey method; epistemologically, it is post-positivist research, which 
focuses on explaining causal relationship among variables through construction of 
quantifiable measures; it uses statistical technique to test or verify theories (Muijs, 
2011). Post-positivist methodology and methods are thus relevant to this study, which 
aims to develop instruments to assess and identify success factors in the management of 
ISAs. 
The nature of the phenomena under investigation justifies the use of such methods. The 
complexity of the research area with various independent and dependent variables has 
pushed the researcher in this direction. The reason for having a large number of 
variables is that there is an issue of data availability in Saudi Arabia; no conclusions can 
be drawn from the existing data. The absence of any research on the management of 
ISAs in Saudi Arabia has motivated the researcher to try to uncover some of the factors 
and build a reliable research model that investigates the phenomena fairly. There are no 
public data on ISA management to draw any conclusions or gain any information about 
the state of ISA management. This deductive research allowed the researcher to 
formulate assumptions and new theories based on existing knowledge and on 
observation. In this type of research (deductive) the researcher starts from a particular 
problem in the real world, and then after consulting the literature and intellectual 
resources formulates a solution to solve the existing problem.  
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One of the key issues in research is the methodology employed by the researcher: does 
it answer the question of the research, and is it suitable for theory development or 
theory testing? This research is deductive in nature, with its hypotheses validated by an 
empirical survey. As Ragin (1989) points out, quantitative approach is well suited to 
“testing hypotheses, identifying general patterns, and making predictions”. Many 
researchers agree that quantitative research is well suited with hypothesis testing (Muijs, 
2011). 
To deduce a hypothesis, it must be subject to empirical scrutiny. The process of 
deduction is: 
1.           Theory 
 
2.       Hypothesis 
 
1.      Data Collection 
 
2.           Findings 
 
3. Hypothesis is confirmed or rejected 
 
4. Revision of Theory 
Source: Saunders, et al. (2009) 
Other reason for using quantitative approach is the ability to generalise from a sample to 
the population (Moser and Kalton, 2001). It allows the researcher to develop 
generalizations that contribute to theory, which in turn enable the researcher to predict, 
understand, and explain certain phenomena. Unlike qualitative design where the 
relatively low sample numbers may lead to arguing that findings are unrepresentative of 
the population. 
 
3.3.2. Sample Design 
The use of sampling to obtain precise information is an efficient technique and is widely 
used. It is encouraged in the literature as an alternative to surveying the entire 
population. Some authors, such as Churchill (1979), argue that sampling can be more 
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accurate due to the potential for non-sampling error associated with a complete census 
(Yu and Cooper, 1983).  
It is almost impossible to survey a whole population due to problems of time, cost, and 
accessibility. That is why sampling is a good solution for researchers; smaller and more 
manageable samples can be representative of an entire population (Saunders, et al., 
2009). However, the difficulty is how to sample and under what bases, and determining 
whether a sample is representative of a whole population.  
The study employed the following selection criteria to respondents: the target 
population of this research is the Saudi firm engaged in ISAs, whether in form of equity 
or non-equity. Given the nature of the information being sought, the sample unit should 
have had some first-hand experience of managing or negotiating ISAs in Saudi Arabia 
(for example, CEO, VP, GM, or PM). There are no data available regarding the precise 
size of the survey population; the estimated number of units varied considerably 
between government agencies and other publications. Empirical studies have always 
faced a number of limitations and challenges, especially in emerging markets and in 
Saudi in particular (Robertson, et al., 2013). Furthermore, ISAs data are known to be 
difficult to obtain (Silva, et al., 2012). Unlike M&A, firms are not obliged to report 
them. Firms might build a partnership without recording it officially.  
In this study, the researcher had the predicament of the unavailability of any list that can 
serve as sampling frames; hence drawing random samples. To overcome this problem, 
the researcher collected the primary data by adopting what is known as “literature 
counting method” (Hagedoorn and Narula, 1996; Silva, et al., 2012). This method is 
widely used and accepted in the ISAs literature (Johnson, et al., 1996; Miotti and 
Sachwald, 2003; Silva, et al., 2012). In this method, the information is gathered through 
the use of multiple resources; for example, journal articles, specialized books, journal, 
newspaper, guide books, and business and trade press (Hagedoorn and Narula, 1996: p. 
270). The literature counting method is the only way to develop a large-scale database 
of alliance activities in this context (Silva, et al., 2012). Hence, we have used the 
literature counting method in this study; the sample was drawn from many sources. In 
early 2011, several agencies were contacted in an attempt to obtain the contact 
information of potential respondents. The Ministry of Commerce, Saudi Investment 
Authority (SAGIA), Chambers of Commerce, a Directory of Multinational Companies 
in Saudi Arabia 2010, and the Commerce attachés of many foreign embassies in Saudi 
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Arabia were all approached to obtain the number of ISAs and their contact information. 
However, not all of them possessed the data sought. 
First, the Ministry of Commerce was contacted several times, but no response was 
received. Therefore, a personal visit was made. Their answer was that they did not 
possess such a list. The researcher asked a friend with a personal connection to people 
from the Ministry, but no list was available. Then the Saudi Investment Authority 
(SAGIA) was contacted, and an email was sent asking them about the list, but no 
response was received. Thus, a personal visit was made, and the researcher was asked to 
follow the procedure and put the request in writing, to be approved by the manager. 
Several visits were made, but the request was not fulfilled. A family friend of the 
researcher was then asked to arrange a meeting with the manager, where the list was 
finally obtained. However, the list was unorganized, with many companies appearing 
repeatedly. The information was limited to the name of the company in Arabic, and 
their telephone and fax numbers. It should be noted that only the companies who used 
SAGIA services would be registered in their lists. Thus, any companies that did not 
enter the Saudi market through SAGIA would not be listed, which means their list 
would not be representative of the whole population. Therefore, other agencies, 
including the Chambers of Commerce for different Saudi cities, were contacted. A list 
of foreign companies operating in Saudi Arabia was also obtained. However, there was 
no indication as to whether the companies were wholly owned subsidiaries or ISAs. 
Thus, the researcher had to refer to the public domain to find out whether these 
companies had any form of Joint Venture. When in doubt, the companies were included 
in the sample. In addition, the Multinational Companies in Saudi Arabia 2010 directory 
was used. This directory was useful, although not always relevant. It included 
embassies, airlines operating in Saudi, and offices of large multinationals. The 
researcher also contacted the commerce attachés of many foreign embassies in order to 
get hold of any available lists. No response was received from the majority of the 
commerce offices, with the exception of the Spanish embassy. Therefore, contact 
numbers of executives were extracted from the public domain by conducting individual 
searches. Eventually, a database of 600 ISAs was successfully built. The database 
included the names of the companies and the executives’ names and contact details. To 
reduce sampling error, the researcher employed a random sampling technique, as this 
can estimate the population with acceptable precision (Dillman, et al., 2009). 
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To reduce sampling error, the sample of 600 ISAs out of around 3300 ISAs in the 
Kingdom was built randomly. The sample represents around 18% of the whole 
population, which is considered representative of the whole population. A completed 
sample of 3% of the whole population would be suitable for the researcher to generalize 
the findings with confidence (Dillman, et al., 2009). It can be said with confidence that 
the sample in this research exceeds 3% of the whole population; as a best estimate, the 
number of international strategic alliances in Saudi Arabia is around 3300. Responses 
were checked to ensure the elimination of any bias, such as "centre bias" where a 
respondent chooses the middle response (Neutral) for all the questions in the survey.  
 
3.3.3. Questionnaire Design 
The development of the questionnaire was guided by the literature review, consultation 
with experts, and a pilot test. It has adopted previously tested measures from earlier 
studies and tested them in new contexts. It has thus already passed tests of validity and 
reliability. A self-administered instrument, delivered via the internet to the target 
sample, used in this survey. The target population are internet and email-dependent 
when conducting business (Idris, 2007). The questionnaire was structured in six 
sections: 1) general information; 2) formation and motivation; 3) learning; 4) culture; 5) 
trust; 6) performance. 
The author was aware of the issue of low response rates associated with mail (email) 
surveys. In addition, from personal experience, knowledge of our local culture and 
conversations with fellow academics and colleagues it was clear that response rates will 
be even lower in Saudi Arabia. Many researchers have to endure great difficulties when 
collecting data from multinational companies in Saudi Arabia, with many 
questionnaires unanswered, unopened, or rejected due to confidentiality (Viola, 1982; 
Mababaya, 2002). Viola (1982) and Mababaya (2002) in their theses managed to get 
only 45 completed responses despite all their efforts to increase response rates. 
Therefore, an extensive review of the literature was conducted in order to increase 
response rates and to anticipate a low response rate.  
Hence, after careful review of literature we have identified five factors as the most 
effective for increasing response rates in surveys. These are sponsorship, saliency, 
follow-ups, personalization, and incentives (Paxons, 1992; Fan and Yan, 2010).  
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First, providing information about the survey to potential respondents and indicating 
how the result will be used and how it might benefit them is a good way to encourage 
participants (Dillman, et al., 2009; Paxons, 1992; Anseel, et al., 2010; Fan and Yan, 
2010). In this research, the researcher ensured that the cover letter contained enough 
information about the survey topics, and the importance of the respondent’s 
contribution would be to the body of literature. Moreover, it gave respondents the 
chance to ask any questions, and they were provided with the researcher’s contact 
information in case they needed any clarification or had questions. Furthermore, the 
respondents were given promises of anonymity, which generally encourage more 
participants. The researcher received some emails, phone calls, and requests to call back 
from respondents asking about the area of the research.  
The quality of questionnaire presentation can also affect the response rate. The 
questionnaire was designed as a conversation, in a way that follows a logical order. This 
means grouping related questions that cover similar topics together, rather than jumping 
from one topic to another which gives the questionnaire a professional look. The 
questionnaire has included rating (ordinal) scales for most of the questions. In some 
questions, It gave the respondents the chance to formulate their responses. 
In addition, during the questionnaire construction careful attention was made in 
planning the first question(s), especially in web surveys. The first question might 
determine whether the participant responds to the survey or not. Thus, we made sure not 
place long, boring, complicated, or embarrassing questions at the beginning (Dillman, et 
al., 2009). A quality of the first question is that it should be easy to read and respond to, 
and should encourage the respondents to continue. Hence, during the pilot study the 
participants were asked about their opinion regarding the first questions, which we will 
discuss in later this section (3.3.4). 
The other factor affecting response rates is the questionnaire design and layout. 
Presentation and visual display are important factors and encourage higher response 
rates (Yu and Cooper, 1983; Dillman, et al., 2009; Fan and Yan, 2010). Thus, we 
established a consistency in the visual presentation of questions, especially when it 
comes to fonts, font size, spacing, and alignments. 
It was important to build a simple but professional covering letter and questionnaire 
with clear and easy-to-follow instructions on how to complete the survey and return it. 
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The questionnaire and covering letter (both headed with the university logo) were 
translated into Arabic. It should be noted that academic or government sponsored 
surveys have higher response rates than commercial ones (Fan and Yan, 2010). The 
initial English language version of the questionnaire was subjected to a back translation 
process. It was first translated into Arabic, and then an Arabic bilingual professional 
translator blind translated it back into English. The translation and back translation 
process continued until the Arabic and English language versions substantially agreed 
with each other. Both versions of the questionnaire draft were successfully pretested for 
instrument validity. 
The email covering letter was sent in Arabic and English. The two covering letters were 
designed to stand in parallel, giving the respondents the option to choose the language 
they felt more comfortable with (please see appendix A). The potential respondents 
were given the chance to either fill in the questionnaire online or download it if they 
preferred. The questionnaire was not attached to the initial email invitation, in order to 
avoid triggering security filters. The printed copies of the questionnaire were prepared 
in a booklet template, giving them a professional look and making them look “shorter”. 
Detailed instructions were given in each section on the nature of the questions and how 
to apply the scale to respond to the questions. 
It is important to make it rewarding for respondents to participate. People are often 
overwhelmed by survey requests, and it thus becomes more important for the researcher 
to distinguish his/her survey from the rest and highlight the potential benefits of 
responding to the survey. Social exchange posits, “People’s voluntary actions are 
motivated by the return these actions are expected to, and often do, bring from others. 
People engage in a social exchange with others when the perceived rewards outweigh 
the expected cost” (Dillman, et al., 2009). Tangible rewards were discussed a lot in the 
literature in an attempt to increase response rates (Yu and Cooper, 1983; Dillman, et al., 
2009; Anseel, et al., 2010). However, due to the status of respondents, this technique 
might be ineffective and might be offensive to the respondents, as putting a monetary 
value to their time would be offensive if it is small sum, or might entail a big financial 
burden on the researcher if it is large sum. Such an incentive was replaced by explaining 
the importance of their contribution to the body of research and promising them a 
summary of the results and the chance to discuss it with them, which proved to be 
effective as the number who requested a copy of the study was large.  
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Furthermore, showing positive regard seems to have a positive effect on response rate. 
Making people feel positively regarded by other people makes them feel rewarded and 
encourages them to participate (Dillman, et al., 2009). In an attempt to show 
appreciation to encourage more responses, the cover letter should be full of appreciative 
and humble words (Dillman, et al., 2009). This can also take different forms; providing 
different options to respond is one. In this research, participants were given many 
options to fill in the questionnaire and return it in the most convenient way possible. 
This showed respect and professionalism. Providing different options to complete the 
survey in both Arabic and English language should encourage potential respondents to 
participate. The literature noticed the positive effect that personalized contact has on 
mail survey response rates, either in the form of advance notice or personalized cover 
letters (Yu and Cooper, 1983). Personalization is needed more in the Saudi context and 
especially when using email-surveys. With the number of emails each ordinary person 
receives every day in their inbox, the invitation to participate in the survey should not 
appear as random; personalization creates increased response rates, whether 
participating or declining.    
Nonetheless, it has been argued that though personalization increases the response rate, 
it can decrease the response quality. This is because a personalized contact may 
compromise response anonymity. Therefore, in attempts to overcome the anonymity 
issue, this research gave the respondents a link to a web survey where it was possible to 
fill in the questionnaire anonymously. Alternatively, they could complete the PDF 
template and then resend it in an automated process that would leave no trace as to who 
filled in the survey.  
 
3.3.4. Pilot Study 
Piloting and testing the research design prior to major research gives the researcher the 
opportunity to assess potential difficulties (Babbie, 1998; Fowler, 1993). Pre-testing 
gives, the researcher the opportunity to assess the adequacy of the research design 
(instruments, data collection plan, methodological procedure) in generating the results 
sought from the population in question. Using pre-tested and tried instrument certainly 
reduces the amount of testing and piloting needed. There is no standard procedure on 
designing the pilot test; it is a matter of judgment.  
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There is an agreement between scholars (Babbie, 1998) that in order to enhance the 
quality of data gathered, and to have reliable and valid data, it is essential to test and 
pilot the questionnaire. The process can reduce measurement error, which is a result of 
answering the questions inaccurately because of misunderstanding the questions. There 
are several aspects to test in the pilot test, including the choice of vocabulary, sentence 
structure, wording, and clarity of instructions on how to answer. All these could be 
causes of confusion and potential problems. The question(s) could be invalid if a 
question is answered differently among respondents, or interpreted in the same way by 
the respondents but not in the way the researcher intended (Oksenberg, et al., 1991). 
Fowler (1993) noted that one of the best ways to test a questionnaire is by administering 
it personally to a selected group, and engaging them in discussion. The test group in this 
study were asked to comment on whether they thought there were relevant questions 
that were not included, and what their expectations were. The covering letter was 
included as well, and they were asked to provide feedback on the presentation, clarity, 
wording, length, and instructions. The test group included 5 academics and 10 
practitioners. 
The questionnaire in this study was bilingual, it was important to test it and ensure that 
the same question was understood the same way in both versions. To confirm the 
accuracy of translation, the questionnaire was back translated, and bilingual academics 
and practitioners checked the two versions to verify that they conveyed the same 
meaning. The pilot test confirmed that the questions were easily understood and the 
right length. It was given to bilingual friends of the researcher who had high levels of 
English proficiency, and they were asked to comment on wording and understanding.  
To establish face validity, the questionnaire was pilot tested on selected members of the 
academic staff from King Saud University and practitioners from various industries 
(pharmaceutical, law, services, manufacturing, public institutions, and trade). During 
the pilot test, the participants were asked to comment on the design, style, and 
presentation. To avoid measurement errors, participants were asked to comment on their 
understanding of each question and to highlight any vague or ambiguous questions. 
Wording is of paramount importance; vague, biased, or complex sentences are all 
causes of low survey completion rates (Paxons, 1992; Anseel, et al., 2010). To confirm 
the accuracy of the translation, bilingual academics and practitioners checked the two 
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versions to verify that they conveyed the same meaning. The pilot test confirmed that 
the questions were easily understood and the right length.  
Academics at King Saud University were visited and asked about their feedback and the 
quality of the questionnaire, as well as about what aspects might affect the quality of 
data or the response rate, based on their experience of conducting research in similar 
settings. In addition, comments and feedback were sought on the quality of the 
presentation, structure, layout, and testing the online version along with the printed one, 
and the PDF template. The respondents were given draft questionnaires; those in distant 
locations were sent questionnaires via email, while nearer respondents were handed 
their questionnaires. The respondents read the questions and were asked whether they 
understood them and whether they were easy or difficult to understand and follow. They 
were also asked about the length of the survey, and for their thoughts on the selection of 
answers in cases of closed questions, i.e. whether they were able to find their answer 
among the options. Feedback was excellent, and much praise on the style and structure 
was received. The feedback from the academics did not contribute much to the 
development of the questionnaire. They sent positive remarks and praise words, but 
with no constructive feedback on how to improve it. The practitioners, on the other 
hand, showed more enthusiasm and willingness to engage in discussion and asking 
questions.  A VP of a well-known company have sent the following message “In 
general, I thought the questionnaire was straight to the point; excellent questions, and all 
points that I have thought of while reading it I found that you were going to ask the 
question in my mind on a later stage”. 
After this process, and based on the suggestion from the respondents, improvements 
were made when it comes to wording and answer options. In addition, there were some 
amendments to the layout, the order of the questions, and some of the wording. The 
changes have included clarification of the word “tacit”. Practitioners found it difficult to 
understand, and it was thus explained more clearly. The question on employee numbers 
was changed after a law firm top executive noted that the options of 1 to 99 were not 
representative of the industry. In response to this, respondents were given more options. 
The final change was related to the order of the personal questions. A number of 
participants suggested moving personal questions to the end of the survey, as 
respondents might be deterred by answering about themselves rather than the ISA at the 
start of the survey.  
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The relevant literature states that questionnaire length and response rates are 
uncorrelated (Yu and Cooper, 1983). However, during the pilot test, a number of 
respondents stressed the importance of not sending out too long of a questionnaire. This 
was taken into account, as questionnaire length is an issue and could be off-putting, 
especially as the respondents were all “busy” executives. Convenience would certainly 
encourage more responses (Dillman, et al., 2009). Surveys that take less than 30 
minutes to complete have higher response rates (Paxons, 1992; Anseel, et al., 2010). 
Hence, we calculated how long in the survey would take for the average respondent to 
complete the survey. On average, it takes the respondents 24 minutes to fill out the 
questionnaire. The amount of time was deemed to be acceptable by the literature and the 
practitioner who participated in the pilot test. 
 
3.3.5. Web Surveys 
Researchers have been using different methods from mail and telephone, and the past 15 
years have seen a surge of new mode web-based surveys (Couper, et al., 2001; Fan and 
Yan, 2010). Web-based surveys have several advantages: short transmitting time, lower 
cost, different design options, and finally very easy data entry. However, web-based 
surveys are facing some challenges that may lead to biased results, a low response rate, 
and exclusion of those who have no internet access. Manfreda, et al. (2008) have 
conducted a study of 45 research studies, comparing the differences between web-
surveys and other survey methods in term of response rates, and have found that web 
surveys have an 11% lower response rate on average compared to other surveys. 
The web-survey literature is becoming increasingly rich with web-based survey 
becoming very popular and common. Internet-based technology solutions are evolving 
rapidly; communities are becoming technology dependent and infrastructure is 
improving by the day. This makes many articles or books discussing web-based surveys 
published 10 years (or even 5 years) ago outdated and not relevant to today’s reality. 
Some of the problems and limitations of using web-surveys in the 2000s are not 
relevant or present at this time due to higher technology adaptations and improved 
infrastructure.  
The web-based survey has a powerful tool, which is the availability of many designs to 
choose from, in contrast to the limitations associated with mail surveys. The possibility 
of guiding respondents, the inclusion of rich visual and audio stimuli, and motivating 
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the respondents to complete the survey are all-powerful features if utilized properly 
(Couper, et al., 2001). 
The biggest problem of web surveys has always been survey error. That part of the 
population with internet access is not representative of the whole population (Schonlau, 
et al., 2009; Couper, 2000). However, the population in this study all have an internet 
access and are technology literate. The use of technology is now the vital for conducting 
business, more so when it involves cross border partnerships. This means reducing the 
survey error (bias error) to a bare minimum. 
The literature has suggested many solutions to increase response rates in web-surveys; 
the majority of them are identical with the “classic” survey literature and have been 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Thus, in this section we are focusing only on what is 
related to web-surveys. Many researchers have included “progress indicators” in their 
web surveys. The rationale was that respondents are more likely to complete the survey 
if they know how much time is remaining. Previous research has shown that progress 
indicators do not increase completion rates; they might actually harm them, but in some 
situation it might increase them. Yan, et al., (2011) have concluded that questionnaire 
length and respondents’ expectations, based on the invitation, are the main 
determinants. Progress has a good effect only on short tasks that are below the 
respondents’ expectations.  
It is important to note the relevance of the technical reliability of the web-survey 
software. The software should be able to support all browsers, and should have a 
reputation of not breaking down or failing to load. All these factors might lead the 
respondents not to complete the survey (Fan and Yan, 2010). 
Galesic and Bosnjak (2009) answered the question on web-based questionnaires length. 
They found, unsurprisingly, that the stated length of the survey correlates negatively 
with initial participation and completion. Moreover, long questionnaires might affect 
the quality of the responses at the end of the questionnaire, leading to more uniform 
answers (Galesic and Bosnjak, 2009). 
 
3.3.6. Response Rate and Data Characteristics 
There is a general lack of interest and unresponsiveness in Saudi towards participation 
in questionnaires and research-related activity (Merdah and Sadi, 2011; Elmusa, 1997; 
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Robertson, et al., 2001). Some of the reasons for the low response rate in Saudi Arabia 
are considered to be: managers treat surveys as low priority due to their busy schedules; 
company information is treated as confidential; there are perceived to be no direct 
benefits from participating; and there is a cultural sensitivity towards cooperating with 
strangers. In light of this, the researcher employed several methods to overcome some 
of these constraints and increase the response rate. Previous research has suggested that 
employing more than one method for collecting survey data is acceptable and usually 
increases the response rate (Cobanoglu, et al., 2001; Dillman, et al., 2009). Thus, the 
questionnaire was distributed via email, fax, and foot-in-the-door. Furthermore, to 
encourage respondents to participate and provide accurate responses, they were 
guaranteed anonymity (Adler and Graham, 1989). Personal assurances of confidentiality 
were found to increase participation rates (Idris, 2007). In addition, participants were 
promised a summary report of the result findings if requested. Non-respondents were 
followed up with two reminders (via email and telephones) to reduce the coverage error.  
Timings were taking into consideration, avoiding start of the week and the end of the 
week, and the two weeks before the quarterly results for the company were publicly 
listed. In addition, non-respondents were followed up with reminder emails to reduce 
the coverage error.  
In total, 650 questionnaires were delivered; 190 were returned, but 56 had excessive 
missing data and were excluded. The final data set has only 134 usable questionnaires. 
Forty participants declined participation for some of the reasons cited above 
(confidentiality, not having the time, or declination with no reasons). The overall 
response rate was 20.6%, a rate which is considered to be excellent, considering the 
context. The number of people who opened the survey was large (295), and was twice 
the number of those who actually completed it (134). This variation between people 
who opened the survey and those who completed it could be due to a lack of available 
time amongst management personnel, or due to the questionnaire not being relevant to 
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Table 3.1 Participants Statistics 
Sent   650 
Viewed  295 
Started  190 
Dropouts   56 
Completed   134 
Response rate   20.6% 
 
Of the 134 respondents, 98 (73.2%) were senior executives (presidents, CEOs, general 
managers, and deputy general managers) and 13 (9.6%) were functional heads (e.g., 
finance, HR managers). Twenty-three (17.2%) opted not to answer this question. The 
sample was composed of 84 (62.67%) equity IJVs and 50 (37.3%) non-equity IJVs 
(contractual or cooperative alliances). The mean of the alliance age was 13.59 years 
(S.D. 13.215 years); however, the median was 8.00 years.  
Table 3.2 Sample Characteristics 
 No. % 
Foreign partner 
Location 
North American 38 28.5% 
European 48 35.7% 
Asian 16 11.9% 
Arab 16 11.9% 
Other 16 11.9% 
Alliance Form Equity  84 62.7% 
Non-Equity 50 37.3% 
Equity share Equal 50% 30 36.1% 
> 75% 9 10.8% 
< 49%  22 26.5% 
51 to 74% 22 26.5% 
Respondent’s Job 
titles 
Senior Executives 98 73.2% 
Functional Heads 13 9.6% 
No Answer Given 23 17.2% 
Ownership  Publicly Listed 
Company (PLC) 
28 20.9% 




Others 58 43.1% 
Industry of Alliance Manufacturing 55 41% 
Tertiary 79 59% 
Alliance Age Mean = 13.59 years (S.D. 13.215 years); Median 8.00 years.  
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A careful design and good planning are essential to avoid research errors. In this survey 
there were attempts to avoid non-sampling error at every stage. During data base 
building, the researcher contacted all the relevant agencies, government bodies and 
relevant publications to ensure a good estimate of the population size and obtain their 
contact information.  
The task of minimising, or eliminating non-response bias is a vital task in research, and 
no effort should be spared to avoid it (Richmond, 1964). The result of unit non-response 
error is due to the failure of the sample unit to return the questionnaire. To overcome 
this error, the researcher focused on reducing the non-response rate and tried to increase 
the response rate using the method above (Jain, Pinson and Ratchford, 1982). Finally, to 
avoid measurement error, participants in the pilot study were asked to comment on what 
they understood from each question and to highlight any vague or ambiguous questions. 
 
Table 3.3 Industry Sector of Saudi partner, foreign partner, and EJV 
Industry Sector  Saudi partner Foreign partner JV 
N % N % N % 
Food/Drink Manufacturing 6 4.5% 6 4.5% 6 7.1% 
Metals and Minerals processing 7 5.2% 8 6.0% 6 7.1% 
Power and Water 12 9.0% 12 9.0% 4 4.8% 
Construction 11 8.2% 13 9.7% 5 6.0% 
Petrochemicals 18 13.4% 18 13.4% 15 17.9% 
Pharmaceutical (Life Science) 4 3.0% 3 2.2% 0 0% 
ICT 4 3.0% 4 3.0% 0 0% 
Telecommunication 2 1.5% 1 0.7% 2 2.4% 
Health 5 3.7% 5 3.7% 3 3.6% 
Automobiles/Aerospace 1 0.7% 2 1.5% 1 1.2% 
Education 5 3.7% 3 2.2% 2 2.4% 
Logistics 3 2.2% 4 3.0% 4 4.8% 
Distribution 5 3.7% 3 2.2% 1 1.2% 
Financial Services 5 3.7% 4 3.0% 3 3.6% 
Other Manufacturing 21 15.7% 21 15.7% 18 21.4% 
Other Services 19 14.2% 20 14.9% 9 10.7% 
Other 6 4.4% 6 5.2% 5 6.0% 
Total 134 100% 134 100% 84 100% 
 
3.4. Measurement Quality 
Measurement is the process of recording the observations that are collected for the 
research (Trochim, 2000). In social science, measurement is the process of linking 
concepts to empirical issues in an organized plan (Carmines and Zeller, 1979; Riley, 
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1963). Measurements of the variables are an essential part of the research; without the 
proper measurement, the researcher cannot test the research hypothesis (Sekaran, 2006). 
Measurement, properly designed, should be able to obtain and establish the relationship 
between the empirical indicators (the responses) and the concepts. 
Development of research measures can take place either through basic research, or 
through adopting previously tested measures from previous studies and testing them in 
new contexts (Brislin, 1986). There are many advantages from using instruments that 
have passed tests of validity and reliability. Alongside the obvious advantages of saving 
time and cost, using existing instruments allow comparisons between existing studies 
with a shared set of concepts and operational definitions (Brislin, 1986).   
In this study, the researcher has relied heavily on already developed and tested 
instruments from previous studies. The question scales were designed on a five-point 
Likert-type. Likert is the most widely used and popular rating scale in survey questions; 
it was developed by the psychologist Renis Likert (Bertram, 20067; Givon and Shapira, 
1984). There is healthy disagreement in the literature regarding the optimal number of 
scale points in surveys, whether 2, 5, 7, or 9 (Bertram, 2007; Givon and Shapira, 1984; 
Lyberg, et al., 2012). Cox III (1980) believes that there is no optimal number that can be 
generalized to all circumstances. However, the five-point Likert scale is the most 
common and most popular (Bertram, 2007; Givon and Shapira, 1984). Lyberg, et al. 
(2012) believe, after an extensive review of the literature, that a scale of 5 to 7 points is 
the optimal length. Scales of this length demonstrate more reliability and validity than 
shorter or longer scales (Lyberg, et al., 2012; Givon and Shapira, 1984). Infosurv, a 
leading market research firm, conducted a study in 2006 asking leading market 
researchers about their preferences between different scales. They concluded that the 
majority of modern researchers prefer the five-point scale when conducting survey 
research (Inforsurv, 2013).    
It is important to note in the construction of a scale how to label it. The most popular 
approach among researchers is to label the endpoints only which is the one used in this 
study. This method has two advantages: first, numeric values are more precise and less 
ambiguous (linguistically) than verbal labels. Second, it is easier for the respondents to 
hold in their memories, and thus requires less cognitive demand than verbal scales 
(Lyberg, et al., 2012). 
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The Likert scale in this questionnaire involves a series of statements or questions related 
to the perception or attitude in question, whereby the respondent is required to indicate 
their degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the statements (Kinnear and 
Taylor, 1987). Detailed instructions were given in each section on the nature of the 
questions and how to apply the scale to respond to the questions. 
There are not many research studies about international business and ISAs in Saudi 
Arabia. Relying solely on the western literature on ISA management (considering the 
differences in the economic, political, and cultural nature between Saudi Arabia and 
other western countries) would not have been sufficient. Morgan (1878 cited in Elder, 
1976) has placed societies into technologically related stages, he argued that societies 
generate predictable changes in its economic, familial, and political institutions when 
they move from one stage to the next. Thus, Taylor (1903: in Elder, 1976) has 
suggested that some sort of cross-national comparison could be possible between 
societies at the same evolutionary stage. Thus, the researcher extensively reviewed 
previous studies on Chinese ISAs. This is to some extent relevant to the Saudi context, 
as China was and is sharing similar economic, business, and political conditions. 
Furthermore, Chinese culture, like Saudi culture, places emphasis on trust, collectivism 
and mutual respect (Hofstede, 1991). Chinese and Saudi scores in power distance, 
individualism, and masculinity are very close to each other (Hofstede, 1991). There 
were studies that discussed trust, for example, as a key variable in the success of ISAs, 
as in this study (Chen and Boggs, 1998; Worm and Frankenstein, 2000; Ng, et al., 
2007).  
There is no agreement in the literature on measuring SAs performance. Researchers 
have used different methods, both subjective and objective. Subjective measures have 
been used extensively in the literature. Barkema, et al. (1996) list a large number of 
studies that have used subjective measures to measure JV performance. Detailed 
justification to the use of performance measures is outlined in the third and fourth 
empirical chapters.  
 
3.4.1. Validity and Reliability  
Validity simply asks whether we are measuring what we want to measure; whether the 
indicator developed to gauge a concept really measures that concept. This is not as 
simple as it may seem, especially with some concepts like attitude or feelings, which 
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cannot be measured as directly as age, for example. These concepts that cannot be 
measured directly are called “latent variables”. Thus, the instrument used to measure 
these concepts has to be accurate. This makes validity an important aspect when 
designing the survey instrument; the survey would be worthless if the researcher fails to 
measure what he/she intends to measure (Muijs, 2011). Content validity refers to 
whether or not the questions in the questionnaire successfully measure the latent 
concepts the researcher is trying to measure. The content validity of the research was 
established through an extensive review of the literature to find out about the instrument 
and the questions used to measure the concept the researcher wanted to measure. The 
content validity was also measured by establishing face validity, asking whether 
questionnaire items measured the concept in the question. This was established during 
the pilot test by asking the respondents whether the instrument looked valid to them. 
Asking experts in the field and getting them to comment on the instrument is also a 
good way of establishing face and content validity (Muijs, 2011; Bryman, 2004).  
 
Reliability refers to the consistency of a measure of a concept; it is one of the 
determinants of the quality of the research measurement instruments. It is a key concept 
in statistical measurement. Whenever we measure something, there is an element of 
error called the measurement error (Muijs, 2011; Bryman, 2004). There are many ways 
to make instruments more reliable. In this study, the researchers ensured that the quality 
of the questions was high (i.e. they are clear and unambiguous) during the pilot testing 
sessions. In addition, topics were measured with more than one item, so that other items 
can cancel out any errors that may occur for a single item. In general, more items means 
higher reliability (Muijs, 2011).  
Furthermore, in this study, the instrument reliability was established by using the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. The test is based on internal consistency, which refers to 
how homogenous the items are, and whether the respondents’ scores for an indicator 
will be related to the scores for other indicators (Muijs, 2011; Bryman, 2004). It is one 
of the most used reliability measures (Bryman and Cramer, 2011). The items with a low 
correlation with other items in their scale are deleted. After that, we calculated the 
Cronbach’s alpha, with a value of 0.50 to 0.60; these values are acceptable in the early 
stages of research (Nunnally, 1978).  
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3.5. Statistical Analysis 
It is important for quantitative research to be done based on standard statistical 
procedures. Trochim and Donnelly (2008) have suggested that before testing the 
hypothesis and testing the relationship, researchers should perform data preparation 
(which involves cleaning and organising the data for analysis). This section will start by 
explaining the process of data preparation, then explaining the statistical analysis tools 
and the rationale behind using them.  
 
3.5.1. Data Preparation 
This research has gone through several data preparation stages. The first stage was 
checking the accuracy of the data; as soon each questionnaire was received, it was 
screened for accuracy. The screening process involved checking whether all important 
questions were answered and whether the questionnaire had been completed, as well as 
checking for any errors that might make the response invalid. As a result, 56 
questionnaires out of 190 were eliminated, as they were incomplete and unusable. This 
left 134 questionnaires for the analysis. The second stage was entering the questionnaire 
answers into the database. The web survey was administered using “Qualtrics”; 1 
respondents who opted to answer the survey using the web survey automatically had 
their answers stored on the system, which at the end could be transferred easily to SPSS 
data file. However, not all questionnaires were answered in English; 74 of the returned 
surveys were answered in Arabic. The Arabic questionnaires went to a separate file 
from the English ones. Thus, both versions had to be merged into one data file after 
checking and arranging the answers of the Arabic questionnaires to be compatible with 
the English versions. Furthermore, not all the surveys were returned using the Qualtrics 
web-link. Five respondents preferred to use the PDF template; their answers were 
subsequently entered manually into the SPSS data file. To avoid entry errors, the data 
were double checked using the following method. Each questionnaire was numbered 
before it was entered into the database. After merging all the data into one file, the data 
were compared and crosschecked against the original questionnaire, using the unique 
number of each questionnaire to ensure they were entered correctly. This procedure 
significantly reduces entry errors. The benefit of using a sophisticated program like 
Qualtrics for data collection is that it makes transforming data into variables an easy 
                                                          
1
 Private research software company which enable users to build online surveys and collect data.  
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process; with a click of a button, the raw data can be transformed into variables ready 
for analysis on either Excel or SPSS depending on the researcher preference. The 
researcher used SPSS for this research. The data were analysed using factor analysis, 
paired sample t-tests, independent sample t-tests, correlations, and multiple regression.  
 
3.5.1.1. Factor analysis 
Factor analysis is a “statistical method for the compression of information, economic 
description of the data” with the goal of creating and investigating concepts, models and 
ideas (Kaplunovsky, 2007). It has several uses, including item analysis, scale 
development, and theory testing (Field, 2009). It allows the researcher to analyse the 
data “independent of their physical nature” (Kaplunovsky, 2007).  
Factor analysis has its own principles different from those of statistics. Exploratory 
factor analysis might be used when there is no prior theory or uses; thus, it may generate 
hypotheses (Kaplunovsky, 2007). Factor analysis is generally used for two purposes: 
explanation and data reduction (Field, 2009; Floyd and Widaman, 1995). For the first, it 
is used, as Floyd and Widaman (1995) explain, “to identify the underlying dimensions 
of a domain of functioning, as assessed by a particular measuring instrument”. Thus, it 
is used to identify different dimensions within an instrument. It is called exploratory 
because the investigator has no prior expectation about the subscale, because it is not 
based on a theory or previous research. The second use of data reduction is where the 
goal is to combine sets of measured variables into summary indices. The purpose is to 
reduce a large set of variables into smaller sets that achieve “maximal variability and 
reliability” (Floyd and Widaman, 1995). There are many studies that have used factor 
analysis for data reduction in social science, which will be considered in later chapters. 
In a simplified way, it reduces the number of variables by grouping variables with 
similar characteristics together to form a group (factor) which is used for further 
analysis. Data reduction is achieved using principal component analysis. Factor analysis 
works by performing correlation matrixes and creating major pieces (factors), 
underlying causes, which have variables that correlate highly with each other. It allows 
the researcher to explain the maximum amount of common variance with a small 
number of constructs (Field, 2009). 
There is disagreement between researchers on what sample size is required for principal 
component analysis. The general role is that the ratio of subjects-to-variables should be 
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4:1 or 5:1, and the more participants the better. There are other conditions; Gorsuch 
(1997) has stated that the sample size is preferred to be at least 200. However, Streiner 
(1998) has suggested different solutions; for a sample less than 100 there should be 10 
participants per variable, while for a sample with more than 100 there should be 5 
participants per variable. However, Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) challenged these 
calculations. They argue that there are no theoretical or empirical bases to support the 
recommended participant-to-variable ratio. 
 
3.5.1.2. T-tests 
The t-test is a statistical method to indicate the differences in mean score between two 
groups (Trochim, 2006). There are two kinds of t-tests, and their use depends on 
whether the independent variable is manipulated using the same participant or a 
different one. The two tests are: 
1) Independent t-test, which “is used when there are two experimental conditions and 
different participants were assigned to each condition”. 
2) Dependent t-test, which “is used when there are two experimental conditions and the 
same participants took part in both conditions of the experiment” (Field, 2009).  
The paired sample t-test is used to compare two sets of data to determine if the mean 
differences are “significant” between the observed paired or not (Zar, 1999). T-tests 
work by calculating the differences between each pair, and then calculating the mean 
and standard errors of these differences. It then divides the mean by standard error of 
the mean to get the test statistics (Field, 2009).  In this study, we used both kind of t-test 
in the first and fourth empirical chapter.  
 
3.5.1.3. Correlation 
Correlation shows the association strength and direction of particular variables (Pallant, 
2007). It looks to whether changes in one variable are met with similar changes in other 
variable (Field, 2009). Muijs (2004) explains Sperman’s rho correlation, which is used 
in this study. He explains it as follow: “Pearson’s r calculates the correlation in part by 
looking at the deviance (difference) between the individual cases and the mean for the 
variable as a whole”. This test is better suited to test the correlation between two 
continuous variables.  
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3.5.1.4. Multi-regression  
The study questions have attempts to investigate the factors that affect successful 
management of ISAs from the Saudi partner’s perspective. Hence, this research is 
examining the causal relationship between different ISAs variables. 
Multiple regressions is one of the most effective techniques used to examine the cause-
effect relationship between a dependent variable and several independent variables 
(Park, 2011). The linear regression is statistical modelling to test a relationship between 
a dependent variable and one (simple linear regression), or more than one (multiple 
linear regression) independent (or explanatory) variables (Cook and Weisberg, 1982). 
According to Hair, et al. (1995: p.20), “multiple regression analysis is a statistical 
technique that can be used to analyse the relationship between a single dependent 
(criterion) variable and several independent (predictor) variables. The objective of 
multiple regression analysis is to use the several independent variables whose values are 
known to predict the single dependent value the researcher wishes to know”.  
The regression investigates the causal relationship between the variables to explain a 
certain management, business, or economic phenomenon that poses many risks and 
difficulties (Yule, 1897; Cook and Weisberg, 1982). Regression is used to estimate the 
relationship between the variables; it mainly focuses on the relationship between the 
dependent and one or more independent variables. It is widely used for prediction and 
forecasting, and understanding and exploring the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables (Field, 2009). It quantifies the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables, and identifies how close and well determined the 
relationship is (Ramcharan, 2006).  
Regression analysis helps the researcher to analyse the data objectively and 
systematically. Compared to objective analysis of the data, decisions based on 
regression results are less biased, more consistent, and more fully explained 
(Armstrong, 2011). The researcher has to accept the results of the data, and discuss and 
explain the results as best as he can. The researcher cannot test the effect of one 
variation at a time (Yule, 1897; Cook and Weisberg, 1982). 
The researcher asked respondents to subjectively assess some of the dependent and 
independent variables. This may represent the possibility of common method bias (Park, 
2011). In order to detect the presence of this bias, the literature has suggested using one-
factor analysis (Hramen’s single-factor test) (Podsakoff, et al., 2003). If “one single 
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factor emerges from the factor analysis” or “one general factor will account for the 
majority of covariance”, this will mean that such a bias exists (Park, 2011).  
 
3.5.1.5. Moderation 
A moderator is a variable (e.g. gender, level of performance, ownership) that affects the 
relation between an independent (predictor) and a dependent variable. It affects the 
direction or/and strength of the relationship (Baron and Kenny, 1986).  
The moderator variable within the framework changes the causal relationship between 
the predictor and the outcome variables.  
 
Figure 3.1: Moderator Model 
 





First, we must establish the difference between the function of the third variables in 
mediation and moderation. Baron and Kenny (1986: pp. 1173) had better explained it: 
“(a) the moderator function of third variables, which partitions a focal 
independent variable into subgroups that establish its domains of maximal 
effectiveness in regard to a given dependent variable, and (b) the mediator function 
of a third variable, which represents the generative mechanism through which the 
focal independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable of interest.” 
Miller, et al. (2007: p. 295) explained mediation in strategic management as follow 
“Mediating effects allow strategic management researchers to understand ‘‘black box’’ 
processes underlying complex relationships whereby the effect of an independent 
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The mediation takes place when a third variable, the mediator, allows an independent 
variable to influence an outcome (dependent) variable (Miller, et al., 2007; Baron and 
Kenny, 1986). The effect of the predictor on the dependent through the mediating 
variables is called the mediating effect; and it can be full or partial mediation (Miller, et 
al., 2007). It is full mediation when the predictor influence the outcome only through 
the mediating variable; and partial when only a portion effect of predictor on the 
outcome is mediated by the third variable, which suggested that the predictor has both 
direct and indirect effect (Miller, et al., 2007). 
 Figure 3.2: Mediation Model 
 
 
Figure: Illustration of a Model with the Mediating Variable (c’ Represents the Relationship between 
Predictor and Outcome Variables with the Mediating Variable in the Model) and without the Mediating 
Variable (c Represents the Relationship between Predictor and Outcome Variables) Miller, et al. (2007). 
 
The mediation can be tested using different approaches; the most common is the causal 
steps developed by (Baron and Kenny, 1986; and Judd and Kenny, 1981). This 
approach is illustrated in figure 3.2. The four steps are as follow: 
1. Path c: the predictor must influence the outcome variable. 
2. Path a: the predictor must influence the alleged mediator. 
3. Path b: the mediator must influence the outcome variable while controlling for 
the predictor variable.  
4. Path c’: the mediator must reduce the previously significant relationship 
between the predictor and outcome (Baron and Kenny, 1986: Miller, et al., 
2007). 
The other two approaches are the difference in coefficients, and the product of 
coefficient. 
Predictor  Outcome 
 
c 
Predictor  Outcome 
Mediator  
    Indirect effect  
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Many scholars have argued about possible limitation of the first approach, and they 
suggested the use of some approaches such as the Sobel’s first-order solution, the 
Goodman unbiased solution, and the Freedman and Schatzkin method to test the 
significance of mediation effect.  
 
3.6. Summary 
This chapter discusses the research methodology of this study. It explains the methods 
used to collect the primary data necessary for the study.  
They objective of this study are; first, to investigate the motivational factors, and partner 
selection criteria of the Saudi and foreign partner from the Saudi firm perspective. The 
second objective is look into the success factor influencing the learning, and ISA 
performance. The study took an extensive analysis to the sociological dimension (i.e. 
culture, trust, understandiability, communication). The study is deductive in nature, and 
questionnaire surveys were disturbed directly to local Saudi firms.  
The analysis of primary data is presented in Chapters four to seven. Each chapter 
includes background literature, definition, and operationalization of variables, and the 
study research hypotheses.  
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Chapter Four: Strategic Motives of ISAs: Saudi 
Firms’ Perspective 
4.1. Introduction 
Research about ISAs motivation and selection criteria have been a major interest for 
researchers in this area. Nonetheless, the focus has been always on the perspective of 
the foreign partner, mostly western or developed economy (Arino, et. al, 1997; 
Geringer, 1989; Glaister and Buckley, 1997). There was a noticeable negligence to the 
prospective of the local partner (Hitt, et. al, 2004; Luo, 2002c; Yan and Gray, 1994). It 
gets clearer when we look at the ISA research in developing countries, as they are 
treated as passive partners (Shenkar and Li, 1996; 1997). Dong and Glaister (2006) have 
noticed this gap, and suggested that motivation for ISA formation can be completely 
different between local firms and their foreign partner (Dacin, et. al., 1997; Demirbag, 
et al., 1995; Tallman and Shenkar, 1990; Yan and Gray, 1994). 
Hence, some attempts have been made to look into the perspective of local partners 
from developing economies; nonetheless, it focused mainly in China (Hitt, et al., 2004; 
Luo, 2002c; Dong and Glaister, 2006). None has looked into the perspective of Middle 
Eastern economies, especially gulf countries.  
Hitt, et al., (2004) have noticed the lack of studies and knowledge on how firms in 
transition economies choose their alliance partners. It has been argued that strategic 
motivation of foreign and local partner are remarkably different. Hitt, et al. (2004) and 
Luo (2002) have encouraged researchers to enrich the body of the literature with the 
perspective of local partners. This study offers a small contribution to the body of 
literature. Strategic motives and partner selection criteria are generally studied 
separately in the literature, rather than linked systematically to examine the 
interrelationship between the two. There are very few studies that looked into the impact 
of strategic motivation on firm’s selection criteria (Dong and Glaister, 2006).  
There are many benefits from forming SAs. These benefits include; risk sharing, 
product rationalization, economies of scale and scope, diversifying risk, overcoming 
entry barriers, transfer of complementary technology, exchange of patents, shaping 
competition, conforming to host government policy, facilitating international expansion, 
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establishing vertical linkages and overcoming the “xenophobic” reactions when entering 
foreign market (Hennart, 1988; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Napier, 1989).  
Previously, firms engaged in SAs only to have market access, especially in countries 
where they have strict laws to control foreign investment. At present with the changes in 
market conditions, it can be noticed that firms seek to form alliances, even with their 
direct rivals (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). Learning has become an important motive for 
their formation and essential for their survival (Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Parkhe, 
1991; Lane, et al., 2001). It is an effective tool to cope with the intense competition and 
rapid technological changes, in addition to the concern of market failure in transferring 
organizationally embodied knowledge (Kogut, 1988; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Lane 
and lubatkin, 1998). 
The Saudi market potential is not only substantial but also unique in many ways; it has 
25% of world’s oil reserves. Furthermore, it is characterized by a powerful and willing 
domestic consumer group consisting of Saudi nationals (20 million), a large expatriate 
workforce (9 million), religious pilgrims (2-3 million), and other Gulf Cooperation 
Council residents (4 million). In addition, to a number of satellite markets, it’s at the 
heart of the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region’s 400 million-strong population 
collectively serve as extended markets for Saudi goods and services. The unique 
characteristics of the Saudi business and economic environment make it an interesting 
place for examination. 
This study aims to explore and identify the strategic motivations of Saudi firms for ISA 
formation, and compare them with those of the foreign partner from the Saudi 
perspective. In addition, it will identify the partner selection criteria from the viewpoint 
of the Saudi firm. Finally, examines the relationship between partner selection criteria 
and the strategic motivation. The chapter findings will help us to answer the first and 
second research questions of the thesis: (1) “What are the main motivations for 
engaging in ISAs in Saudi Arabia?” and (2) “On what basis do firms select their 
partners; how much are their decisions influenced by their motivations?” 
The findings in this study contribute to the current body of literature. More specifically, 
issues from an emerging economy firms’ perspective are investigated; previous studies 
have neglected this information. It is especially looking into the Saudi Arabian context 
where a study of this scale does not exist. The Saudi Arabian economy’s unique 
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characteristics have created different demands, and hence, different motivations. Thus, 
we argue that not all emerging markets share the same motives and selection criteria. 
While we acknowledge that firms from a developed economy share similar motives, we 
argue that local firms will have different motives, due to different micro and macro 
“institutional” factors. The results of this study offer an extension to the existing 
knowledge by arguing that the motivation of Saudi firms will be different from the 
emerging economy firms identified in the literature.  
  
4.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1. Motivation 
Why do firms form strategic alliances? SAs have gained increasing popularity across all 
sectors. Firms have found that it provides them with “flexible and less binding 
relationships” that is needed in an uncertain environment. At the same time, it will 
allow them to respond to competitions, and pursue new technological development, 
products, and markets. It will give them a chance to create desired synergy by 
combining resources, and spread out the fixed costs (Young and Wiersema, 1999; 
Ohmae, 1989; Chen and Chen, 2003; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Researchers has attempted to explain the rational of engaging in SAs and presented 
many theories to explain firms’ motives. The literature is mostly dominated by three 
theories:  transaction cost theory, resource based theory and organizational learning 
(Brouthers, 2002). Please refer to the first chapter (section 2.2) for more details 
regarding the theories, its history, rational and links to ISAs.  
The basic concept of transaction cost theory of SAs is to minimize the transaction and 
product cost under certain circumstances; alliances are used as a device to bypass 
market inefficiencies (Chen and Chen, 2003; Das and Teng, 2000; Hennart, 1988; 
Glaister, 1996). Furthermore, it promote the use of alliance as a means to reduce 
transaction costs related to technology transfer, and the costs of extending vertical links 
(Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Hennart, 1988). 
Firm, according to the resource based theory, engage in alliances to find valuable 
resources they lack, gain, or preserve control over certain resources (Chen and Chen, 
2003). It argues that the motives for forming alliances are to create value by pooling the 
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resources of the firms and exploit new business opportunities (Das et al., 1998; Chen 
and Chen, 2003; Dussauge, et al., 2000). 
In the last few decades, inter-organizational learning has become an important motive, 
as learning becomes essential for surviving. Firms forming alliance seeks to learn from 
each other, and bypass the market failure when it comes to transfer knowledge, 
especially tacit (Lane, et al., 2001; Glaister, 1996). Firms seek to enhance their 
competencies, and engage in alliances to create economic value and acquire knowledge 
via socializing, internalization, or combining different kinds of explicit and tacit 
knowledge to create new knowledge (Kumar and Nti, 1998; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; 
Lyles and Salk, 1996). The target knowledge is organizational embodied; thus, it is the 
best way, or it could be the only way to properly transfer 'tacit' knowledge (Glaister, 
1996; Kogut, 1988). 
The lack of domestic investments in some of the developed economies, have made 
going abroad rewarding for multinational companies, and SAs have become an 
important internationalisation mean (Prak, et al., 1986; Lewis 1990). SAs for 
multinational have high importance when targeting Arabian market due to cultural 
unfamiliarity and political constraints. The local partner knowledge and connection 
becomes essential in less developed countries (O'Reilly 1988; Beamish 1985; Yavaş, 
Eroğlu and Eroğlu, 1994; Ali, 2009). Firms exercise caution when they decide to invest 
in an international market (i.e., culturally similar countries with stable economic, social 
and political conditions). In these countries firms tend to enter with a wholly owned 
mode to maximise their profits (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Kim and Hwang, 1992). 
However, when investment risks increases, then firms tend to favour forming an ISA 
with a local partner to reduce their resource commitment and risk exposure (Beamish 
and Banks, 1987; Brouthers, 2002). Natural resources dependent foreign firms have 
extra motivation to form ISAs with a local firm to gain access to the natural resources 
they hold (Hennart, 1988). Glaister and Buckley (1996) have identified alliances as a 
mean to access new markets, and enabling faster entry.  
Glaister and Wang, (1993) broadly identifies seven (possibly overlapping) objectives 
can be achieved through SAs:  
(1) Risk reduction; 
(2) Economies of scale and/or rationalization; 
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(3) Technology exchange; 
(4) Co-opting or blocking competition; 
(5) Overcoming government-mandated trade or investment barriers; 
(6) Facilitating initial international expansion of inexperienced firms; and 
(7) Vertical quasi-integration advantages of linking the complementary contributions of 
the parties in a "value chain". 
As stated previously no study has attempted to look into the motivation of local partner 
perspective in Middle East. Tatoglu (2000) and Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999) have 
looked into the motives of establishing IJVs in Turkey and Bahrain respectively, but 
from the perspective of foreign partner.  
In the past several decades, the GCC countries have relied on natural resources (oil and 
gas) based production and export. They are now attempting to diversify and learning 
how to compete with firms in knowledge-intensive industries (Rice, 2003). The role of 
the government, Saudi including, in the economy is large and is not expected to decline. 
It takes different forms, and the government plays an active role in forming ISAs (Ali, 
2009). Saudi as a developing country is unique in its business conditions and resources. 
Saudi government is pursuing a policy to increase the role of private sector in the 
modernization of the kingdom. Saudi Arabia local firms lack technical know-how and 
cannot cope with the size of the Saudi contract market. This has motivated international 
firms to come to the Kingdom to compensate the deficit (Moon, 1986; Yavaş, et. al, 
1994). Less developing companies embrace ISAs enthusiastically, because it allows 
them access to capital, advanced technology, know-how, marketing and management 
skills (Connolly, 1984; Yavaş, et. al., 1994). The Saudi government is no different in 
this sense and have actively promotes the formation of ISAs (Yavaş, et. al., 1994). 
However, unlike many developing nations, Saudi companies when seeking to form an 
ISA with multinational, they do not seek capital. These firms have cash, some from 
established business families, and are after partners’ technology and know-how (Ali, 
2009: p. 222). Considering the nature of entry conditions into the Saudi market, the lack 
of entrepreneurial connections and macro-political and strategic backup can be a hurdle 
to foreign firms targeting lucrative government contracts. Firms have realised the 
significance of local intermediaries, whether required by law or not, for business 
operations in the Kingdom (Moon, 1986).  
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The huge revenues from Oil have created a different economical mechanism from the 
rest of emerging economies. It is a characteristic the Saudi economy share with some 
member of the Gulf countries (Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE). The huge government 
spending on infrastructure projects, health, education, transportation, and power have 
created a demand on particular expertise and skills not available in the Saudi market. 
Therefore, it has created a different set of motives for the Saudi firms from other 
emerging economies.  
Besides the above reasons, the Saudi government pursue a policy of Saudization (policy 
of replacing jobs held by foreigner with Saudi citizens), which encouraged foreign firms 
to form ISAs with local firms to avoid restriction (Moon, 1986; Al-Rasheedi, 2012). 
Following the argument, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the importance of the strategic motives for 
ISA formation in Saudi Arabia will differ significantly between Saudi partners and 
foreign partners. 
H1b. From the perspective of Saudi partners, foreign firms’ main motives would be 
market access and partner local knowledge respectively. 
H1c. From the perspective of Saudi partners, local Saudi firms’ main motives would be 
access to complementary technology. 
 
4.2.2. Partner selection criteria 
4.2.2.1. Task related 
The choice of the “right” partner has been discussed extensively in the literature and 
was linked with satisfactory performance and success. Looking for complementary 
capabilities have been the focal reason in the literature to engage in SAs; nevertheless, 
“how to achieve it” has varied between the different texts. According to resources based 
perspective, in SAs partners are chosen to access resources and knowledge that will 
enhance the focal firm’s capabilities (Hitt, et al., 2000). Institutional factors have been a 
major reason for firms to engage in ISAs, especially from the perspective of transition 
economies (Hitt, et al., 2004). 
Geringer (1991) has reviewed the previous literature regarding partner selection criteria 
and have classified them to; task related and partner related criteria. Task related is the 
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operational skills and resources that firm requires (the complementary capabilities) for 
its competitive success; while partner related are associated with the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the partner and the ability to work with a partner. Geringer (1991) task-
related criteria included patents, technical know-how, financial resources, experienced 
managerial personnel, access to marketing and distribution systems, knowledge of the 
market conditions, knowledge of the environment, and political influence. Partner-
related criteria included reputation, potential to maintain a continuing and stable 
relationship, position within the industry, professionalism, trust, honesty and 
seriousness, fit (size), the degree of favourable past association between the partners, 
and enthusiasm for the project (Arino, et. al., 1997). 
Hitt, et al., (2000) have distinguished between firms from emerging and developed 
markets in partner selection criteria. Large firms from developed economy want to 
leverage their resources, and they seek a partner with local market knowledge and 
access to distribution channels and major buyers to achieve that (Tatoglu, 2000; Hitt, et 
al., 2000; Glaister and Buckley, 1997). Hennart, et al., (1999) have claimed that IJVs 
are used as “Trojan Horse” to enter a country. Hamel (1991) points out those IJVs have 
two roles: allow partner to create and appropriate value.  
Killing (1983) and Beamish (1985) have ranked the major reasons for creating an ISA 
in developing countries as follow; the need for another partner's skills and attributes or 
assets, and government legislation. However, this is not always the case. Lee and 
Beamish (1995) found that, for most of Korean firms, the main motivators were the 
need for partner’s knowledge to expand in their local market, and utilization of cheap 
labour. Having local partner carries many advantages when the risk in a country is high 
and familiarity is low. Local partner would reduce entry risks and resource commitment 
(Arino, et. al., 1997). 
On the other hand, developing economies firms emphasise financial assets, technical 
capabilities, intangible assets, specialized and complementary skills, and willingness to 
share expertise. They, also, seek to develop their capabilities by trying to acquire 
tangible and intangible resources from their partner to be able to compete domestically 
or globally (Hitt, et. al., 2000; Berry, 2010). Hitt, et al., (2004) argue that firms from 
emerging economies need to choose a partner with complementary resources to 
succeed. However, in so many occasions firms have failed in selecting the right partner.  
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Studies on partner selection criteria in emerging economies have been weak (Hitt, et al., 
2004). Although, in the last decade, some studies have emerged, it mainly focused on 
the Chinese context (e.g. Shenkar and Li, 1999; Glaister and Dong 2006). Studies that 
looked into Middle East or GCC are rare. There was a study by Al-Khalifa, and 
Peterson (1999), which looked into the motivation and selection criteria of ISAs in 
Bahrain. However, it looked only into the perspective of the foreign partner. 
Previous studies (Hitt, et al., 2000; Newman, 2000; Hitt, et al., 2004) have showed that 
not all the firms from emerging markets have the same motives and differ in their 
partner selection criteria. These differences are due to different needs, institutional 
factors. The economical states of emerging countries markets are different, and they are 
not all equal. Therefore, we cannot generalize the findings from previous studies to the 
Saudi context, which is a context with different culture, and institutional reality.  
SAs are a valuable means for firms in emerging markets to access partner’s assets and 
resources (Hitt, et al. 2000; Zahra, et al. 2000). Some assets, sophisticated technological 
knowledge, are available for firms from transition economies only through alliances, 
and they need it to compete globally (Zahra et al. 2000; Oliver, 1997; Luo, 1999). Thus, 
engaging in SAs is about gaining access to these sets of resources and technology. 
Technological capabilities are not the only target for emerging market firms; managerial 
and marketing knowledge is under their radar too (Hitt, et al., 2004). Firms by working 
closely with the alliance partner allow their manager to learn efficiently the “tacit 
components of their capabilities” (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). 
 
4.2.2.2. Partner selection 
Partner selection criteria are an important strategic choice for any firm entering a 
foreign market (Roy and Oliver, 2009). It is the main determinant of the ISA mix of 
resources and skills (Beamish, 1987). Institutional environment, legality in particular, 
has also been suggested as ISA partner selection criteria (Hitt, et al., 2004). Many 
studies have addressed the issue of partner selection criteria. They have highlighted the 
importance of particular skills and characteristics when selecting a partner. Glaister and 
Wang (1993) have listed some of these attributes; past association, partner's ability to 
negotiate with the host government, relatedness of business, trust between top 
management, financial status/resources of partner, established marketing and 
distribution system, reputation, and complementary resources (Glaister and Buckley, 
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1997). Other researchers have suggested some indirect measures of fit in alliances, such 
as relatedness, size, nationality, ISA experience, and consensus of operational policies 
(e.g. Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Globerman and Nielsen, 2007; Yan and Duan, 2003; 
Roy and Oliver, 2009). 
It was also noted that partner selection criteria change depending on motives. Pak and 
Park (2005) have noticed that Japanese firms choose the location based on their 
strategic motives. They have chosen Far East and China when their goals are to exploit 
assets, and chose West and US when their motives are augmenting their global 
competitiveness. Glaister and Wang (1993) investigated the motives of British firms’ in 
China. They were; gain faster entry to the market, facilitate international expansion, 
access to knowledge of the local market and local culture, links with major buyers and 
to distribution channels. They were qualities that would be difficult for British firms to 
gain by operating alone. Tatoglu (2000) investigated western IJVs in Turkey, his 
findings reaffirmed the belief that IJVs of western firms in emerging economy is a 
vehicle to enter a new market faster and reduce any potential risks.  
Some authors (Shenkar and Li, 1999; Connolly, 1984; Hitt, et al., 2000) have used the 
complementary perspective to support their argument. They argued that firms seek 
capabilities that “complement their own knowledge base”. Every company has a set of 
capabilities and firms, whether from a developed or emerging economy, try to find the 
“ideal” partner to complement their capability to build or leverage their resources.  
Partner’s knowledge of a local market, trust between top management teams, reputation 
of partner and partner's ability to negotiate were the most important partner-related 
criteria of western IJVs in Turkey (Tatoglu, 2000). 
Firms from emerging economies enjoy, usually, lower labour and management cost, 
lower inputs cost, and local market knowledge. However, they lack, generally, capital, 
up to date technology, management, and marketing skills that firms from developed 
economy possesses (Connolly, 1984). 
Some intangible assets play an important role in alliance partner selection. Firms can 
form alliances to improve their reputation and legitimacy (Hitt, et al., 2004; Dollinger, 
et al., 1997). Collaborating with a foreign firm with a strong positive reputation provide 
the local firm the legitimacy and prestige in the market, which could be a success factor 
(Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2001; Shan and Hamilton, 1991; Beamish, 1988; Hitt, et al., 
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2004). Thus, executives from emerging market firms are likely to value the reputation 
of the partner strongly (Hitt, et al., 2000). 
Hitt, et al., (2000) argue that the motive of firms from emerging markets is to have 
access to capital. This is due to their less developed financial markets, weak institutions, 
and economic instability, which make access to capital costly. However, this is not 
always the case across all emerging economies. Firms from natural resource rich 
countries, like the gulf countries, have no cash strains. Hence, not all emerging 
economies firms would be motivated by access to capital, despite some suffer from less 
developed financial markets.    
Other authors have argued that firms from emerging markets would base their selection 
on partner technological capabilities and expertise. Especially on competencies they are 
lacking, which would make them more competitive (Hitt, et al., 2000). 
Most of the studies that addressed the issue of partner selection criteria have looked into 
it from the perspective of the foreign partner, and seldom from those of local partner. 
This has started to change with more studies looking into the perspective of the local 
partners, Chinese especially (Luo, 2002; Dong and Glaister, 2006). 
 
H2a. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the Saudi firms’ task-related selection 
criteria will be determined by the strategic motives for ISA formation. 
H2b. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the Saudi firms’ partner-related selection 
criteria will be determined by the strategic motives for ISA formation. 
H3. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the Saudi firms’ task-related selection 
criteria will be determined more strongly by the strategic motives for ISA formation 
than will the Saudi firms’ partner-related selection criteria. 
4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. Measures 
The questions measured the Saudi firm managers’ perceptions of the strategic motives, 
task-related and partner-related selection criteria relative importance at the time of 
alliance formation. Responses were assessed using five points Likert-type scales, i.e. 1 
‘‘not important’’ to 5 ‘‘very important’’. The instruments have been used in previous 
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studies (Dong and Glaister, 2006; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Geringer, 1991; Glaister, 
and Wang, 1993). The questions relating to strategic motives are listed in Table 4.3; 
task and partner related selection criteria in Table 4.4. The instruments appropriateness 
was also tested during the pilot study. The study explored the perspective of the local 
“Saudi” partner. Ideally, the researcher would have included representatives of both 
parent firms as well as the ISA, but the limited resources, access restrictions, absence of 
a database, and the size and nature of the study precluded such an approach. Many ISAs 
studies have relied on data from one of the partner’s perspectives. 
 
4.3.2. Variables 
Dependent variables: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was utilized in attempts to 
produces a set distinct non-overlapping task-related selection criteria and partner-related 
selection criteria; it follows the path of previous studies (Geringer, 1988; Glaister, 1996, 
1997; Dong and Glaister, 2006). After the initial test, the variable partner-related 
selection criterion (Relatedness of partner’s business) was removed as it was driving the 
reliability of the factor low, and EFA was run again. The results were, non-overlapping, 
3 task-related selection criteria factors and 2 partner-related selection criteria factors. 
They have a KMO of (0.607 and 0.739) respectively, which is above the bare minimum 
of 0.5 (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). The correlations between the variables were 
checked from the correlation matrix, and most of them correlate with each other 
significantly (correlation between .3 and .9). None has correlated higher than .9, which 
rule out any possible multicollinearity in the data. The determinants were (0.551 and 
.340) respectively which is greater than the necessary value of 0.00001. This further 
confirms that variables correlate reasonably, and multicollinearity is ruled out. The 
Cronbach’s alpha of the factors range between (0.587 and 0.652); this is close to the 
acceptable value in exploratory research (Hair, et al., 1998: p. 118). 
 
Independent variables: EFA was used on the 13 strategic motives. After the initial 
test, one variable (To reap the benefits of economy of scale) was removed. It was 
loading almost equally on all factors creating a conflict with the variables. After the 
deletion process, EFA was run again using Kaiser’s criterion and SPSS extracted 3 non-
overlapping factors with a KMO of (.827) which is above the bare minimum of 0.5 
(Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). The correlation matrix was checked, to check the 
correlation between the variables. Most of them correlates significantly wither each 
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other (correlation between .3 and .9). None correlated higher than .9, which rule out any 
possible multicollinearity in the data. The determinant is .007, which is greater than the 
necessary value of 0.00001. This further confirms that variables correlate reasonably. 
Cronbach’ alpha of the three independent variables ranged from (0.644 to 0.773). 










Cronbach   
Task Related      
Factor 1 (market knowledge)  1.878 37.551 37.551 .589 
Access to local or international 
knowledge 
.758     
Access to knowledge of local 
culture 
.722     
Access to government bodies .703     
Factor 2  (product Knowledge)  1.242 24.848 62.399 N/A 
Access to product-specific 
knowledge  
.928     
Factor 3 (Finance)  .755 15.109 77.507 N/A 
Access to capital/finance .966     
      
Partner Related      
Factor 1 (Stability)  1.832 36.643 36.643 .652 
The partner company’s size .769     
Reputation of the partner .734     
Financial stability of the partner .697     
Factor 2   (Trust and Past 
association) 
 1.512 30.232 66.875 .587 
Degree of favourable past 
association between the partners  
.893     
Trust between the top 
management teams  
.695     
Principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation.  
K–M–O Measure of sampling adequacy = (.739). Bartlett test of sphericity = 108.785; P <.000. 
K–M–O Measure of sampling adequacy = (.607). Bartlett test of sphericity = 66.422; P <.000. 
 
 
Control variables: Saxton (1997: p. 450) notes the administrative form of an alliance 
may indicate the motives of the partner companies and have a considerable impact on 
the expected performance outcomes. To control for alliance form, this variable was 
entered as a dummy, coded 1 for equity ISAs and 0 for non-equity ISAs. The industry 
sector of the alliance was also entered as a dummy variable, coded 1 for the 
manufacturing sector and 0 for the tertiary sector. The partner firm home economic 
stage was entered as dummy as well; it was coded 1 for firms from developed 
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economies and 0 for firms from developing economies. We also controlled alliance age; 
it was calculated as the difference between the time of data collection and the year of 
the alliance formation. 










Cronbach   
Factor 1 (Resource sharing and 
reduce competition) 
 2.657 22.139 22.139 .773 
To Obtain raw materials or 
natural resources 
.790     
To Transfer production to low 
cost market 
.709     
To cooperate with existing or 
potential competitor to reduce 
competition 
.707     
To share R&D costs .594     
Factor 2 (Market Entry)  2.374 19.786 41.925 .753 
To Enable faster entry to the 
market 
.853     
To Establish presence in the 
market 
.826     
To Facilitate international 
expansion 
.646     
To Accommodate Host 
government policy 
.483     
Factor 3 (Diversification and 
utilization) 
 2.075 17.290 59.215 .644 
To enable diversification of 
products or services  
.781     
To Spread investment cost and 
risk 
.566     
To Facilitate exchange of 
complementary Technology 
.566     
To fully utilize financial 
capability  
.555     
Principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. K–M–O Measure of sampling adequacy = (.849). Bartlett test of 
sphericity = 496.900; P <.000. 
 
 
4.3.3. Statistical analysis 
Hypothesis 1 was tested using a t-test; it looked to the differences in means between the 
respective strategic motives. Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 3 were tested using multi-regression 
analysis. Normality and Multicollinearity were checked and the data were normally 
distributed and no evidence of multicollinearity. Furthermore, the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) was to measure multicollinearity level among the independent variables. 
The VIFs did not show any evidence of multicollinearity, and are well within the 
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recommended cut-off of 10 (1.018-1.261). A high value above 10 suggests the 
possibility of multicollinearity (Hair, et al., 2003: p. 305; Neter, Wasserman, and 
Kutner, 1985). Hence, it is not a problem in the regressions analysis (Park, 2011).  
 
4.4. Results and Findings 
Hypothesis 1, 1b, 1c 
Table 4.3 shows the strategic motives rank order of SAs formation. It shows both 
partners motives rank from the perspective of the Saudi partner. The ranking is based on 
the mean measure of 13 motives. It is evident that there are clear differences in the 
ranking between the two partners’ motives. This provides reasonably good support to 
Hypothesis 1.  
Table 4.3: Saudi partner and foreign partner firms’ strategic motives for ISA 
formation in Saudi 
 Saudi Partner Foreign Partner 
Strategic Motives Rank Mean S.D Rank Mean S.D T-Value 
1. To reap the benefits of economy of 
scale 
 
7 3.06 1573 6 3.15 1.562 -.826 
2. To facilitate international expansion 6 3.11 1.576 1 4.08 1.181 -5.911*** 
3. To facilitate exchange of 
complementary technology 
 
4 3.64 1.458 7 3.05 1.426 4.077
***
 
4. To enable faster entry to the market 3 3.65 1.440 2 3.97 1.222 -2.477** 
5. To establish presence in the market 2 3.70 1.422 3 3.94 1.287 -1.874* 
6. To enable diversification of product 
or services 
 
1 3.78 1.344 4 3.32 1.448 3.668
***
 
7. To spread investment cost and risks 5 3.19 1.401 5 3.25 1.474 -0.537 
8. To fully utilize financial capability 8 2.82 1.442 8 2.97 1.465 -1.747* 
9. To share R&D costs 11 2.38 1.393 10 2.41 1.408   -.395 
10. To cooperate with existing or 




10 2.43 1.446 11 2.39 1.485 .491 
11. To transfer production to low cost 
market 
 
12 2.31 1.404 12 2.36 1.517 -.479 
12. To accommodate host government 
policy 
 
9 2.81 1.565 9 2.88 1.627 -.985 
13. To obtain raw materials or natural 
resources 
 
13 2.28 1.497 13 2.30 1.528 -.162 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 (two tailed). 
 
The motives “To enable diversification of products and services” (P< 0.01), and, very 
close second, “To establish presence in the market” came at the top of Saudi partner 
strategic motives. For the foreign partner, as confirmed by most of the literature, the 
119 | P a g e  
 
motive “To facilitate international expansion” (P < 0.01) came as the top motive. The 
second and the third motives were “To enable faster entry to the market” (P < 0.05) and 
“To establish presence in the market” (P < 0.1). 
The results of foreign firms motivation came as predicted, and it is consistent with other 
literature that looked into foreign firms’ motives entering developing economies. On the 
other hand, Saudi firms need skills and expertise to bridge the shortage of some 
capabilities “quickly” in order to compete. Moreover, the Saudi market is young and 
developing with many new business areas that are worth exploiting. Saudi firms with 
extra cash always seek to invest in those new areas and diversify their portfolio. Hence, 
they lack the experience, they seek foreign partners with experiences to help them 
diversify faster and seize the opportunities the contract market present. This 
arrangement suited the foreign partner; they can spread the risk, have access to lucrative 
market, minimise the risks, win government contracts, and gain access to local 
knowledge. This can be seen in some of the new formed ISAs in Saudi Arabia. For 
example, Tharawat Investment House has collaborated with Kubota Corporation (Japan) 
to form Kubota Saudi Arabia Company IJV to manufactures heat-resistant alloy tube 
(Kubota, 2012). Tharawat is newly established investment house (2008) that has no 
experience on manufacturing alloy. Another example is from one of the latest ISAs in 
Saudi Arabia, which is between Philips and Al Faisaliah Medical Systems (FMS), a 
subsidiary of the Al Faisaliah Group. The responsibilities of the partner, as stated in the 
following announcement, “…The joint venture will combine Philips' healthcare 
portfolio, including medical imaging systems, patient monitoring devices and clinical 
information solutions, with FMS' knowledge of the market requirements and strong 
position in Saudi Arabia, the largest economy in the Middle East” (Marketwatch, 2012). 
The few studies that looked into the perspective of firms from emerging economies had 
different motives from the Saudi one. In Dong and Glaister (2006), they found that “To 
effectively compete with existing competitors” and “To maintain competitive position 
in existing market” were the main motives of the Chinese partner. In their study, Hitt, et 
al., (2000) have looked into the selection criteria of some emerging economies (Mexico, 
Poland, and Romania). Financial assets came at the top of these companies list. Hitt, et 
al., (2004) have researched the motives of transitioning economies, China and Russia, 
and have concluded that financial assets were the main motive for the companies of 
both countries as well. 
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The foreign firms’ motives in this study are to some extent consistent with the literature 
that looks into foreign firms’ motives investing in emerging economies. In Dong and 
Glaister (2006), the motives ‘‘to enable faster entry to the market’’ and ‘‘to establish 
presence in the market’’ were the two highest ranked strategic motives of foreign 
partners as perceived by Chinese firms. In Glaister and Wang (1993), it was faster entry 
and facilitating international expansion that came at the top of British firms’ motives 
investing in China. While in Tatoglu (2000), it was to gain presence in new markets and 
to enable faster market entry that came at the top of foreign firms’ investing in Turkey.   
The motives “To enable diversification of product or services”, “To spread investment 
cost and risks”, “To reap the benefits of economy of scale”, and “To facilitate exchange 
of complementary technology” came in as the 4th to 7th motives respectively. The 
foreign firm wants to spread their investment cost and use their existing capabilities to 
maximise their profits.  
There is no formal requirement on foreign investors to have a Saudi partner (SAGIA, 
2012). Foreign companies can operate in Saudi Arabia with 100% ownership. However, 
it is common to see foreign investors seek a Saudi partner to have access to various 
government investment incentives. Hence, it is not surprising to see the motive “To 
accommodate host government policy” comes 9th on the list. However, some service 
sectors, such as telecommunications, have some license limitation. Thus, foreign firms 
form an alliance with existing license holder to operate in the Saudi market. It was not 
surprising to see the motives “To transfer production to low cost market”, “To 
cooperate with existing or potential competitor “, and “To share R&D costs” came at 
the end of the list. As the Saudi market is not characterised by cheap labour; and is not 
R&D oriented, especially private organization. The last motive in the list was “To 
obtain raw materials or natural resources”. Unlike US, UK, and Russia where private 
investors develop natural resources; in Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas concessions are 
restricted. It is owned and run by government enterprise “Aramco”, which develop, 
produce, and sell Oil and Gas on behalf of the government. However, recently Gas 
exploration concessions were opened to foreign investors.  
Both SA partner motives in this study were from the perspective of the Saudi partner. It 
seems that the Saudi partner is aware of what the foreign partner motives and what they 
can offer. There seem to be a clear goal congruence or compatibility, and no conflict is 
obvious. The literature suggest that this relationship, in which both firms agree and 
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aware of each other objective, are more likely to achieve its goals (Beamish and Delios, 
1997).  
Hypothesis 1b, has predicted the foreign partner main motives would be market access. 
Table 4.3 shows that the first three foreign partner motives are: (To facilitate 
international expansion “4.14”, To enable faster entry to the market “3.91”, To establish 
presence in the market “3.91”). This provides strong support to Hypothesis 1b.  
Hypothesis H1c have predicted the Saudi partner main motive would be access to 
complementary technology. The table shows that the first motive is (To enable 
diversification of product or services “3.78”); and with a very close second is (To 
establish presence in the market “3.70”). This provides some support for hypothesis 1c; 
thus, we can say that hypothesis 1c is partially supported. 
 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b 
Task related and partner related selection criteria of the Saudi partner are ranked in 
order in table 4.4. There are five tasks related selection criteria; two out of five factors 
exceeded the median value of “3”. The most important tasks related were “Access to 
product specific knowledge”, and “Access to local or international market knowledge”. 
The other task related score were below the median “3”. The task “Access to 
capital/finance” score was the lowest “2.44”. The results are different from those found 
in the literature. The top task related selection criteria in Hitt, et al., (2004) study on 
Chinese and Russian firms were complementary capabilities, managerial capabilities, 
market knowledge, and unique competencies. While in Luo (2002c), it was 
technological capability, foreign market power, and international marketing expertise. 
Finally, in Dong and Glaister (2006), product specific knowledge, and international 
market knowledge come at the top of Chinese firms list.  
In all of these past studies (Hitt, et al., 2004; and Dong and Glaister, 2006), with the 
exception of Luo (2002c), it was financial assets that came as one of the most important 
selection criteria. While for Saudi firms, financial assets did not hold the same 
importance. 
Saudi firms, as the rest of emerging markets firms, placed high importance to product 
specific knowledge, and international and market knowledge as the top task related 
selection criteria. It is not surprising to see Saudi's firm attach high importance to 
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product specific knowledge. Saudi firms attempting to win a contract in a certain sector 
look for a partner that holds the necessary competencies, experience, and expertise to 
win the contract. Why financial assets are not at the top of the Saudi company list? Ali 
(2009) gives a good explanation; business families, especially those from established 
business families, have cash liquidity, and they seek partners with know-how, technical 
expertise, especially in organizing and new technology. Furthermore, there are many 
funding bodies in Saudi Arabia that offer long term loans with minimal or no interest. 
 
Table 4.4: Task-related and partner-related selection criteria ranking—Saudi firms 
Task related Criteria Rank Mean  S.D 
1. Access to product-specific knowledge 1 3.72 1.497 
2. Access to local or international market knowledge 2 3.69 1.259 
3. Access to government bodies 3 2.91 1.472 
5. Access to knowledge of local culture 4 2.48 1.385 
4. Access to capital/finance 5 2.44 1.346 
 
Partner Related Criteria Rank Mean  S.D 
1. Reputation of the partner 1 4.60 .749 
2. Trust between the top management teams 2 4.08 1.176 
3. Financial stability of the partner 3 4.00 1.212 
4. Relatedness of partner’s business 4 3.98 1.190 
5. The partner company’s size 5 3.80 1.199 
6. Degree of favourable past association between the partner 6 3.46 1.311 
 
There were six partner selection criteria and the mean value of 3 was exceeded by all of 
them. It was “Reputation of the partner” and “Trust between the top management 
teams” that came up on top. They had a mean over “4.60” and “4.07” respectively. The 
financial stability and relatedness of partner’s business came on as third and fourth.  
The results from this study are consistent with the finding from previous few studies 
that looked into the perspective of emerging market firms, mainly Chinese perspective. 
Reputation of the firm were important for Chinese investors (Dong and Glaister, 2006; 
Luo, 2002c). In this study, trust shows its value as an important selection criteria; it 
confirms the findings of Dong and Glaister (2006). It validates the assumption of trust 
as an important selection criterion. 
Ali (2009) talked about the importance of trust for Arabian and Saudis in particular: 
“Arabia is a personalized society where individuals are received and treated according 
to personal reputations. Therefore, image and impressions (e.g., sincerity, trust, and 
worthiness) are considerably important. In fact, once trust is established many other 
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obstacles will be minor and psychological barriers will crumble” (Ali, 2009: p. 130). In 
Saudi culture, trust must be established before any business can be conducted 
(Mababaya, 2002; Rice, 2003; Al-Khatib, et al., 2004). The results may support the 
claims that suggest trust has a positive association with performance and learning (Lane, 
et al., 2001; Doney, et al., 1998; Parke and Ungson, 1997; Ng, et al., 2007). Financial 
stability came on top of firm’s selection criteria, and it was consistent with previous 
studies (Dong and Glaister, 2006; Hitt, et al., 2000; Hitt, et al., 2004). 
 
Hypothesis 2a 
The results in table 4.5 show support to Hypothesis 2a. The three regression models 
relating to task-related selection criteria have all significant F value (P < 0.01); and each 
one of the three models has significant coefficient with 1 to 3 strategic motives. The 
first regression has the largest explanatory power (R
2
) with 30% of the variance is 
explained by the independent variables.  
The first regression on task-related criteria is the market knowledge factor. It has a 
significant and positive relationship with the following strategic motives: resource 
sharing and reduce competition .285 (P < 0.01), market entry .392 (P <0.01), and 
diversification and utilization .220 (P < 0.01). 
This shows the importance of market knowledge in SAs. All of the strategic motives 
(resource sharing and reduce competition, market entry, and diversification and 
utilization) had a positive relation with the task related market knowledge. Model one is 
an indication that whatever the firm's motives, market knowledge is crucial. The 
importance is not exclusive to the market entry motive; but also firms motivated with 
sharing resource and diversification, and diversification and utilization emphasis on 
market knowledge as well. Alliance's industry, form, and the economical stage of the 
partner had no significant relation with the dependent variable. However, alliance age 
has a negative significance relationship (-.013) P < 0.1. This means that younger 
alliances stress more on market knowledge. 
The second regression model is on task-related criteria “product knowledge”. It has a 
significant and positive relationship only with the strategic motive diversification and 
utilization .311 (P < 0.01). It has an explanatory power (R
2
) of 15.6%. Model 2 shows 
that firms motivated by diversification and utilization of products will select a partner 
with specific product knowledge. Alliance industry (0 if tertiary), has a significant 
124 | P a g e  
 
positive coefficient (P < 0.1). This means manufacturing alliances, comparing to tertiary 
alliances, emphasise more on the product knowledge when selecting a partner.  
Table 4.5: Multiple regression on factors of task-related selection criteria, factors of 
partner-related selection criteria and factors of strategic motives 





Finance Stability Trust 
and PA 
Constant  .058 -  .214  .167 .139 -.261 




 .129  .316
***
   .080 .137 
Market Entry .392
***

















 -  .009  .006  -.006  - .003 
JV Form .082 - . 071  .043  -.064  .247 
Industry .050    .347
*
 - .156  .183  .021 
Economic Stage .053    .289 - .294  -.145 .178 
Interaction effects 
Resource sharing, and reduces 
competition X Form 
-.322
*
 .140 .074 -.058 -.147 









Diversification and utilizations 
X Form 
.103 .300 -.237 -.182 -.063 
Resource sharing, and reduces 
competition X Industry 
.161 -.002 -.040 .192 .020 
Market entry X Industry .067 -.449
**
 -.267 -.222 .448
**
 
Diversification and utilizations 
X Industry 
.214 -.079 .094 .269 -.037 
Resource sharing, and reduces 
competition X Economic status 
-.175 -.156 .424
*
 -.144 .068 






 -.221 -.239 
Diversification and utilizations 


















***p< 0:01; **P<0:05; *P<0:1; the F-test on R2 is one-tailed; the t-test on each regression coefficient is two-tailed. 
The interaction effect of alliance form (0 if non-equity), is moderating the effect 
between market entry and product knowledge. This suggests that the link between the 
strategic motives of market entry and the task-related selection criteria of product 
knowledge is significant in EJVs. Equity-alliances usually involve higher resource 
commitment; and when entering a new market they will be looking for a partner with 
technical competencies. Moreover, alliance industry (0 if tertiary) is significantly 
moderating the effect between market entry and product knowledge. This means that 
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firms in tertiary sector will be looking for partner with product knowledge when 
entering new market. 
The third regression model is on task-related criteria “finance”. It has a significant and 
positive relation with the strategic motive of resource sharing and reduce competition 
.316 (P < 0.01), and diversification and utilization .186 (P < 0.05).  It has an explanatory 
power (R
2
) of 19%. Regression model three shows that firms motivated by resource 
sharing and reduce competition, and diversification and utilization will take into 
account the financial strength and stability of the partner. 
The interaction table is showing that the partner economical stage (0 if developing), is 
moderating the effect between resource sharing and reduces competition, and 
diversification and utilizations with the task-related selection criteria of finance. 
However, it has a negative effect between market entry and finance. This shows that the 
link between the resource sharing and reduces competition, diversification and 
utilizations with finance is stronger when the alliance is formed with a partner from a 
developed economy. While the link between market entry and finance is stronger when 
the alliance is formed with a partner from a developing economy. 
The results are an extension of previous studies. Consequently, they further affirm the 
importance of task related selection criteria for firms. The results add to the existing 
knowledge by testing some of the assertions in the literature in a new context, which is 
known by placing large weights on personalized relationships and feelings. 
 
Hypothesis 2b 
The results from table 4.5 also show support to hypothesis 2b. The two regression 
models relating to partner-related selection criteria have significant F value (P < 0.01); 
with the second regression having the largest explanatory power (R
2
) of 23.1%. 
The first regression on partner-related selection criteria is stability factor. It has a 
significant and positive relationship with the following strategic motives market entry 
.280 (P < 0.01), and diversification and utilization .335 (P < 0.01). In other word, firms 
with market entry, and diversification and utilization motives will most likely choose a 
partner that is financially stable and has a good reputation.  
The interaction table is showing that alliance form (0 if non-equity) is positively 
moderating the effect between market entry and stability .014 (P < 0.01). This suggests 
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that the link between market entry and stability is stronger in EJVs. Furthermore, 
partner economical stage (0 if developing) is positively moderating the relation between 
diversification and utilization, and stability .663 (P < 0.01). This means that the link 
between diversification and utilization, and stability is stronger when the alliance is 
formed with a partner from a developed economy. 
The second regression on partner-related selection criteria is trust and past association. 
It has a significant and positive coefficient with market entry .418 (P < .01), and with a 
high explanatory power R
2
 of 23.1%. The findings come as no surprise, and it is 
consistent with the existing literature. Glaister (1996), and Dong and Glaister (2006) 
have all highlighted the importance of trust on partner-selection criteria. In business 
dealings, trust has an imperative important for the Saudi firms that could decide the fate 
of the partnership. Ali (2009: p. 138), points that: “Arabian spends considerable time on 
cultivating relationships and hopes to establish trust at the early stage. For Arabians 
trust is the most significant step for moving toward the next steps”. In Saudi Arabia, 
trust is regarded as the core of business and economic relation, where business is built 
on (Child and MOllering, 2003). Child and Tse (2001) believe that the importance of 
trust in countries like China is due to the underdevelopment of its institutions. The same 
argument can be extended to the Saudi context. Trust according to Das and Teng (1998) 
is, after control, one of the biggest sources of confidence in partner cooperation. They 
also argue that any formed SA has some sort of minimum level of trust. The importance 
of trust in ISA will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.  
In table 4.5, alliance form (0 if non-equity) has negatively moderated the relation 
between market entry and, trust and past association. It means that the link between 
market entry, and trust and past association is stronger in non-equity alliances. 
Furthermore, industry (0 if tertiary) has positively moderated the relation between 
market entry and, trust and past association. This means that the link between market 
entry and, trust and past association is stronger in manufacturing alliances. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Looking at the regressions models table 4.5, we could notice that task-related selection 
criteria have more explanatory power than the partner-related selection criteria. It shows 
that the task related selection criteria are more determined by the strategic motives than 
the partner related is. Thus, there is a reasonable support for hypothesis 3.  
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Task-related selection criteria are clearly more determined by strategic motives because 
it is a requirement for specific tasks (Glaister and Dong, 2006; Glaister, 1996). We can 
also notice in table 4.4 that partner related selection criteria has a higher mean (average: 
3.97) than task related selection criteria (average: 3.05). The findings are consistent with 
previous studies, and it indicates that Saudi firms has greater consensus on partner 
related selection criteria than on task related selection criteria. The findings can be 
explained that task related selection criteria are more linked to firm’s specific strategic 
motives and requirements. On the other hand, partner selection criteria are qualities and 
requirements the partner should possess; therefore, it is less driven by strategic motives. 
Although, this might not be the case for reliability and trust; as it has a higher value for 
the Saudi partner, and it can determine the future of any potential relationship .  
The low means of task related selection criteria is linked to the Saudi partner different 
motives. The higher the differences in motives the lower is the mean of task related, 
unlike the partner related. This reinforces the findings that task related selection criteria 
are determined by strategic motives for alliance formation.  
 
Table 4.6: Correlation-task-related selection criteria, factors of partner-related selection 
criteria and factors of strategic motives 
Variables 1           
SM Factor 1 1.000 2          
SM Factor 2 -.034 1.000 3         
SM Factor 3 .002 .059 1.000 4        
TR Factor 1 .286
** .384** .237* 1.000 5       
TR Factor 2 .088
** .024 .183 -.021 1.000 6      
TR Factor 3 .331
** .103 .217* .021 -.060 1.000 7     
PR Factor 1 .047 .240
* .229* .238* .332** .101 1.000 8    
PR Factor 2 .128 .388
** .155 .383* -.076 .146 .036 1.000 9   
IJV Age .119 .127 -.041 -.107 -.011 .040 -.080 .037 1.000 10  
IJV Form .119 .143 .036 .138 .077 .058 .044 .152 .036 1.000 11 
Industry .126 -.069 .016 .059 .193
* -.046 .064 .035 .184* .262** 1.000 
Partner stage -.095 .099 -.098 .058 .072 -.169 -.055 .091 .085 .076 .168 
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4.5. Discussion and Contributions 
  
The thesis has acknowledged the importance of research on ISA from the perspective of 
emerging market companies. However, it argues that not all emerging economies are the 
same; hence, motives and requirements will differ accordingly.   
The institutional differences between the developed and developing markets illustrate 
that there is a need for local knowledge resources by the developed market firms (Choi 
and Beamish, 2013). They defined the local knowledge-related resources as “the 
resources that consist of local marketing skills, local personnel management skills, and 
legal/government relations management skills”. According to the RBV, firms engage in 
SAs when they perceive critical resource complementary (Beamish, 2008; Chung, 
Singh, and Lee, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997); these resources are not 
readily available in the market (Choi and Beamish, 2013). 
Many studies have confirmed that resource complementary is one of the key drivers 
behind the formation of ISAs (Beamish, 2008; Chung et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995; Inkpen 
and Beamish, 1997; Choi and Beamish, 2013). The foreign firms desire to access the 
local knowledge is a consistent pattern identified in the literature.  
The study has illustrated that Saudi firms are not motivated by financial access, unlike 
most firms in developing nations. Due to its oil wealth and the size of the economy, the 
demand for foreign investment is motivated by combining resources and access to 
complementary technology and the know-how necessary to win contracts.  
One of the factors that influence firm expansion strategies and firm selections criteria is 
institutional factors. These factors can be for formal (e.g. regulatory, economic, and 
politics) or informal institutions (e.g. culture, and commercial conventions). The 
choices are not only influenced by internal factors and firms’ resources, but also by 
external factors (Lei and Slocum, 2014; Ahlstrom, et al, 2013).  
Some scholars have touched on the fact that partner selection criteria in strategic 
alliances have mostly focused on firms from developed economies (Ahlstrom et al., 
2013). The local institutional environment can affect partner selection (Vasudeva, 
2013). In this study, it is of a great importance. Although firms are not obliged to form 
alliances, they still do to access the local partner network and connections. This is 
valuable in conducting business in Saudi Arabia. Hence, culture has an important 
influence on strategic choices (Ahlstrom, et al, 2013).  
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The results illustrate that the task selection criteria are more important than the partner 
selection criteria; however, there was not a huge margin of difference. This is due to the 
nature of doing business in Saudi Arabia, where personal connections, more precisely 
trust, can be of huge importance when selecting a partner.  
This study has looked into the role of reputation in alliance formation decisions. 
Recently, Stern, et al (2014) called for other scholars to incorporate reputation and 
status in any model examining alliance formation. Fombrun (1996: p. 72) defined 
reputation as “a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future 
prospects that describes the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when 
compared to other leading rivals.” This means that the value of firms’ previous actions 
can determine its reputation.  
The study illustrates how important reputation is for Saudi firms when selecting their 
foreign partner. Jones and Kahnna (2006: p. 453) have talked about how history 
“reputation” matters in international business. They said that ‘‘although there is 
widespread acknowledgment that history matters [in international business], there is still 
a search for how it matters.’’ The results helped us to address their concerns and show 
how history can influence firms’ decisions.  
Stern, et al (2014) investigated how the reputation and status of firms’ founders can 
influence firms’ decisions to form an ISA with emerging firms. Their results indicate 
that a negative reputation and status has stronger effects than positive signals. Although 
their study context is in technology-driven industries, alongside the results of this study, 
it illustrates the weight of reputation in the strategic alliance selection criteria.   
Theoretically, the study has given support to the studies of Hitt, et al. (2000, 2004) in 
proving that institutional factors (e.g. government, culture) affect partner selection 
criteria.   
The practical contribution of this research can come from expounding on how Saudi 
firms select their partners, as well as what their motivations are. This will help 
executives to better understand their motivations, and their preferences, which will 
increase their chances of creating a successful alliance.  
Another empirical contribution of this study is that it is the first empirical study to 
examine a sample from Saudi Arabia, a developing economy that is different from other 
developing economies. This information helps us to better understand the thinking of a 
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Saudi firm’s managers and their decision-making process. It also contributes to practice 
by illustrating foreign firms ISA partner preferences of local firms in Saudi Arabia. 
This study has also shown how important trust is for alliance formations, especially in 
the Saudi context. Although partner selection criteria are generally less important than 
task selection criteria, in this context, trust is illustrating strong associations with the 
ISA selection criteria. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter are based on a good-sized sample of ISAs in Saudi Arabia. 
The study looked into the perspective of the Saudi firm. No empirical studies have 
looked into the strategic motivation or partner selection criteria of the Saudi firms, 
which make the study findings valuable extension to the existing research. 
Saudi Arabia is a unique economy; it is vast and growing. It is a developing economy, 
yet very wealthy. Furthermore, it relies on government spending on key sectors, e.g. 
educations, transportation, health, energy, aviation, financial service, and infrastructure. 
Saudi firms lack the necessary expertise and skills to execute projects in this magnitude. 
Therefore, they are in need for essential skills and expertise. Thus, it was no surprise to 
find out that the highest ranked strategic motives for Saudi firms are “To enable 
diversification of products and services”, and “To facilitate exchange of complementary 
technology”. Foreign firms are in pursuit to access this lucrative economy. Thus, the 
motives of foreign firms from the perspective of the Saudi firms are “To facilitate 
international expansion”, “To enable faster entry to the market” and “To establish 
presence in the market”. The motives between the Saudi firms and the foreign firms 
vary significantly; thus, it confirms and supports Hypothesis 1.     
This chapter has also looked into partner selection criteria in ISA formation. The study 
differentiated between the task-related and partner-related selection criteria. The 
findings from this study give a rare insight to the thinking, motivation, and partner 
selection criteria of Saudi firms. The empirical findings offered a good support to H2a 
and moderate support to H2b. It proved that task related selection criteria are influenced 
by firms’ motivation; while partner related have a limited affect. Nevertheless, the 
partner related motive of reliability and trust was a very determinant factor. This 
confirms the important of trust and reliability in the Saudi business culture, and for 
Arabs in general.  
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The finding of this paper gives an insight to the motivation of the Saudi firms, and it is 
clear that Saudi firms are aware of the motivation of foreign firms. Thus, they are 
seeking a win-win situation; a relationship that gives the foreign firms the chance to 
enter the market, understand it, and avoid risks. On the other hand, the Saudi firms can 
benefit from the partner experience, technical expertise and skills that would assist them 
winning government contracts. Awareness of partners’ motives and contribution has 
many positive outcomes. According to De Mattos, et al., (2002), it can lead to better 
understanding and negotiation process. They add that it will help partners to reach 
satisfying and attractive alternatives during negotiation.  
This chapter provides detailed background literature, the measures of variables, the 
hypotheses, the results and discussion related to strategic motivations and selection 
criteria of the Saudi firms. 
Next chapter, Chapter 6, examines the relation between knowledge tacitness, level of 
communication, trust, and number of expatriates with knowledge acquisitions rate. 
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Chapter Five: The Determinants for Knowledge 
Acquisition in ISAs 
5.1. Introduction 
The resources of a firm play an important role in laying down the foundations of the 
firm’s strategy (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). The resources and capabilities of a firm, as 
the primary source of profit, are a firm’s main strengths, and can be used to implement 
strategies that improve efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). The 
importance of timely acquisition of crucial skills has increased; thus, learning has 
become an important motive for the formation of ISAs and essential for firms’ survival 
(Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Parkhe, 1991; Lane, et al., 2001). Intense global 
competition has forced firms to acquire new skills, as no firm can create all the 
resources needed in order to grow and prosper (Dussauge, et al., 2000).  
The resource-based view of the firm has explained the reasons behind the formation of 
ISAs (Lubatkin, 1983). Firms, according to this theory, engage in ISAs to access 
valuable resources they lack, gain, or preserve control over certain resources (Chen and 
Chen, 2003). Firms engage in ISAs to add to their existing expertise and knowledge. 
They acquire knowledge via socializing, internalization, or combining different kinds of 
explicit and tacit knowledge to create new knowledge to enhance their competencies 
(Kumar and Nti, 1998; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Lyles and Salk, 1996). Firms by 
adapting to partner skills and capabilities can create competitive advantage for 
themselves (Porter, 1986). Thus, ‘learning alliances’, where the primary objective for 
both partners is to learn from each other to improve their operations, are increasingly 
common (Khanna, et al., 1998; Larsson, et al., 1998). 
According to organizational learning theory, ISAs are a vehicle for firms to “learn or 
seek to retain their capabilities” (Kogut, 1988; Hayward, 2002). It is an effective tool to 
cope with market failure in transferring organizationally embodied knowledge (Kogut, 
1988; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998); especially tacit 
knowledge, technology based and dynamics capabilities (Mowery, et al., 1996). 
Scholars have defined organizational learning as the successful restructuring ‘by 
individuals’ of organizational problems and growing insights, with an aim to improving 
actions through better knowledge and understanding (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Prior 
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literature noted that there are four constructs related to organizational learning: 
knowledge acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation, and 
organizational memory. The one most related to ISAs is knowledge acquisition. 
Knowledge can be acquired by adopting different methods. The ones most closely 
related to ISAs are learning from experience, learning by observing other organizations, 
and grafting (Huber, 1991).  
It is important to note that there are adverse factors that affect the success or failure 
learning outcome. These include the partners’ characteristics, such as intent, receptivity, 
and transparency, which affect their learning. Other factors such as the partners’ prior 
experience, cultural factors, attention to human resource management (Hamel, 1991; 
Makhija and Ganesh, 1997), type of knowledge (Ranft and Lord, 2002), employee 
reactions (Empson, 2001), communications (Bresman, et al., 1999), and expatriate 
(He´bert, Very, and Beamish, 2005). In chapter two, we have reviewed in details how 
some of these factors can hinder learning in ISAs.  
This chapter will examine some of the factors that might hinder or bolster learning. It 
will first look into the impact of tacitness on knowledge acquisition. Second, it will 
provide an overview to the role of expatriate on acquiring knowledge. Third, it will test 
the effect of communication on knowledge acquisition. The final part will examine the 
role of trust in knowledge acquisition. 
This study will give a better understanding of the determinants of learning in ISAs. 
Saudi firms have been trying for four decades to decrease its dependence on foreign 
technical competencies. They are still heavily dependent on foreign partner; this 
research will help uncover some of the causes that lie behind that presumed failure. 
There are no empirical studies that looked into this issue before in Saudi Arabia.  
Although, the study does not offer a complete test of all complex factors that affect 
knowledge acquisitions, it does provide an important contribution to understanding the 
factors that contribute to better understanding. The findings lay foundations and provide 
direction for future studies to consider in detail how Saudi firms can maximize their 
learning. The failure (over many decades) of Saudi firms to break away from complete 
dependence on foreign knowledge and expertise make the findings more instrumental.  
The argument relating to knowledge tacitness is straightforward: we expected that the 
weak Saudi knowledge base would mean that they were affected by this factor. The role 
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of expatriates in firms has been neglected; hence, the study contributes to the awareness 
of how numbers of expatriates can affect knowledge acquisition. The possible outcome 
could be valuable for Saudi in understanding their failure at reaping the benefits.  
The study also contributes to understanding of how personal trust affects ISAs through 
knowledge acquisitions. The role of communication in SAs is minimized in the 
literature. It is expected that communication is an influential factor in determining the 
success of knowledge acquisition in ISAs. The hypotheses builds on existing literature, 
it examines similar hypotheses but with extension to a different context. 
By the end of this chapter, the findings will help us to answer the third research question 
of the thesis “What are the factors affecting learning within ISAs?” The findings will 
lay foundation to future study and help give a good understanding to the reasons behind 
the continuous Saudi dependency on foreign knowledge and technology.  
 
5.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Inter-firm learning in ISAs takes place either by transferring the ‘existing’ knowledge 
from one firm to another, or by creating new knowledge through pooling the existing 
knowledge of both firms (Larsson, et al., 1998). However, learning from ISAs has some 
necessary conditions to be successful: the possession of absorptive capacity, and, most 
importantly, the intent to learn. Firms must be eager to learn from their partner firms; 
the absence of the intent to learn is a ‘form of arrogance’, which will negatively affect 
the outcome (Mowery et al., 1996).  
The transfer of knowledge does not take place by merely bringing two firms together. 
There are many conditions and skills required and many obstacles to overcome. 
Capacity to learn (absorptive capacity), articulated goals, and structural mechanisms 
(such as foreign partner training) have all been reported to facilitate learning (Lyles and 
Salk, 1996; Dong and Glaister, 2009). Firms need to possess the necessary skills to 
learn from their alliances. These skills are what known as the “absorptive capacity” of 
the firms (Simonin, 2004; Kim and Inkpen, 2005; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). It has 
been considered by many academics as the most significant determinant of 
organizational learning (Park, 2011). Moreover, both partners must be transparent 
(Larsson et al., 1998). Additional factors (such as the nature of the knowledge, 
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performance and the timing of the experience), also have an impact on the level of 
knowledge acquisition (Hayward, 2002).     
Absorptive capacity is “a firm ability to value, assimilates, and utilizes new external 
knowledge” (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Simonin (2004) has described absorptive 
capacity as the ‘learning capacity’ of the firm; while Hamel (1991) has defined the 
partners’ capacity to learn from each other as ‘receptivity’. A lack of absorptive 
capacity is “the most important impediment of knowledge transfer” (Minbaeva, et al., 
2003). 
Several mechanisms generate absorptive capacity recommended in the literature. First, 
prior related knowledge is important to enable firms to evaluate and recognize 
knowledge. Business relatedness has been proposed as a tool to indicate prior 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2001; Park, 2010). Lane, et al., 
(2001) have used cultural differences as a tool to measure the cultural compatibility as 
suggested by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). Yan and Gray (1994) have recommended 
some sort of business “similarity” and mutual experience. There are positive 
associations between an ISA’s performance and survival, and business relatedness 
(Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Kogut, 1989). Relatedness has an association with positive 
learning and knowledge acquisition, which has been examined by Lane, et al., (2001). 
They found that there are positive associations; the “student” partner is able to 
assimilate more knowledge when there are business similarities. 
Prior experiences and previously accumulated knowledge play an important role in 
improving the absorptive capacity of individuals and organizations, as they help firms to 
assimilate and use new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Prior experience and 
knowledge facilitate the learning of new knowledge, although this does not mean that 
learning will not take place without prior experience (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Cultural (national or corporate) factors are very powerful, and have an effect on 
people’s perceptions, values and beliefs (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). Studies have shown 
that national culture is the reason for 50 per cent of differences in values and beliefs 
among managers, even when they work for multinational companies (Hofstede, 1991). 
The differences between partners could lower resource sharing and create cultural 
conflict, consequently affecting knowledge acquisition (Sirmon and Lane, 2004; Lyles 
and Salk, 1996). 
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There are also other factors that play an important role in the transfer of knowledge and 
learning between partner firms. Ownership has been reported as a pivotal factor for the 
successful transfer of knowledge (Lyles and Salk, 1996). It has been identified that 
ownership affects knowledge transfer and acquisition between ISA partners. Equal 
ownership between partners is reported to have more difficulties, especially in the 
presence of cultural differences (Killing, 1983). Furthermore, shared management ISAs 
are affected by cultural misunderstanding (Lyles and Salk, 1996). This is because none 
of the parents has dominant control. However, in other studies, Salk (1992) has found 
that partners of equal partnerships display greater willingness to share and transfer 
knowledge, as both partners have the same commitment and stake in the business. A 
study by Lyles and Salk (1996) found that 50/50 ISAs reported higher levels of 
knowledge acquisition. In addition, in shared management ISAs, there are greater levels 
of communication and interaction, which in turn promotes greater knowledge transfer 
and sharing (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Westney, 2002).  
Trust and transparency between partners are essential components for achieving desired 
learning (Hamel, 1991). Furthermore, business relatedness has been reported as a 
success factor for ISAs (Yan and Gray, 1994; Kogut, 1989). Ambiguity and partner 
protectiveness have also been reported to have hindering effect on learning and 
knowledge transfer (Simonin, 2004; Lyles and Salk, 1996).  
For decades, Saudi Arabia economy has relied on oil exportation and oil based products. 
Thus, the kingdom is in an attempt to diversify its economy and learn how to compete 
in knowledge intensive industries (Rice, 2003). The Saudi government has placed a 
strong emphasis on education in an effort to build a solid base of young and highly 
skilled workforce to strengthen the innovation capability of the country (Rice, 2003).  
ISAs are the preferred form for both Saudi firms and multinationals (Williams, 2009; 
Mababaya, 2002). ISAs allow both companies to pool their resources. They can 
combine the technical and commercial capabilities and competencies of the Western 
partner with the local knowledge and commercial competitiveness of the local partner 
(Al-Rasheedi, 2012). It allows the Saudis to bring in competencies that will add to their 
competitive advantage (Williams, 2009). When seeking to form ISAs with 
multinationals, Saudi companies (unlike their counterparts in many other developing 
nations) are not seeking capital. These firms have cash, some from established business 
families, and are seeking partners’ technology and know-how (Ali, 2009: p. 222). The 
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Saudis have always preferred short cuts and to buy knowledge (a “turn-key” policy) in 
major projects. This has hindered the country efforts to develop technologically literate 
work force (Haidar, 2000). Thus, Saudis realized that they needed to possess the ability 
to assimilate, accommodate, and absorb technology to transfer it successfully (Haidar, 
2000).  
Saudis and the Saudi government have tried to learn from advanced countries. The 
government has sent thousands of students abroad in an attempt to ensure that they learn 
and transfer some of the knowledge back to Saudi. However, Saudis are facing some 
impeding factors that have hindered their learning and the utilisation of acquired 
knowledge. These factors include authoritarian leadership style, resistance to new ideas, 
and lack of qualified staff (Yavas, 1998). The transfer of technology in Saudi Arabia has 
always faced many barriers, most notably comprised of organizational, technical, and 
human problems (Atiyyah, 1989). They face many barriers, such as the lack of a skilled 
workforce or management and industrial capabilities, as well as weak and ineffective 
legal and regularity conditions (Merdah and Sadi, 2011). 
In the coming section we will be assessing how the following factors (tacitness, 
communication, number of expatriate, and trust) affect learning in ISA in the Saudi 
context. 
5.2.1. Tacitness 
Knowledge can be divided into ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’. It can be acquired from ISAs via 
socializing, internalization, or combining different kinds of explicit knowledge to create 
new knowledge (Lyles and Salk, 1996). Tacit knowledge is abstract and difficult to 
communicate (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004), more valuable (Sen, 2009), not easily codified in 
formulas and blueprints (Zander and Kogut, 1995), and according to Simonin (1999), 
“the most significant determinant of knowledge transferability”. By contrast, explicit 
knowledge is more codifiable and easier to transfer (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004). 
Tacit knowledge is represented by the firm's experience in manufacturing and marketing 
products, and its knowledge of local customers, markets, and policies. Sen (2009) has 
noted that we know more than we can tell. Such knowledge is a non-codifiable set of 
skills, embodied in the individual. It can only be exchanged through 'intimate human 
contact' (Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Sen, 2009; Simonin, 1999). On the other hand, 
explicit knowledge (such as a quantifiable technology and product development) is 
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codified and can be transferred more easily in a written format and in formal systematic 
language (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004; Sen, 2009; Kogut and Zander, 1993).  
Individual knowledge in the form of know-how, skills, managerial and marketing 
expertise are more tacit (Shenkar and Li, 1999; Lane, et al., 2001). It is complex 
knowledge which is hard to codify; it is difficult to articulate, and this affects the speed 
of knowledge transfer (Zander and Kogut, 1995). The level of tacitness of specific 
knowledge, skills, and know-how affects the transfer; more tacit knowledge is more 
difficult to transfer (Simonin, 1999; Lam, 1997). Kogut (1988) argues that, among the 
methods of transferring tacit knowledge, such as licensing, JVs are the best. The reason 
is not market failure or high transaction costs, as transaction cost theory explains; but 
simply that the target knowledge is embodied within the organization. Thus, it is the 
best (or possibly the only) way to transfer 'tacit' knowledge properly (Glaister, 1996; 
Tsang, 1998), whilst explicit knowledge - ‘the simple knowledge’ - is easy to learn and 
transfer (Bhagat, et al., 2002).   
The process of transferring tacit knowledge is complicated, and it is more complex 
when it is combined with cultural differences (national or organizational). It becomes 
more difficult for the ‘student’ to understand the behaviour of the ‘teacher’, and the 
teacher will find it difficult to transfer the knowledge in an understandable ‘language’ 
for the student (Bhagat, et al., 2002).  
Tacit knowledge has a certain ambiguity, and that is because it is embedded within 
“individuals’ cognitive processes”, and rooted in the routines of organization culture 
(Bhagat, et al., 2002). It is transferred by closely and directly monitoring the ‘knower’ 
doing what they do best, interacting with them, and analysing their actions (Dhanaraj, et 
al., 2004). Ambiguity creates more difficulty and puts more strain on knowledge, which 
in turn makes the knowledge immobile and hard to transfer (Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Hamel, et al., 1989). This applies also to explicit knowledge, which, in theory, should 
be easier to transfer (Simonin, 2004). According to Inkpen and Crossan (1995), firms 
that fail to overcome the ambiguity of their partner skills will probably fail to achieve 
their desired learning. The greater the complexity of the knowledge or know-how the 
higher the likely level of ambiguity (Simonin, 1999). 
Saudis prefer face-to-face meetings as personal dealings enhance personal trust and 
relationships (Ali, 2009). Ardichvili, et al. (2006) have pointed out in a recent study on 
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organizational learning and knowledge creation that knowledge sharing, 
communication, and learning in organizations are affected by employee cultural values. 
Saudi's score highly in the power distance index and low in individualism, which means 
that Saudis prefer to work together, and with personal interaction. As a high context 
society, Saudis better comprehend what is being communicated when they are able to 
closely observe the environment, situation, and people (Rice, 2003). Thus, knowledge is 
transferred best when there is direct instruction from a supervisor (Al-hazmi, 2010). 
Saudi Arabia is suffering from a lack of Saudi skilled staff and technologically literate 
workforce (Haidar, 2000; Idris, 2007). This has hindered technological advancement 
and the ability to assimilate, accommodate, and absorb technology (Idris, 2007; Haidar, 
2000). 
H1. From the perspective of Saudi ISA partners, knowledge acquisition is negatively 
related to the extent to which the knowledge of the foreign partners is tacit. 
 
5.2.2. Communication and Number of Expatriate 
The Saudi market is always in pursuit of the latest technology and management 
techniques. Nevertheless, Saudi firms have failed to reap the benefits of these 
partnerships. They face many barriers such as the lack of a skilled workforce and 
management and industrial capabilities, as well as weak and ineffective legal and 
regularity conditions (Merdah and Sadi, 2011). Above all, Saudi lacks management 
technology (Merdah and Sadi, 2011). The importance of management technology is that 
it has a direct impact on the selection, adaptation, absorption and integration of other 
forms of technologies (Grosse, 1996). Acquiring technology does not guarantee 
successful technology transfer; it has to be accompanied by absorption capabilities for 
successful integration and utilization (Merdah and Sadi, 2011).  
Saudi culture places a strong emphasis on the group, not the individual. Furthermore, 
loyalty, obedience to seniors, face-to-face interaction, and personal connections are all 
important attributes to have (Kassem and Habib, 1989; Al-Rasheedi, 2012).  
Saudi Arabia is suffering from a lack of Saudi skilled staff, which hinders technological 
advancement (Idris, 2007). Saudi is a net importer of technology and foreign labour in 
order to meet its technical needs (Al-Kibsi, et al., 2007). The availability of financial 
resources in Saudi Arabia and similar Arabic states (due to the huge influx of oil 
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revenue) has tempted the country to resort to short cuts (“turn-key” policies) in major 
projects. These methods, although beneficial in the short term, have obstructed the 
country from the opportunity to build technologically literate work force with the 
necessary skills (Haidar, 2000; Idris, 2007). In order for the country to be successful in 
transferring and benefitting from technology, it needs to develop the ability to 
assimilate, accommodate, and absorb technology (Haidar, 2000). In order to achieve 
this, Saudi must prepare a solid base of indigenous scientists, engineers, and skilled 
manpower (Haidar, 2000). Arabs, in general, are keen entrepreneurs with more 
inclination towards trade than towards manufacturing (Rice, 2003). Many studies have 
addressed the issue of private enterprise preference to expatriate, as they respond more 
positively to foreign job applicants (The Economist, 1997; Atiyyah, 1996; Al-Dosary 
and Rahman, 2005; Sadi and Al-Buraey, 2009). This is because private sector believes 
in the foreign worker skills, they are generally less expensive, and for top and key 
positions, they possess more experience and higher competence (The Economist, 1997; 
Sadi and Al-Buraey, 2009). Earlier studies have found higher productivity and 
discipline of the expatriate in Middle East comparing to local workforces (Atiyyah, 
1996; and Lumsden, 1993). Park (2011) argues that co-working with expatriate experts 
can push the acquisition of operational and manufacturing activity. Expatriates in ISAs, 
according Park, et al., (2009) are the primary driver of knowledge flows. 
Following the above argument, we expect a positive relationship between the number of 
expatriate and knowledge acquisition. The role of expatriate in organization has been 
largely neglected. The situation in Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries in general, is unique 
in terms of the proportion of foreign workforce to the local workforce.  
H2. From the perspective of Saudi ISA partners, knowledge acquisition will be higher 
in the Saudi firms with greater number of foreign expatriates compared to those with 
smaller number of foreign expatriates. 
 
Communication as an integral part of the process of distribution of knowledge 
(Buckley, et al., 2005; Daghfous, 2004; Si and Bruton, 1999), and is considered as an 
essential part of absorptive capacity. In the Saudi context, a lack of skilled Saudi 
employees and the resulting reliance on expatriates to do the technical jobs means that 
the number of expatriate is positively related to absorptive capacity. Lane, et al. (2001) 
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has suggested that trust is a critical part of absorptive capacity. As it plays a crucial role 
on learning and knowledge exchange. 
Communication plays an important role in conducting business in Saudi Arabia. 
Business is conducted between people, not between companies or contracts (Al-
Rasheedi, 2012). Socialising plays an important part in establishing business relations in 
Saudi (Moran, et al., 2007). Westerners place more emphasis on oral communication, 
while Saudi emphasizes both oral and aural communication. This is rooted in the 
traditional Bedouin culture that places emphasis on both speaking and listening (Al-
Rasheedi, 2012). Saudis prefer face-to-face meetings, as the personal dealings enhance 
personal trust and relationships (Ali, 2009). National cultural differences can hinder the 
advancement of the relationship between partners in ISA due to the lack of shared 
norms and values, which reduces communication between partners (Sirmon and Lane, 
2004; Pothukuchi, et al., 2002). This makes communication more important in cross-
cultural SAs. 
Organizational protectiveness behaviour, ambiguity and trust all have an impediment 
effect on learning. Thus, open and frequent communication might have a positive effect 
on the learning process (Adenfelt and Lagerström, 2006; Park, 2011). The exchange of 
formal and informal information is dependent on the quality of communication (Park, 
2011). It helps the flow of knowledge between firms (Von Krogh and Roos, 1996). Park 
(2011) in his study of knowledge transfer in multinational enterprises claim that 
knowledge distribution is dependent on the frequency and density of interactions. Open 
communication breeds trust and reduces misunderstanding, thus increasing 
collaboration and knowledge sharing in return (Park, 2011). Interaction between top 
management plays a vital role in the firm’s ability to access the partner technology 
(Inkpen and Dinur, 1998). 
The role of communication in SAs is minimized in the literature. We expect that 
communication is an influential factor in determining the success of knowledge 
acquisition in ISAs. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H3. From the perspective of Saudi ISA partners, knowledge acquisition is positively 
related to the level of communication between the Saudi firms and the foreign partners. 
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5.2.3. Trust, Protectiveness, and Learning 
Learning in alliances involves accessing sensitive and important information, 
competencies, and skills from the partner (Becerra, et al., 2008). According to social 
exchange theory, factors such as reciprocal commitment, trust, and mutual influence 
have a positive effect on the transfer of knowledge between alliance partners 
(Muthusamy and White, 2005). Trust has been defined in the literature in various ways; 
McEvily, et al., (2003: p.101), described it as a “multi-faceted concept”. This chapter 
adopts the following definition of trust -‘goodwill’ trust- which is “one party’s 
confidence in the goodwill” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). This definition is suited to 
this particular study, as the type of trust sought is on a personal level. It reflects how the 
two parties understand and appreciate each other’s needs (Lado, et al., 2008).  
Firms may fear opportunistic behaviour in their partners, and may expect them to use 
alliances to “steal” their secrets and technology (Doz, 1996). A lack of trusts will 
increase fear of opportunistic behaviour, and firms will most likely have a negative 
outcome from untrustworthy behaviour (Nooteboom, 1996).  
Shared values and systems, together with trust, play a vital role in facilitating learning 
and knowledge transfer between organizations. Thus, trust is a pillar for successful 
knowledge acquisitions (Park, et al., 2008). Trust leads to shared understanding, which 
in return facilitates access to resources and promotes cooperation between the different 
parties, which makes the knowledge sharing more successful (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Park, 2011). It develops a sense of openness and shared 
understanding (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Wahab, et al., 2011), facilitate knowledge 
access, and create commitment and openness in sharing knowledge and competencies 
(Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Cultural conflict and 
misunderstandings between partners will reduce trust, and this in return will limit the 
sharing of information, raise costs, and have a negative effect on the learning outcome 
between partners (Lane, et al., 2001; Doney, et al., 1998; Park and Ungson, 1997). 
There is a consensus among the ISAs literature that conflict, especially cultural conflict, 
has a destabilizing effect and could hinder positive performance (Killing, 1983; Lane 
and Beamish, 1990).    
The quality of the relationship has significant effect on the degree of knowledge 
tacitness transfer, and more on explicit knowledge (Wahab, et al., 2011). The same 
argument is extended to mutual trust, except this time the transfer of tacit knowledge is 
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slightly stronger (Wahab, et al., 2011). Nielsen and Nielsen (2009) have confirmed the 
relation between trust and tacitness; moreover, they have affirmed that trust can affect 
learning outcome. Tacit knowledge requires trust, interaction, and exchanging of ideas 
in order for the knowledge transfer and learning to take place. Cultural differences slow 
down the integration process, and misunderstandings can replace trust with suspicions 
(Dhanaraj, et al., 2004; Kedia and Bhagat, 1988). 
Transparency is an essential condition for learning to take place. The most important 
knowledge is tacit, “sticky”, and socially embedded, which makes transparency a must 
(Larsson, et al., 1998; Simonin, 1999). Hamel (1991) has also confirmed through his 
observation that transparency influences the learning process between partners. 
However, culture differences may restrict any attempt for firms to be transparent; 
differences in language, customs and tradition will obstruct communication between 
partners, and can make even the well codified knowledge hard to obtain (Larsson, et al., 
1998; Simonin, 1999). It hinders the decision making process and firms’ efforts to 
promote social integration (Tsang, 1998; Zahra and George, 2002). It affects 
sociocultural integration, synergy realization and shareholder value in two ‘opposing’ 
way, depending on the degree of the cultural differences and relatedness (Stahl and 
Voigt, 2008). 
In order for firms to exploit knowledge in SAs, they first need to share knowledge. 
Social integration mechanisms, whether formal or informal, are one of best methods of 
sharing knowledge between employees (Lane, et al., 2001).  
Collective societies, due to their nature, trust their in-group members and place more 
value on trust. Individuals who want to be members of their in-group must first gain the 
trust of the group (Huff and Kelly, 2003). Saudis are known to be a collectivist society 
(Ali, et al., 1997; At-Twaijri and Al-Muhaiza, 1996). Collectivist societies have higher 
levels of loyalty and commitment to their groups, whether families or working groups 
(Al-Rasheedi, 2012). It is a personalized society where friendship, kinship, and 
communal relationship have a significant influence on individual behaviours (Ali, 
2009).  
Thus, the importance of loyalty and trust is paramount and cannot be separated from 
business. In Saudi culture, a person’s word has the same value as a written commitment 
(Mababaya, 2002; Rice, 2003). Businessmen in Saudi Arabia take the time to get to 
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know someone and build a relationship before doing business with them; they must trust 
them first (Mababaya, 2002; Rice, 2003). There is a strong emphasis on building trust 
before any transaction takes place within the culture of all Gulf countries (Al-Khatib, et 
al., 2004). Thus, it is not uncommon for initial business meetings to consist only of 
socialisation, with no actual business taking place (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). When trust is 
gained, it eases business dealings and communications. However, when it is lost, it can 
cause serious obstacles (Ali, 2009). Companies need to develop a trust-based 
environment in order to successfully share their knowledge (Von Krogh, et al., 2000). 
Saudi Arabia exhibits a higher level of personalization and intimate relationships 
compared to Western societies (Ali, 2009). Saudis prefer to work together, and prefer 
personal interaction. Thus, knowledge is transferred best when there is direct instruction 
from a supervisor (Al-hazmi, 2010). There is a clear lack of understanding of Western 
culture, except among a few highly educated individuals (educated abroad), which has 
hindered the assimilation of Western technology (Hill, et al., 2000). The constant 
interaction between traditional culture and modern economic and business realities 
makes Saudi Arabia a unique culture (Abu-Musa, 2006).  
The legal framework in Saudi Arabia is weak and still developing, with continuous 
conflict between traditionalist and modernist movements (Al-jarbou, 2007). There are 
essentially two legal systems in Saudi Arabia; “one is based on Shari'ah Islami'iah 
(Islamic teachings) and the other is based on secularized (non-religious) laws, known as 
nizam” (Cassell and Blake, 2012). The Saudi legal system is still developing, and there 
are some gaps in government regulations; for example, there is a lack of patent and 
copyright protection. Thus, in the absence of legal protection, foreign companies 
implement cautionary actions (Yavaş, et al., 1994). Child and Mollering (2003) have 
reflected on institution-based trust, and how lack of confidence in the legal system 
might damage it. Moreover, Luo’s (2007) research results have confirmed that the lack 
of law enforceability in developing markets increases opportunistic behaviour. This 
shows that trust is even more important in enabling firms to exchange knowledge. 
Considering the above argument, it is easier to predict that personal trust would be 
playing a large role in determining knowledge acquisition levels. Therefore, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
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H4. From the perspective of the Saudi ISA partners, knowledge acquisition is positively 
related to the level of personal trust between the top managers of the Saudi firms and 
the foreign partners. 















The survey questions measured the Saudi firm managers’ perceptions of the achieved 
learning and learning impediment (tacitness, communication, number of foreign 
workforce, and trust). Responses were assessed using five points Likert-type scales: for 
trust, knowledge acquisitions, and tacit (reverse coded) and explicit knowledge, a scale 
of 1 (little) to 5 (to a great extent) was used. This instrument has been used in previous 
studies (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004; Nooteboom, et al., 1997; Zaheer, et al., 1998; Simonin, 
1999b; Simonin, 2004; Lane, et al., 2001). For culture distance, a scale of 1 (not at all) 
to 5 (a great deal) was used. These instruments have been used in previous studies 
(Lyles and Salk, 1996; Simonin, 1999b). For communication, a scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) was used. This instrument has also been used in previous 
studies (Simonin, 2004; Simonin, 1999a; Park, 2011). For trust, the scale ranged from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Muthusamy and White (2005) have used this 
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pilot study. The study explored the perspective of the local “Saudi” partner. Ideally, the 
researcher would have included representatives of both parent firms as well as the ISA, 
but the limited resources, access restrictions, absence of a database, and the size and 
nature of the study precluded such an approach. Many ISA studies have relied on data 
from one of the partner’s perspectives. 
 
5.3.2. Variables 
Dependent variable: This scale was designed to measure the learned knowledge from 
foreign partners across seven areas: new technological expertise, new marketing 
expertise, product development, process know-how, knowledge about foreign cultures 
and tastes, managerial techniques, and manufacturing processes. Respondents were 
assessed using five point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 (little) to 5 (to great extent). 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was run to produce one learning factor in line with 
previous studies (Geringer, 1988; Glaister, 1996, 1997; Dong and Glaister, 2006).  
The items correlated significantly with each other (correlation between .3 and .9). None 
correlated higher than .9. This ruled out any possible multicollinearity in the data. The 
determinant was (0.099) respectively, which is greater than the necessary value of 
0.00001. This further confirms that variables correlate reasonably and multicollinearity 
is ruled out. The Cronbach’s alpha of the factor was (0.819) within the acceptable value 
in exploratory research (Hair, et al., 1998: p. 118). 
Table 5.1: Factor Analysis of Dependent Variables 
Factors Factors 
load 




Cronbach   
Factor 1 (Learning)  3.395 48.503 48.503 .819 
Managerial technique .732     
Process know-how .713     
Product development .700     
New technological 
expertise 
.696     
Manufacturing processes .695     
New marketing expertise .684     
Foreign culture 
knowledge 
.653     
KMO= .777 
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Independent variables: EFA was run on the 7 items measuring tacitness, number of 
foreign employees, and level of communication. After the initial test, one variable was 
removed “Your partner's technology/process know-how is easily codifiable (in 
blueprints, formulas, etc.)”, as it was driving the reliability down. After the second run 
another item was deleted “There are few difficulties in communicating with our 
partner”, it was loading almost equally on all factors. After the deletion process, EFA 
was run again using Kaiser’s criterion SPSS extracted 3 non-overlapping factors with a 
KMO of (.668) which is above the bare minimum of 0.5 (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 
1999). The correlation matrix was checked, to check the correlation between the 
variables. Most of them correlates significantly wither ach other (correlation between .3 
and .9). None correlated higher than .9, which rule out any possible multicollinearity in 
the data. The determinant is .434, which is greater than the necessary value of 0.00001. 
This further confirms that variables correlate reasonably. Furthermore, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) was to measure multicollinearity level among the independent 
variables. A high value above 10 suggests the possibility of multicollinearity (Hair, et 
al., 2003: p. 305). The VIF did not show any evidence of multicollinearity, which shows 
it is not a problem in the regressions analysis (Park, 2011). Cronbach’ alpha of the three 
independent variables ranged from (0.750 to 0.838). 
Personal Trust: This scale was designed to measure the state of personal trust between 
top managers of the ISA parents. Respondents were asked, using a four-items scale, to 
indicate to what extent they would agree with the following statements about the state 
of personal trust between them and their partner. Responses were assessed using a five 
point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). EFA 
produced one factor with a KMO of .813 (Cronbach’s alpha, 0.838).  
The items correlated significantly with each other (correlation between .3 and .9). None 
correlated higher than .9. This ruled out any possible multicollinearity in the data. The 
determinant was (0.154) which is greater than the necessary value of 0.00001. This 
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Cronbach   
Factor 1 (Level of communication)  2.003 40.057 40.057 .750 
The quality of communication 
between parents is extremely good. 
 
.861 
    
We always keep each other 
informed about events or changes 
that may affect the other firm. 
 
.836 
    
Regular contacts are maintained 
between senior management. 
.742     
Factor 2  (Knowledge tacitness)  1.004 20.083 60.140 N/A 
Technology/process know-how is 
very difficult to understand and 
imitate. 
.992     
Factor 3 (Number of expatriate)  1.004 20.079 80.079 N/A 
The percentage of non-Saudi 
nationals working in medium or 
high level positions. 
 
.994 
    
Factor 4 (Personal Trust)  2.804 70.106 70.106 .838 
I always feel confident when my 




    
My counterpart is trustworthy. .870     
My counterpart and I can always 
find appropriate solutions through 
compromise when conflicts arise. 
 
.868 
    
The joint ventures are characterized 
by personal friendship between the 
partners at multiple levels. 
.729     
 
 
Control variables: EFA was run on the 5 items measuring cultural distance and 
relatedness. After the initial test one variable was removed “Language differences are 
major obstacles in communicating and understanding the partner”, it was loading almost 
equally on all factors and creating a problem with the module. After the deletion 
process, EFA was run again using Kaiser’s criterion SPSS extracted two non-
overlapping factors, cultural distance, and relatedness, with a KMO of (.668). The items 
correlated significantly with each other (correlation between .3 and .9). None correlated 
higher than .9. This ruled out any possible multicollinearity in the data. The determinant 
was (0.434) which is greater than the necessary value of 0.00001. This further confirms 
that variables correlate reasonably and multicollinearity is ruled out. The Cronbach’s 
alpha of the factor was (0.819). 
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Cronbach   
Factor 1 (Culture distance)  2.330 58.247 58.247 .855 
Their national culture is quite 
different from ours  
.927     
There is much cultural dissimilarity 
between us and our foreign partner  
.891     
There are significant cultural 
differences between us and our 
foreign partner 
.823     
Factor 2  (Relatedness)  1.015 25.366 83.613 N/A 
Are your company and your 
partner primarily engaged in the 
same industries   
.994     
 
Ownership: a dummy variable to measure parents’ equity share was used. One dummy 
variable was created; ISAs with 50/50 ownership were coded 0, whilst others were 
coded 1. 
Sector: The industry sector of the alliance was also entered as a dummy variable, coded 
1 for the manufacturing sector and 0 for the tertiary sector.  
Economic status: The partner company’s economic stage was also entered as a dummy 
variable; coded 1 for firms from developed economies and 0 for firms from developing 
economies. The classification is based on IMF “World Economic Outlook” report on 
April 2012. 
Age: we also controlled for alliance age, which was calculated as the difference 
between the time of data collection and the year of the alliance formation. 
5.3.3. Statistical analysis 
The choice of an appropriate strategy could be derived from the research question and 
objectives (de Vaus, 1990, p.121). The study questions consider the factors that affect 
learning and knowledge transfer from the foreign firms to the Saudi firms in ISAs. 
Hence, this study is examining the causal relationship between the factors influencing 
the learning in the ISA. Multiple regression is one of the most effective techniques used 
to examine the cause-effect relationship between a dependent variable and several 
independent variables (Park, 2011). According to Hair, et al. (1995: p. 20), “multiple 
regression analysis is a statistical technique that can be used to analyse the relationship 
between a single dependent (criterion) variable and several independent (predictor) 
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variables. The objective of multiple regression analysis is to use the several independent 
variables whose values are known to predict the single dependent value the researcher 
wishes to know”. The hypotheses were tested using a multi-regression analysis. 
Normality and Multicollinearity were checked. The VIFs did not show any evidence of 
multicollinearity, and are well within the recommended cut-off of 10 (1.000-2.381). 
Hence, it is not a problem in the regressions analysis (Park, 2011). 
 
5.4. Findings and discussions 
5.4.1. Results 
The regression analysis in Table 5.4 shows a significant positive relationship between 
knowledge acquisition, and level of communication and knowledge tacitness (reverse 
coded), with coefficients of 0.346 (P < .01) and 0.260 (P < .01) respectively. The 
number of foreign expatriates and personal trust show no significant relationship with 
knowledge acquisition. The model has significant F value (P < .01), and it has a large 
explanatory power (R
2
) of 49.2%.  
 
  Table 5.4: Multiple Regressions on Knowledge Acquisitions 





Industry relatedness .107 






Ownership type -.040 
JV age .007 
Industry -.106 
Economic status -.046 
Main Effects 
H1: Knowledge tacitness .260
***
 
H2: Number of expatriates -.034 
H3: Level of communication .346
***
 






***p< 0:01; **P<0:05; *P<0:1; the F-test on R2 is one-tailed; the t-test on each regression coefficient is two-tailed 
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The control variable cultural distance is showing a positive and significant correlation 
with knowledge acquisitions with coefficient of 0.346 (P < .01). Too is Prior ties, which 
showing a significant and negative correlation with knowledge acquisitions with 
coefficient of -0.328 (P < .1). 
There is also, in the correlation table (Table 5.5), a positive and significant relationship 
between knowledge acquisition and level of communication (0.275) (P < .05), 
knowledge tacitness (0.279) (P < .05), and the personal trust (0.237) (P < .1). 
Furthermore, two control variables are showing significant correlation. Cultural distance 
has a positive significance coefficient (0.424) (P < 0.01); while, prior ties is showing 
significant but negative correlation (-.261) (P < .05). Thus, the model is showing strong 
support to hypotheses 1 and 3, and no support to hypotheses 2 and 4. 
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Table 5.5: Correlation- Knowledge Acquisitions, Independent and Control Variables 
 1            
Knowledge acquisition 1 2           
Level of communication .275
**
 1 3          
Knowledge tacitness .279
**
 -.198 1 4         





 -.050 -.141 1 6       
Industry relatedness .085 .218
*
 -.090 -.102 .255
**
 1 7      
Cultural distance .424
***
 -.001 .194 .237
**
 .125 -.215 1 8     
Prior ties -.261
**
 -.117 -.058 .255
**
 -.130 -.049 -.126 1 9    
Ownership type .131 -.023 .327
***
 .026 -.043 -.145 .161 -.081 1 10   
JV age -.054 -.083 -.034 -.018 -.054 .004 -.166 .112 .157 1 11  
Industry -.013 .152 -.140 -.075 .012 -.048 .005 -.209 .012 .231
*
 1 12 
Economic status .045 .094 .108 .180 -.173 -.083 .052 -.092 .192 .053 .320
***
 1 
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5.4.2. Discussion 
The results show that the less tacit the knowledge is the more of the knowledge 
acquired. The literature shows agreement that the more tacit knowledge is, the more 
difficult is to transfer it (see Dhanaraj, et al., 2004; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Simonin, 
1999). Thus, the results of the study are consistent with the literature that has described 
“tacit” knowledge as difficult knowledge (Sen, 2009). Less tacit knowledge can be 
transferred more easily; it is less difficult to explain and easier to understand (Glaister, 
1996; Tsang, 1998; Bhagat, et al., 2002).  
Communication is important in international business in general and more so in the 
Saudi context. Hence, it was not surprising to see the significance of the level of 
communication on knowledge acquisition. Saudis after all are high context society. 
Communication has greater importance in high context cultures comparing to low 
context culture, like the US, where the context of a meeting is perceived less important 
(Hennart and Zeng, 2002). Level of communication, besides its role on knowledge 
acquisition, has an important role on building trust, resolving conflicts, and overcoming 
cultural distance barriers. 
The results show that the better is the level of communication, the more the acquired 
knowledge. This is consistent with the finding from the literature that found a positive 
correlation between communication and knowledge acquisitions (Park, 2011). 
Communication plays very important part in a society like the Saudi society. It is a 
personalized society and knowledge is transferred best when it is communicated directly 
(Rice, 2003; Al-Hazmi, 2010).  
Learning is based on sharing, and sharing cannot take place in a relationship not 
governed by trust. Trust plays a vital role in facilitating learning, sharing, and access to 
resources (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004). Thus, trust is vital for the success of alliances to 
achieve desired learning; more so if the knowledge desired is tacit (Kedia and Bhagat, 
1988; Dhanaraj et al., 2004; Larsson et al., 1998; Simonin, 1999; Inkpen and Beamish, 
1997).  
Saudis place more importance on trust. Saudis, as a collectivist and personalized 
society, place higher importance on loyalty, friendship, and communal relationships 
(Ali et al., 1997; At-Twaijri and Al-Muhaiza, 1996; Al-Rasheedi, 2012; Ali, 2009). 
Thus, in a place where the word has the same value as a written commitment, trust is of 
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paramount importance for business (Mababaya, 2002; Rice, 2003). The existence of 
trust is fundamental for successful learning relationships (Al-Khatib, et al., 2004; Al-
Rasheedi, 2012; Von Krogh, et al., 2000).  
Lane, et al. (2001) have emphasised the importance of trust as a critical tool to enhance 
absorptive capacity. It influences both the extent of knowledge exchanged in ISAs 
(Buckley and Casson, 1988; Inkpen, 1997; Inkpen and Currall, 1997; Johnson, et al., 
1996; Lyles and Baird, 1994), and the efficiency with which it is exchanged (Kogut, 
1988; Parkhe, 1993). The evidence from the literature was all directed towards the 
notion that the greater the trust, the greater the resource sharing (Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman, 1995; Chiles and McMackin, 1996). However, the results from this study 
showed no direct evidence between the level of personal trust and knowledge 
acquisition. Norman (2002) and Nielsen and Nielsen (2009), found a negative 
relationship between trust and protectiveness. Becerra, et al. (2008) have argued that 
trust is critical for learning; more so when the knowledge is tacit, due to the necessity of 
personal interaction.  
The insignificance of personal trust is rather surprising. However, there might be a 
theoretical explanation to understand the nature of knowledge transfer in ISA. Buckley 
et al. (2009) have differentiated between complementary knowledge accession and 
supplementary knowledge accession, and between complementary knowledge 
acquisition and supplementary knowledge acquisition. First, let us explain the 
difference between complementary knowledge and supplementary knowledge. The first 
reflects the similarity of knowledge with aim to achieve higher efficiency and 
productivity. While the later takes place when ISA partners possess different core 
competencies from each other (Buckley et al., 2009). Knowledge accession, according 
to Buckley et al., (2009) entails knowledge amalgamation and it does not require high 
cost or trust comparing to the case of organizational learning that includes knowledge 
acquisition. Since Saudis have always preferred short cuts and to buy knowledge (a 
“turn-key” policy) in major projects (Haidar, 2000). This may be an indication that 
Saudi firms are seeking knowledge accessions, not acquisitions; which may justify the 
insignificance of trust. Hence, future studies should look into and trust affects the 
transfer of both kind of knowledge in ISA. Other explanation is that trust simply has no 
influence over knowledge acquisition, and cannot compensate the lack of absorptive 
capacity for example. In this study, we have looked only into the role of personal trust; 
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hence, we cannot eliminate the role of other kinds of trust. Distrust or inter-firm trust 
might have more influential role on knowledge acquisitions than personal trust. The 
results should encourage more research on the role of trust on knowledge transfer, if 
any. Trust role in knowledge might be not direct, and it might be playing a mediating 
role.  
Percentage of expatriate did not show any significant effect on knowledge acquisition. 
One of the reasons to explain the failure can come from the employee motivation 
literature. Employees are not only motivated extrinsically, but intrinsically as well. 
Osterloh and Fery (2000) argued that intrinsic motivations are crucial for knowledge 
transfer, which is echoed by Yin and Bao (2006). They argued that successful 
knowledge acquisitions requires commitment and motivation, hence expatriates need to 
be motivated intrinsically. Commitment from managers and organization to learning 
would encourage employee to acquire knowledge (Evangelista, and Hau, 2009).  
Some articles discussed some issues facing expatriates in Saudi Arabia. Bhuian, et al., 
(1996) have discussed the reasons behind the high turnaround and under-performance of 
high percentage of expatriate. One of the reasons is that in Saudi Arabia expatriate are 
employed on contractual bases, short or long term. Hence, their jobs tenure are not 
guaranteed. Although, most of them got their contracts renewed, they still have to live 
with this uncertainty. Bhuian, et al., (1996) described organizational commitment as “a 
strong desire to remain a member of the particular organization, given opportunities to 
change jobs”. In their study, they found that average expatriate employee in Saudi 
Arabia is not showing signs of commitment and more inclined to being uncommitted.  
The reason for the weak commitment is the lack job satisfaction. Although, they were 
initially allured by extrinsic rewards; the lack of intrinsic rewards can cause lack of 
motivation and commitment.   
Other possible explanation comes from Child and Rodrigues (1996) who pointed out 
that social identity were one of the barriers towards successful knowledge transfer 
(learning) in ISAs. According to Child and Rodrigues social identity “derives from 
people’s awareness that they belong to one group (the “in-group”) to the exclusion of 
other groups (out-groups)” (1996: P. 46). They argue that the different groups ISAs 
bring together create complexities. It is responsible for the quality of learning that take 
place in ISAs. The compatibility of identities is a condition for a successful learning. 
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Saudi firms dominated by large expatriate work force, 34% of the sample have reported 
to have expatriate in more than 51% of their medium and high-level position only. 
Hence, this may affect the firms’ ability to establish its own identity.  
Therefore, lack of intrinsic motivation, uncertainty, sense of belongings, and strong in-
group culture all might be possible explanations of why expatriates, despite their 
technical skills and competence, are not significant factors in knowledge acquisition.   
The findings in the literature relating to the effect of culture on ISAs are inconclusive or 
contradictory (Dong and Glaister, 2009; Hennart and Zeng, 2002). The findings of this 
study support the counter argument in the literature that claim cultural distance has a 
positive effect on learning.  
Pak, et al., (2009) have found that national cultural differences will negatively affect 
knowledge acquisitions. Parkhe (1991, 1993) has argued that cultural distance has a 
negative influence on a firm’s ability to benefit from knowledge spillover. Furthermore, 
Lane and Beamish (1990), Lyles and Salk (1996), and Hennart and Zeng (2002) have 
all affirmed that differences disrupt learning and collaboration. Sirmon and Lane, 
(2004) and Pothukuchi, et al., (2002) have highlighted the impeding effect of culture 
differences in term of building relationships and improving communications. Moreover, 
Bjorkman, et al. (2007) found that differences weaken absorptive capacity. Dussauge, et 
al. (2000), Lane et al. (2004) and Sirmon et al. (2004) have all affirmed that similarities 
have a very positive effect. Subsequently, all these researchers have agreed that cultural 
distance has an impeding effect on learning. Stahl and Voigt (2008) have argued that 
cultural differences affect firms in two “opposing” ways, depending on the degree of 
cultural difference and relatedness.  
However, there is a counter argument. The idea that cultural distance can lead to 
learning is not a new notion; according to many researchers, differences in values and 
beliefs foster learning and innovation (Fiol, 1994; Huber, 1991; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001). Morosini, et al. (1998) argued that due to their differences, firms are 
more likely to hold capabilities and competencies which are different from their partner 
firm; thus, there is a lot for each firm to learn. Vaara, et al. (2012) found that differences 
in national and organizational culture are positively associated with knowledge transfer 
in international acquisitions. Reus and Lamont (2009) argued that cultural distance has 
dual effects – both positive and negative. The positive effect of culture enhances 
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understandability and communication, which indirectly improves learning and 
performance. Nevertheless, all this research took place in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions rather than ISAs; although they have similarities, the findings of these 
studies cannot be generalized to ISAs context.  
Chakrabarti, et al., (2009) have argued that cultural differences can actually become a 
source of ‘value creation and learning’; they can, according to theoretical studies, spur 
learning and innovation. However, Pothukuchi, et al. (2002), whilst agreeing that 
differences have an impeding effect, have questioned the assertion that cultural 
differences alone disrupt resource sharing. There is still limitation to our understanding 
of how culture affects knowledge transfer (Bjorkman, et al., 2007). 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This study has examined the effect of several factors on knowledge acquisition. It has 
first looked into the role of knowledge tacitness, number of expatriate, level of 
communication, and personal trust on knowledge acquisitions. The results showed good 
support to hypothesis 1 and 3; it shows that factors like knowledge tacitness, 
communication, cultural distance and prior ties has a significant effect of the level of the 
knowledge acquired from a partner.  
The findings of this research could have an implication on the managerial view of 
business nature in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the existence of expatriate workforce had 
no effect on learning. Lack of skilled worker might be an institutional problem not a 
firm one. However, firms should either focus on training local workforce and build 
strong organizational culture; or try to address the issues of intrinsic motivation of 
expatriate.  
Other interesting finding is that personal trust, although very important factor to start 
business in Saudi, not significant when it comes to knowledge acquisition. Saudi society 
is highly personalized one and place higher importance on trust. Trust is instrumental in 
improving relation between partners, and Fadol and Sandhu (2013) in their studies of 
ISA in UAE found that trust helped partners to exchange knowledge and information 
more smoothly.  
However, this study showed that personal trust has no significant effect on knowledge 
acquisition. The insignificant of a linear relation between trust and knowledge 
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acquisition does not rule out the possibility of moderating or mediating effect. Future 
studies should further investigate the moderating role of trust, especially in relation with 
communication. Furthermore, future studies could look into the relation between 
knowledge acquisition and another kind of trust, especially inter-firm trust. 
Hayward (2002) defined organizational learning as a process in which firms engage in 
action, draw some conclusions, and use these insights to guide future experiences. It 
shows that organizational learning is a process that needs to be implemented for 
successful learning. The literature has discussed the issues of organizational learning; 
we have highlighted the main arguments in Section 2.4.  
Complementary alliances do not mean automatic learning and enhanced new product 
performance. There are mediating and moderating factors that can affect ISA learning, 
such as knowledge absorption effectiveness, organizational structure and culture (Yao, 
et al, 2013).    
A learning organizational culture has been suggested as a necessary requirement for 
successful learning. Garvin (1993: p. 80 in Yao, et al, 2013) stated that ‘‘a learning 
organization is an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring 
knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights’’. 
Vasudeva (2013) argued that firm’s institutional contexts are decisive on knowledge 
acquisition outcomes in an ISA. Countries vary regarding their knowledge acquisition 
approach and intentions.    
In a recent paper, Pollitte, et al (2014) differentiated between industries for knowledge 
transfer in ISAs. They claimed that in manufacturing industries, the aim is to acquire 
knowledge, products, and innovation processes, in exchange for market entry. In the 
service industry, the goal is knowledge accession, which enjoys higher levels of 
success, because knowledge, in this case, is location specific and has little value outside 
the ISA. 
Finally, Saudi culture, which is perceived to be too different and too difficult, has 
actually proved to be hospitable, adaptable, and foster learning. The fact it did not prove 
to be a hindering factor, on the contrary it proved to be enriching factor. 
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Chapter Six: Trust in ISAs 
6.1. Introduction 
There is much research on alliances and JVs, the three most important concepts that 
have received most of the attention are trust, control, and performance (Inkpen and 
Currall, 2004). 
Gulati (1998) acknowledges that it is very complicated to recognize the factors affecting 
the performance of alliances. He argues that performance is one of the most “exciting” 
and unexplored areas in the SA and JV studies. The performance of alliances has 
received less attention due to different obstacles facing researchers when measuring the 
performance of alliances; for example, “logistical challenges” in collecting the 
necessary detail data for this type of research (Gulati, 1998). Moreover, the ambiguity 
of performance measurement makes it difficult for researchers to study alliances; it also 
make it more difficult for firms to learn from alliances (Zollo, et al., 2002). 
Recent studies argue that SAs success is determined not by the conventional belief of 
formal set of structure (e.g. ownership structure), but more to the informal process that 
sum the quality of the relationship and goodwill between partner (Robson, et al., 2006). 
MacDuffie (2011) explains that the surge of studies in trust was driven by a 
combination of geo-political events, and organizational development that have put more 
emphasis on relationship collaboration. He acknowledged the rarity of empirical 
research on trust across different contexts. The role of trust in ISA management has 
been recognized and examined in previous literature (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Lane and 
Beamish, 1990; Currall and Inkpen, 2002; Parkhe, 1998; Inkpen and Currall, 2004). For 
example, inter-firm trust has been examined across many relationships: supplier 
relationships (e.g. Lane and Bachmann, 1996); joint ventures (e.g. Inkpen and Currall, 
1997; Das and Teng, 1998); and strategic alliances (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995). The role of trust in cooperative relationships was highlighted 
in a special issue of the Academy Management Journal (1995), which stated that “the 
study of trust and its impact on cooperative relationships at all levels may be a 
particularly fruitful area of future research” (Smith, Carroll and Ashford, 1995: p. 15). 
However, despite the overwhelming support for this notion, there is still limited 
evidence to validate the “normative bias” that inter-partner trust in SA enhances 
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performance (Robson, et al., 2008). A review of the literature provides us with mixed 
results (Robson, et al., 2008). Some (e.g. Cullen, et al., 2000; Lane, et al., 2001) have 
found that inter-firm trust does enhance or create economic benefits for the alliances. 
However, others found no significant direct links between performance and trust 
(Fryxell, et al., 2002; Inkpen and Currall, 1997; Sarkar, et al., 2001). Other findings 
have revealed that alliances’ performance is detrimentally affected by risky and costly 
inter-partner trusts (Lyles, et al., 1999). 
Trust is not only relevant to firms in developing economies, it is as important for firms 
from developed countries when working in developing markets (De Mattos, et al., 
2003).  
This chapter will examine the effect of trust on the performance of ISAs within the 
Saudi context. It will start by reviewing the literature on ISA performance. Then, it will 
reflect on trust literature, and distinguish between the different kinds of trust in ISAs. It 
will then discuss the methodology employed in the chapter. Finally, the last section 
presents the results followed by a discussion, conclusion, and suggestions. 
Existing literature is full of contradicting and mixed results on trust, and has failed to 
establish direct or clear links between trust and performance. There is therefore a lack of 
empirical evidence on trust. The study has responded to calls from researchers for an in-
depth study on trust. By breaking the concept of trust into different dimensions 
(personal trust, distrust, and competence trust) and testing them, the study has made a 
valuable contribution to the existing literature. Conceptually, the study has 
distinguished between trust dimensions; trust in previous studies has been treated as a 
single construct. Dividing trust into different dimensions provides us with better 
understanding of how and when trust affects performance. The study using mediating 
and moderating factors shows how and where trust could influence ISA performance.  
The study contributes to the literature by understanding the relation between trust and 
environmental uncertainty. It shows how sensitive alliance performance is to the 
environmental uncertainty.  
By the end of this chapter, the findings will help us to answer, partially, the fourth 
research question of thesis “How far do cultural factors affect the performance of 
ISAs?” The seventh chapter will also attempt to answer the same question. 
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6.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development: 
Arino (2003) has defined strategic alliance performance, as “the degree of 
accomplishment of partners’ goals, be these common or private, initial or emergent”. 
Yan and Beamish (2004) defined performance of SAs as the satisfaction of managers of 
the venture about the overall performance. Common goals are the goals shared by both 
partners in the SA; however, every partner has specific goals of their own, which are 
called “private” goals. Both the shared or private goals can change over time and be 
called “emergent” goals; these are different from the “initial” goals (Arino, 2003). 
In the literature, there is no consensus on the appropriate measurement or definition of 
ISA performance (Zollo, et al., 2002; Geringer and Hebert, 1991). There is no universal 
approach to measuring the performance of SAs (Lunnan and Haugland, 2008), as there 
are many difficulties associated with the study of alliances’ performance. This is due to 
different factors, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
It is important, before measuring the performance of ISAs, to take into the account the 
motives for establishing ISAs. It might not be only to achieve the assumed motive, 
financial profitability; rather the firm might be motivated, for example, by enhancing 
organizational learning (Kogut, 1988; Hamel, 1991), or strategic positioning 
(Contractor and Lorange, 2008; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Tatoglu and Glaister, 
1997). Thus, it is important to adopt measures that will capture performance based on 
the performance expectation of the ISA. 
Measurement of SA performance varies according to the set of objectives; each method 
is used in a particular context and depending on the goals of the alliance (Artisien and 
Buckley, 1985; Arino, 2003).  
There are different methods used to evaluate the performance of SAs. Lunnan and 
Haugland (2008) have classified measurement approaches as financial, operational, and 
effectiveness. Geringer and Hebert (1991) have classified the approaches as subjective 
(such as financial indicators, profitability, growth, and cost position); and objective 
(such as the survival of the JV, its duration, and its stability). The literature is full of 
debate about the best method to measure the performance of ISAs. 
Financial measures are common methods used when there is an “explicit” financial goal 
that includes profitability, growth, and cost position (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Arino, 
2003). Conversely, operational measures (which are based on stability measures, e.g. 
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longevity, survival, and contract stability) are used when focusing on key operation 
factors that are ultimately fundamental in yielding financial returns (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991; Yan and Zeng, 1999; Arino, 2003). The most common, and probably the 
most popular, method is organizational effectiveness, which measures the firm’s 
satisfaction with the SA’s performance, and looks at the degree to which the SA has 
fulfilled the initial goals (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Parkhe, 1993b; Arino, 2003).  
Anderson and Narus (1990) have considered partner satisfaction as a reliable indicator 
of ISA performance. Although financial performance has been used in earlier ISA 
research, it does not convey satisfaction with the inter-partner relationship (Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1994). Other limitations to the use of objective measures are that they 
could fail to consider a SA reaching its long-term goals (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
They also fail to capture any difficulties, in contrast to subjective data (Osland and 
Cavusagil, 1996; Lu and Lee, 2005). Geringer and Hebert (1991) have pointed out in 
their study that objective and subjective measures correlate highly. 
We have looked into ISA performance measurement issues in the literature review 
chapter (section 2.5). Please refer to the section for more lengthy debates regarding the 
different measurement approaches.  
In this study, ISA performance is assessed by measuring overall partner satisfaction 
(Choi and Beamish, 2004; Yan and Gray, 1994; Lin and Wang, 2008; Glaister and 
Buckley, 1998; Geringer and Hebert, 1991). SAs need patience and it is rare to see a 
venture yielding profits in the first two years of its creation; some ventures need years to 
create positive returns on investments (Anderson, 1990). Thus, it is hard to evaluate the 
success of ISAs based purely on financial performance; this might not reflect the true 
performance and its success in achieving partner objectives. There is also the difficulty 
of obtaining financial data due to the sensitivity of the information and partners’ 
inclination to protect it. It is more difficult in the Saudi context, as there are a limited 
number of firms listed in the Saudi stock index, which limit the information available in 
the public domain. 
 
6.2.1. Trust in ISAs 
Trust has also been conceptualized as sentiment, or expectations of a partner’s 
trustworthiness (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Morgan and Hunt (1994) have defined trust 
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as the willingness to rely on the exchange partner. Trust occurs when a firm has 
confidence in a partner’s reliability and integrity (Ramaseshan and Loo, 1998). Trust, 
according to Shah and Swaminathan (2008), consists of two dimensions: benevolence 
and competence. The first dimension focuses on the motives and the good intentions of 
the firm’s partner, while the latter consists of the partner’s ability to constantly show 
reliability and expertise (Shah and Swaminathan, 2008). The organizational trust 
literature suggests that trust takes place between organizations when one partner has 
confidence in the other partner’s integrity and reliability (Gulati, et al., 2000; Li, 2005). 
According to Dyer and Chu (2011) organizational processes, whether within national or 
international relationship, are responsible for building positive expectations of 
predictability, reliability, and competence. McEvily, et al., (2003) have described trust 
within ISAs as acceptance by a firm’s management of vulnerability based on positive 
expectations of partner firm intentions. 
Many factors contribute to building trust in ISAs. Previous experience between the 
partners can increase their understanding of each other’s cultures, capabilities, 
management practices, etc...(Zollo, et al., 2002). The accumulated knowledge and 
understanding of each other can help improve coordination and conflict resolution (Doz, 
1996). Also, same-partner experience increases interpersonal trust (Zollo, et al., 2002); 
there will be less fear of opportunistic behaviour, as familiarity can breed trust (Gulati, 
1995). The parent firm’s past IJV experience has been postulated in some parts of the 
literature to have a positive impact on performance, although the results are conflicting 
(Blumenthal, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Makino and Delios, 1996). 
The links between trust and performance are now receiving more attention in the 
international business literature. There is general agreement in the literature that trust is 
an integral part of the success of ISAs (Beamish, 1993; Fryxell, et al., 2002; Das and 
Teng, 1998, 2001; Krishnan, et al., 2006; Robson, et al., 2008; Nielsen and Gudergan, 
2012; Buckley, et al., 2009; Mohr and Puck, 2013). The link of trust as a source of 
satisfactory relationships can be traced back to the 1980s in Granovetter (1985). 
Sherman (1992: p. 78) claims that ‘‘the biggest stumbling block to the success of 
alliances is the lack of trust.’’ This claim is echoed by Kale and Singh (2009: p. 51) who 
argued “...developing trust during the post formation phase of an alliance is critical to its 
success in many ways.” 
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Zaheer, et al., (1998) have explained the positive influence of trust on performance 
through the reduction of transaction costs. Trust, as well, reduces conflicts through 
improved negotiation. Park and Ungson (2001) have linked organizational complexity 
and inter-firm rivalry to poor outcomes in alliances. Hence, trust helps firms to 
overcome the difficulties associated with organizational complexity, enhancing 
productivity by lowering transaction costs and increasing transaction value. This makes 
trust in particular a pivotal factor in higher-performance ISAs (McEvily and Zaheer, 
2006). This, in a way, establishes a link between trust and performance (Robson, et al., 
2008). Other way that explains the influence of trust is through the development of 
relational governance, which improves performance (McEvily and Zaheer, 2006). 
McEvily and Zaheer defined relational governance as “a mode of organizing exchange 
that involves the integration of activities—such as decision making, planning and 
problem solving” (2006: p. 284). Trust improves information flow and encourages 
partner to share valuable and confidential information (Dyer and Chu 2003; Lane et al., 
2001; Sako, 1998). This in return create transaction value which reflects positively on 
alliance performance (McEvily and Zaheer, 2006; Robson, et al., 2008). 
There is an undeniable link between ownership control and ISA performance (Lu and 
Hebert, 2005). Thus, we can notice that some of the research on ISA performance has 
shifted focus from ownership and legalism to trust (Lin and Wang, 2008; Madhok, 
2006). However, some researchers argue that trust does not substitute control; in fact, 
they co-exist and interact with each other. It is important for the development of a 
healthy relationship based ultimately on non-calculative trust (MacDuffie, 2011). This 
takes us to the issue of legalism. In the presence of weak legalism, trust is considered an 
effective tool to deal with any of the ISA issues (Lin and Wang, 2008). Still, the 
phenomenon of trust is not fully understood (Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006), and the 
extent of the relationship between trust and contracts is still unclear (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Contracts can increase the expectation of reliability and 
competence; however, they will be attributed to the existence of contracts not as 
evidence of trustworthiness (Murnighan, et al., 2004). 
 
It is important to note the different kinds of trust in existence within ISAs (Currall and 
Inkpen, 2002). There is much focus within the literature on interpersonal trust (Ng, et 
al., 2007). Zaheer, et al. (1998) have pointed out that interpersonal trust and inter-
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organizational trust are related, but different constructs and play different roles. Their 
findings confirm that inter-organizational trust has more significance than interpersonal 
trust in exchange relationship. Although, they argued that individuals in an organization 
are the ones who trust each other’s, not the organizations. Thus, an organization’s trust 
within a particular company or group of individuals will be mainly influenced by the 
individuals’ inclination to trust (Huff and Kelley, 2003). The collective trust held by a 
firm’s members towards partner firms is called inter-organizational or external trust 
(Zaheer, et al. 1998). In the Saudi context, the majority of the businesses are family-
owned and run. Hence, decision makers are less likely to leave their companies, which 
make personal trust more relevant in this context.  
However, research on trust economic benefits remains largely “anecdotal”, and it does 
not establish direct link to performance according to Nielsen and Gudergan (2012), and 
Krishnan, et al., (2006). Silva, et al., (2012) have pointed out that there are limited 
empirical evidence to confirm the positive relationship between trust and performance. 
Child (2001) argues that trust in SAs is still an under-researched, under-theorized, and 
poorly understood phenomenon. Additionally, many researchers have called for more 
systematic empirical research on trust beyond the strongly held presumed positive 
relationship (e.g. Aulakh, et al., 1996; Hosmer, 1995; Inkpen and Currall, 1998; 
Mo¨llering, 2003; Sako, 1998; Koza and Lewin, 1998; De Mattos, et al., 2003). The 
current literature is faced with conflicting and ambiguous findings; as some found 
positive relationship (e.g. Boersma Buckley, and Ghauri, 2003; Mo¨llering, 2003), no 
significant direct links (e.g. Aulakh et al., 1996; Inkpen and Currall, 1997), or not 
conclusive findings (Lyles, et al., 1999). Hence, prompting for further research on trust 
performance relationships. 
Furthermore, there is still a lack of empirical research on the role of trust in developing 
economies (Lane, et al., 2001; Ng, et al., 2007). The Middle East and Saudi Arabia in 
particular are lacking empirical studies analysing ISA management issues. In relation to 
trust, the writer is unaware of any empirical research on the role of trust in SAs. The 
existing information is constrained to a handful of business guidance books stressing the 
importance of trust in the Saudi culture in particular and within Arab culture in general 
(e.g. Ali, 2009).  
Saudi Arabia is an ideal context for research on trust, and for testing existing theories 
which derive from a context distinctly different from the Saudi one. It is a country that 
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regards trust as the core of business and economic relations, although this is not 
empirically supported. Though business is built on trust, trust is difficult to build outside 
the close knit of tight social groups. This is a feature Saudis share with Far Eastern 
Asian countries, for example, China (Child and Mollering, 2003; Buckley, et al., 2006).  
There are many reasons for the importance of trust in countries like China and Saudi 
Arabia. Child and Tse (2001) have argued that in China the cause of trust’s significance 
to economic exchange is due to the underdevelopment of its institutions. This, in return, 
has made it clear why the Chinese will not extend trust easily beyond their inner circles, 
and foreigners in return do not find it easy to trust the Chinese (Child and Mollering, 
2003). 
There are some contradictions in existing studies regarding trust. Das and Teng (1998) 
have argued that trust is a belief that a partner firm’s motivation is to act in accordance 
with the trustor’s best interests. However, others (such as Gulati, 1995) claim that trust 
curbs the partner acting opportunistically. Thus, it is linked to opportunistic behaviour 
and not, as Das and Teng have argued, linked to acting according to the partner’s best 
interests.  
Trust is not one concept, or construct; it is a collective of constructs, with each construct 
having its own weight on ISA relationships. Therefore, in this study, we divided trust 
into three dimensions. The first is personal trust, which is the belief that a partner firm 
will act according to the best interests of both parties. This involves an element of 
loyalty. The second is distrust, which is the fear of a partner firm acting 
opportunistically. The third dimension is competence trust, which is the belief in a 
partner firm’s ability and reliability in performing its functions within the alliance with 
no feeling of loyalty or fear of opportunistic behaviour. 
The literature has looked into the cycles of trust and one of them is the breach of trust 
and the cost to repair it (Robinson et al., 2004). MacDuffie (2011) highlighted the 
differences, inconclusively, between the words “mistrust” and “distrust”. He argued that 
the first refers to negative expectations based on past experiences; while the latter refers 
to “the prudent withholding of trust in situations where it is not yet proven”.  
As we argued previously, trust is the foundation of cooperation. However, it involves an 
element of competence trust (Buckley, Clegg and Tan, 2006). Trust is an indication of 
the confidence one partner has in another’s experience and reliability (Inkpen and 
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Currall, 1998). Trust takes place in alliances when a partner has confidence in its partner 
firm’s integrity and reliability (Ramaseshan and Loo, 1998).  
Butler (1991) identified an element of trust regarding consistency and promise 
fulfilment, which is similar to the concept of competence trust. Later in this chapter, in 
the section regarding competence trust, we will further elaborate on how various trust 
definitions have used an element of competence trust.  
The three dimensions will be discussed in more detail later in this section. The three 
dimensions are similar to those Cummings and Bromiley (1996) have proposed: 
keeping commitments, negotiating honestly, and avoiding taking excessive advantage of 
partner organizations. 
6.2.1.1. Personal trust 
Trusting relationships in ISAs are a mix of belief and behaviour (Robson, et al., 2008). 
Trust will be limited, even if a manager believes that their partner is trustworthy, if they 
are not willing to rely on that partner. It is a dependency if a firm relies on their partner 
without holding the belief that they are trustworthy (Nooteboom, et al., 1997).  
Trust helps firms to achieve higher performance by triggering various structural and 
mobilizing mechanisms (Robson, et al., 2008). McEvily, et al. (2003) theorizes that 
trust gained through enhancing tie density, thickness and stability strengthens the 
structure of a network.  
Trust based on relational behaviour has a positive effect on performance as it reduces 
transaction costs (Robson, et al., 2008). It reduces transaction costs by less time being 
spent by partners on non-productive activity such as monitoring each other’s behaviour 
and performance and enforcing agreements (Dyer and Chu, 2003). 
It has been argued that interpersonal trust and mutual trust plays an integral part in 
curbing opportunistic behaviour (Macneil, 1980), thus minimising the role of and the 
need for contractual and bureaucratic arrangements (Ng, et al., 2007) and reducing 
negotiations and conflicts costs (Zaheer, et al., 1998; Gulati, 1995). Luo, et al. (2001) 
consider trust as an informal control mechanism that complements formal control 
settings. Madhok (2006), based on the trust-centred approach, argues that the classic 
ownership-control perspective is stagnant, and does not reveal the complexity of 
managing ISAs. Trust is viewed more now as a source of enforceability, along with 
ownership and legal enforcement (Svejenova, 2006).  
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Parkhe (1993) has emphasised the role trust plays in ISA performance and stability. 
Effective commitment and strong goodwill and personal trust strengthen ISA 
relationships (Styles and Hersch, 2005). Baird, et al. (1990) have ranked trust at the top 
of success factors for ISAs, while Ng, et al (2007) have shown that trust has a positive 
effect on ISAs. 
The fact that building trust in organizations is a social decision makes their national 
culture an influential factor in shaping their trust relationships (Doney, et al., 1998). The 
link between societal culture and an organization’s ability to trust has not been 
discussed sufficiently in the literature (Huff and Kelley, 2003). It has been touched upon 
by acknowledgement of the existence of high trust and low trust national business 
societies (Fukuyama, 1995). Although trust has been proved to have an effect on 
performance, the level of impact, depending on social and institutional factors, does 
vary across countries (Currall and Inkpen, 2002; Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006). The 
national context might play a role in inflating the role of trust across borders (Zaheer 
and Zaheer, 2006). The effect of trust on performance is not always direct, as partners 
from different countries might bring either symmetric or asymmetric conceptions of 
trust to their relationships (Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006). Trust plays other important roles, 
as it moderates the negative effects of cultural misunderstanding (Ng, et al., 2007). 
 
Personalisation of economic relations and personal relationships is one of the traditional 
values of Eastern society, as observed by Child (1994) and Child and Mollering (2003). 
It is common during business practice in China, for example (Dong and Glaister, 2007). 
Saudi society is no different. Dyer and Chu (2003) argue that theoretically, trust 
between firms does not exist. The rationale is that trust is a micro-level social 
phenomenon that lies within individuals. Trust can take place when one individual trusts 
another individual or group of individuals in other organizations (Dyer and Chu, 2003).  
Saudi Arabian culture is heavily influenced by Islamic teaching and belief (Robertson, 
et al., 2013). They draw their values, local customs, and practices from Islam (Ali, 
1990; Metcalfe, 2008). This also affects Saudi management culture, along with strong 
tribal and family orientations (Ali, 1995; Assad, 2002; Rice, 2004).  
Cultural traits such as individualism and collectivism strongly influence managerial 
practices (Song, Di Bendetto and Song, 2000), which means that Saudis prefer to work 
together, and prefer personal interaction. Saudi Arabia exhibits a higher degree of 
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personalization and intimate relationships compared to Western societies (Ali, 2009). 
The continuous interaction between traditional culture and modern economic and 
business realities makes Saudi Arabia a unique culture (Abu-Musa, 2006). 
 
Some of the Eastern cultures do not see legalism as an assurance for satisfactory ISA 
performance (Lin and Wang, 2008). The Saudi Arabian context of personal 
relationships is similar to (and as influential as) the Chinese concepts of quanxi 
(Robertson, et al., 2013). Saudis do not view contracts in the same way as Western 
executives do, as a means for specifying duties and obligations. For Saudis, the power 
of mutual trust outweighs any written agreement (Al-Ali, 1987). Personal and non-
verbal behaviour is more important than legal documents (Calantone and Zhao, 2000). 
Weaknesses in the legal systems of some countries reinforce this weak reliance on legal 
mechanisms (Lin and Wang, 2008). 
Collective societies, due to their nature, trust their in-group members, and place more 
value on trust. Individuals who want to be members of their in-group must first gain the 
trust of the group (Huff and Kelly, 2003). Saudi Arabia is known to be a collectivist 
society (Ali, et al., 1997; At-Twaijri and Al-Muhaiza, 1996). Saudis have higher levels 
of loyalty and commitment to their groups, whether families or working groups (Al-
Rasheedi, 2012). It is a personalized society where friendship, kinship, and communal 
relationships have a significant impact on individual behaviour (Ali, 2009).  
Saudi culture places a strong emphasis on the group, not the person. Furthermore, 
loyalty, obedience to seniors, face-to-face interaction, and personal connections are all 
important attributes to have (Kassem and Habib, 1989; Al-Rasheedi, 2012). Children in 
Gulf countries are taught the value of loyalty and obedience from a young age (Al-
Khatib, et al., 2004). Thus, the importance of loyalty and trust is paramount and cannot 
be separated from business. In Saudi culture, a person’s word has the same value as a 
written commitment (Mababaya, 2002; Rice, 2003). Businessmen in Saudi Arabia take 
the time to get to know someone and build a relationship before doing business with 
them; they must trust them first (Mababaya, 2002; Rice, 2003). There is a strong 
emphasis on building trust before any transaction takes place within the culture of all 
Gulf countries (Al-Khatib, et al, 2004). Thus, it is not uncommon for initial business 
meetings to consist only of socialisation, with no actual business taking place (Al-
Rasheedi, 2012). When trust is gained, it eases business dealings and improves 
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communications, and minimizes the negative effects of institutional factors; but when it 
is lost, it can cause serious obstacles (Ali, 2009). Arab Firms are viewed as a “family 
unit”, and employees tend to focus on strengthen their standing among their working 
group (Rice, 2003). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 




Opportunistic behaviour has been cited by scholars as one of the reasons behind the 
failure of many alliances (Das and Teng, 1998; Das and Rahman, 2010). Luo (2006) has 
defined opportunism in JVs as “an act or behavior performed by a party to seek its own 
unilateral gains at the substantial expense of another party and/or the joint venture entity 
by breaching the contract or agreement, exercising private control, withholding or 
distorting information, withdrawing commitment, shirking obligation, or grafting joint 
earnings”. 
The transaction cost theory has explained opportunism as a party’s “calculated efforts 
(by an exchange agent) to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” 
(Williamson, 1985: p. 47). Firms cannot predict their partner’s behaviour in alliances. A 
detailed contract is one way to make this behaviour predictable. The other way to ensure 
predictability is through trust. One of the main determinants of a firm’s choice of 
governance structure in alliances is the presence of inter-firm trust which drives firms to 
behave loyally (Gulati, 1995). 
Trust in ISAs is a key factor in reducing fears of one partner acting opportunistically 
(Lin and Wang, 2008). Trust curbs any fear of opportunistic behaviour which alters the 
associated transaction cost (Gulati, 1995). The fear of opportunistic behaviour has 
always jeopardized partners’ relationships; prior relationships increase trust and help to 
minimize these risks (Parkhe, 1993). Das and Rahman (2010) argue that opportunism in 
SAs have not received enough scrutiny. Ghoshal and Moran (1996) have made a 
distinction between opportunistic attitude and opportunistic behaviour. They argued that 
that the behaviour is a manifestation of attitude. In this study, we define distrust as the 
fear of opportunistic behaviour either as a result of opportunistic attitude, past 
experience, reputation, or stereotypes. 
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The Western tradition is characterized by a developed legal system and low-context 
culture of “information codification and application of rules” (Bosit and Child, 1999). 
Therefore, the concept of legalism is backed, and it serves Western organizations as a 
form of formalization (Abzug and Mezias, 1993) and provides solutions to potential 
problems and conflicts (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). 
Emerging economies usually suffer from weak intellectual or industrial property rights 
(Delios and Henisz, 2000; Hoskisson, et al., 2000; Luo, 2006). Thus, people rather than 
laws shape economic activities (Luo, 2006). It is not an issue of the existence of 
legislation; rather it is a problem of enforceability due to different institutional factors 
(Luo, 2006).  
The Saudi market is characterized by some weaknesses, such as weak and ineffective 
legal and regularity conditions (Merdah and Sadi, 2011). The legal framework in Saudi 
Arabia is weak and developing, and this is coupled with continuous conflict between 
traditionalist and modernist movements (Al-jarbou, 2007). There are essentially two 
legal systems in Saudi Arabia: “one is based on Shari'ah Islami'iah (Islamic teachings) 
and the other is based on secularized (non-religious) laws, known as nizam” (Cassell 
and Blake, 2012). The Saudi legal system is still developing, and there are some gaps in 
government regulations; for example, there is a lack of patent and copyright protection. 
Thus, the risks operating in Saudi Arabia increase the need for legalism for foreign 
firms and the implementation of cautionary actions (Yavaş, et al., 1994). They also 
increase the need for trust-based relationships. 
Therefore, it can be argued that distrust and the fear of opportunistic behaviour hinders 
active sharing of information and the development of personal trust (Das and Teng, 
1998). These factors also create an atmosphere of negativity and suspicion between the 
partners and jeopardize the inter-firm relationships (Das and Teng, 2001; Das, and 
Rahman, 2010). This means that in the absence of legalism distrust will have a higher 
impact on ISA performance. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2. From the perspective of Saudi firms, distrust is negatively related to ISA 
performance. 
Many researchers now argue that the relationship between trust and performance is not 
as clear-cut as it appears, and is more complex and contingent on other factors 
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(Krishnan, et al. 2006). The state of the industry and industry-related factors have been 
reported in the literature as contingent factors for SA performance. The literature 
suggests that parent firms’ industry-relatedness has an impact on ISA performance (Sim 
and Ali, 1998). 
The fear of opportunistic behaviour increases in alliances with the aim of sharing or 
developing new technologies (Badaracco, 1990; Hennart, 1988; Gulati, 1995). 
Factors such as industry growth, structure technology, and competitive nature have been 
reported as influential factors (Luo, 1995; Kogut, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Franko, 1987; 
Hennart, 1991). The factor discussed in this study is industry unpredictability and its 
impact on performance. Firms engaged in challenging industries where the core 
technologies keep changing, where demands are unpredictable, and which are R&D-
dependent require different management styles. Firms from developing countries may 
find it more comfortable to deal with mature industries than unpredictable industries. 
Early studies clearly indicated that high-trust social relations facilitate knowledge 
transfer, especially tacit knowledge (Hansen, 1990; Becerra, et al., 2008). The social 
learning perspective argues that knowledge is transferred and developed best through 
intensive social interaction (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Becerra et al., 2008). Explicit 
knowledge requires less cognitive relation, as it can be transferred through written 
documents. 
Alliances differ in their degree of interdependencies, which increase based on shared 
resources and objectives (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kumar and Seth, 1998; Krishnan, et 
al., 2006). For example, an alliance set up to develop new technology is considered a 
highly interdependent alliance (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Park and Russo, 1996); 
while alliances formed to share production facilities create weak interdependence 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998). Highly interdependent alliances share overlapping 
responsibilities and valuable knowledge-intensive materials, and require continuous 
mutual adjustment (Kumar and Seth, 1998; Nooteboom, 2002; Park and Russo, 1996; 
Park and Ungson, 2001; Gulati and Singh, 1998). The sensitivity of valuable 
knowledge-intensive materials raises concerns over each partner’s intentions; this 
increases tensions between alliances (Oxley, 1999) Krishnan, et al. (2006) have argued 
that the effect of trust on alliances that are not highly interdependent will be weaker 
compared to alliances which are highly interdependent. 
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Trust has been argued in the literature as an important factor for alliance formation, and 
it interacts positively with environmental uncertainty and knowledge intensity 
(Mukherjee, et al, 2013). Since R&D alliances involves mutual transfers of key 
technologies and information, trust can act as safeguarding mechanism to mitigate any 
risks (Mukherjee, et al, 2013). Trust between partners can mitigate the negatives 
feelings associated with R&D alliance formation due its environmental uncertainty. The 
existence of trust can reduce the time for processing demands, and motivate the firm to 
form alliances and rely “blindly” on their partner (Krishnan et al., 2006; Mukherjee, et 
al, 2013).  
A relationship not governed by trust makes partners reluctant to share their knowledge 
or motives. This may result in partners holding information back or taking unfair 
advantage if they are given the opportunity (Johnson, et al, 1996). Trust facilitates the 
sharing of intellectual capital and information exchange by creating or enhancing the 
necessary factors for the exchange to take place (Li, 2005).  
Distrust is destructive to the transfer of management techniques and technologies 
(Clegg, 1990; Perlmutter and Hennan, 1986). The fear of partner opportunism can 
hinder the collaborative knowledge process (Simonin, 2004; Nielsen and Nielsen, 
2009). In ISAs, the level of knowledge exchange and information sharing is determined 
by the level of trust (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2009). 
ISAs allow Saudi firms to pool resources with partners, combining the technical and 
commercial capabilities and competencies of the Western partner with the local 
knowledge and commercial competitiveness of the local partner (Williams, 2009; 
Mababaya, 2002; Al-Rasheedi, 2012). This allows the Saudis to bring in competencies 
that will add to their competitive advantage (Williams, 2009). The transfer of 
technology in Saudi Arabia has always faced many barriers, most notably comprised of 
organizational, technical, and human problems (Atiyyah, 1989).  
Hence, we predict that the combination of distrust and uncertainty will have a higher 
negative effect on ISA performance than distrust in established industries.  
H3. From the perspective of Saudi firms, the negative relation between distrust and ISA 
performance will be higher when industry unpredictability is high. 
 
174 | P a g e  
 
6.2.1.3. Competence trust 
As we have explained earlier, trust is the foundation of cooperation, and it involves an 
element of competence trust (Buckley, Clegg and Tan, 2006). Trust is an indication of 
the confidence one partner has in other’s experience, integrity and reliability (Inkpen 
and Currall, 1998; Ramaseshan and Loo, 1998). It involves an elements of consistency 
and promise fulfilment (Butler, 1991). 
Inter-partner trust has been explained as the firm’s management acceptance of 
vulnerability based on positive expectations about their partner firms’ behavioural 
intentions (McEvily, et al., 2003). This view, according to Robson, et al. (2008), sheds 
light on two central aspects of trust in the inter-firm exchange literature. Conceptually, 
trust is described as sentiment; expectations about the partner’s trustworthiness based on 
its competence, reliability or both (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). This is a view also shared 
within the ISA literature (e.g., Lane, et al., 2001).  
Currall and Inkpen have identified “reliance” and “risk” as key components of most 
definitions of ISA trust across the literature. Reliance is when one partner’s fate, based 
on positive trustworthiness of the other partner, is determined by another (Currall and 
Judge, 1995). Risk, on the other hand, is when the other partner proves untrustworthy 
(Currall and Inkpen, 2002). Thus, trust is a combination of social judgements that 
comes from assessing the other party’s motives, trustworthiness, etc.; and weighing the 
risks in case the other party turns out to be untrustworthy (Currall and Inkpen, 2002). 
Thus, Currall and Inkpen (2002) have proposed this definition of ISA trust as “the 
decision to rely on another IJV party (i.e., person, group, or firm) under a condition of 
risk”.  
Becerra, et al., (2008) have identified three trust dimensions: integrity, benevolence, and 
ability. Integrity has been identified as “the overall moral character and ethical 
behaviour of the partner or trustee” (Becerra, et al., 2008). Benevolence, on the other 
hand, has been explained as “the positive vs. egocentric orientation of the trustee in 
dealing specifically with the trustor” (Becerra et al., 2008); or as Shah and Swaminathan 
(2008) have defined it: “the extent that partners in an alliance will act in a manner that 
shows their reliance on the partner’s goodwill and avoidance of opportunism”. Finally, 
ability (or competence-based trust) was explained as “general competence and expertise 
of the trustee” (Becerra, et al., 2008); or in another definition “the extent that partners 
consistently exhibit traits such as credibility and expertise. As such, competence-based 
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trust reflects the degree to which partners are willing to rely on each other’s expertise, 
capabilities, and judgments” (Shah and Swaminathan, 2008). 
Zaheer, et al., (1998) have suggested that inter-firm trust is based on three components: 
reliability, predictability, and fairness. Dyer and Chu (2003) define inter-organizational 
trust as a construct based on three components: reliability, fairness, and goodwill. It is 
the expectation that they will demonstrate reliability in carrying out their promises, 
fairness when dealing with each other, and goodwill in unforeseen contingencies. The 
importance of partner competence and reliability for the state of a trusting relationship 
between the partners is thus clear. This makes the importance and the effect of 
competence trust on performance hard to ignore. The effects of competence trust on 
performance have not been discussed on the literature. Nielsen, and Gudergan (2012) 
discussed competence similarity; they argue that it reduces information asymmetry, 
hence it should improve the productivity of the combined alliance resources. 
Thus, it is clear that competence trust has been identified as a construct from personal 
trust. However, in the literature it has been largely treated as part of “general” trust 
concept. Trust in a partner’s ability to do the job is not less important to the success of 
the alliance than personal trust (or distrust). This leads to the hypothesis: 
H4. From the perspective of Saudi firms, competence trust is positively related to ISA 
performance. 
Fear of opportunistic behaviour and distrust affects a firm’s ability to perform its job. 
The local firm’s distrust creates a fear that stems the partner firm’s ability to show or 
prove their abilities. Thus, it creates an atmosphere of suspicion that makes the 
development of competence trust very difficult. This leads to the hypothesis: 
H5. From the perspective of Saudi firms, the positive effect of competence trust on ISA 
performance is moderated by distrust. 
 
6.2.2. Communication 
Differences between partners can have a devastating effect on their partnership (Hennart 
and Zeng, 2002). Cultural differences between ISA partners, in the absence of 
understanding, can obstruct communication (Rao and Schmidt, 1998). Furthermore, 
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they hinder communication between partners and their ability to resolve conflict, and 
inflate the cost of knowledge transfers (Lane and Beamish, 1990; Clegg, 1990; 
Kaufman and O’Neill, 2007). Cultural differences breed miscommunication. The 
different language can affect the verbal communication of both “perceptual and 
encoding/decoding gaps (Root, 1994). Communication has greater importance in high-
context cultures compared to low-context cultures. In the US, for example, a low-
context culture, the context of meeting is perceived as less important (Hennart and 
Zeng, 2002). Effective communication is crucial for the management of ISAs. It allows 
partner firms to communicate their goals and capabilities, and know each other’s 
behaviour well before the start. It allows firms learn about each other, and avoid 
misunderstandings and suspicion. Failure to do this will cause lower commitment and 
poor performance (Doz, 1996; Inkpen and Birkinshaw, 1994; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). 
It has been reported that cross-national ISAs, due to partners’ value differences, have 
been suffering communication, cooperation, commitment, and conflict resolution 
problems (Pothukuchi et al., 2002; Harrigan, 1988; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Parkhe, 
1991; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
Communication and language barriers can be considered the most common problems as 
a result of culture distance (Yavaş, et al., 1994). Communication plays an important role 
in conducting business in Saudi Arabia. Business is conducted between people, not 
between companies or contractually (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). Saudis prefer face-to-face 
meetings, as personal dealings enhance personal trust and relationships (Ali, 2009). This 
makes communication an essential tool for conflict resolution, especially for ISAs in 
Saudi. 
A relationship governed by trust fosters the development of communication and 
stabilizes the ISA relationship (Parkhe, 1993; Styles and Hersch, 2005). Furthermore, it 
reduces the difficulties associated with the transfer of tacit knowledge and the impact of 
cultural distance (Baird, et al., 1990; Li and Scullion, 2006). Trust encourages open 
communication and improves understanding, thus enhancing cooperation and 
knowledge transfer (Lin and Wang, 2008; Dhanaraj, et al., 2004). In conducting 
business, trust has been always significant to Asian culture in shaping relationships and 
determining cooperation (Lin and Wang, 2008; Wang, 2007). Trust is part of the social 
control mechanism between partners; performance is positively enhanced when trust 
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between partners increases (Frexell, et al., 2002). Other studies argue that trust can 
encourage more trade and further cooperation (Carson, et al., 2003).  
 
The significance of level of communication to ISA performance is confirmed in the 
literature. In some service sectors, e.g. marketing, communications is considered as 
determinant of trust (Silva, et al., 2012). Communication entails an exchange of 
information, which means openness and willingness to rely on the other partner (Silva, 
et al., 2012). It contributes to strengthen the ties between partners (MacNeil, 1980), 
hence it can support them to cope with internal conflicts, or external threats (Heide and 
John, 1992). Good communication between partners can help firms understands each 
other demands, and recognizes mutual benefits (Shin, Park and Ingram, 2012). In the 
literature, there is a disagreement to which precede trust or communication. Silva, et al., 
(2012) from the social exchange perspective, considered communication to be an 
antecedent of trust. However, other authors have argued that trust can precede 
communication (e.g. Francis, Mukherji and Mukherji, 2009; Robson, et al., 2006). We 
argued earlier that trust could encourage communication and exchange of information. 
Hence, we believe that communication mediate the relationship between trust and 
performance.  
H6. From the perspective of Saudi firms, level of communication mediates the 
relationship between personal trust and ISA performance. 
 
Lack of control (or ineffective control) might hinder a firm’s ability to coordinate and 
effectively utilize resources (Geringer and Hebert, 1989). However, the need for control 
is conditioned to different factors (Tallman and Shenkar, 1994). Institutional factors and 
cultural differences create a unique set of managerial value and controls (Ralston, et al., 
1993). Control has been discussed in the literature as a factor affecting ISA performance 
(Barkema et al., 1997; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Yan, 2000). Some studies (Al-Aali, 
1987; Phatak and Chowdhury, 1991; Killing, 1983) found some positive effect of one 
parent having dominant control over the SA. 
The importance of communication is essential to make the partnership work, and 
performance can be severely affected if any of the partners find it difficult to coordinate 
with each other. Level of communication might have more weight in one condition than 
another. EJVs entail higher resource commitment and integration. Hence, they rely on 
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communication and coordination between the alliance parties. They are more likely to 
be affected by any drop of communication, and coordination than NEJ. Although, that 
does not mean that the level of communication has any lesser importance for NEJ. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H7. From the perspective of Saudi firms, the positive effect of the perceived level of 
communication on ISA performance is more apparent in equity alliances. 
 
Figure 6.1 Conceptual Framework 

















The survey questions measured the Saudi firm managers’ levels of satisfaction and 
perceptions of performance, and the effects of trust and levels of communication on the 
performance of ISAs. Responses were assessed using five-point Likert-type scales: for 
performance assessment, a scale of 1 (not very good) to 5 (very good); and for 
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creation, a “success measure” scale of 1 (none) to 5 (many opportunities) was used. This 
instrument has been used in previous studies (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Lane, et al., 
2001; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Tatoglu and Glaister, 1998; Killing, 1983; Beamish, 
1985; Walter, et al., 2008).   
For measurement of trust, the scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). Muthusamy and White (2005) have used this instrument in their study. In 
addition, these instruments have been used in the following studies (Dhanaraj, et al., 
2004; Nooteboom, et al., 1997; Zaheer, et al., 1998; Simonin, 1999b; Simonin, 2004; 
Lane, et al., 2001). For cultural distance, a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal) was 
used. These instruments have been used in previous studies (Lyles and Salk, 1996; 
Simonin, 1999b). For communication, a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree) was used. This instrument has also been used in previous studies (Simonin, 2004; 
Simonin, 1999a; Park, 2011). The appropriateness of the instruments was tested during 
the pilot study. The study explored the perspective of the local “Saudi” partner. Ideally, 
the researcher would have included representatives of both parent firms as well as the 
ISA, but the limited resources, access restrictions, absence of a database, and the size 
and nature of the study precluded such an approach. Many ISA studies have relied on 
data from only one of the partner’s perspectives. 
ISAs in past research have been measured by both objective and subjective measures 
(Beamish, 1993). However, previous studies have proved that both measures correlate 
highly (Geringer and Herbert, 1991; Beamish, 1993). The choice of subjective data was 
down to the difficulties of obtaining reliable, objective data in Saudi. Furthermore, 
many studies have employed subjective measures to assess ISA performance (e.g. 
Yavaş, et al., 1994; Ainuddin, et al., 2007; Kele, et al., 2002). 
 
6.3.2. Variables 
Dependent Variable: This scale was designed to measure ISA performance from the 
perspective of Saudi partner in terms of overall success, financial performance, and the 
strategic contribution of the alliance (see Table 6.1 for more details about these items). 
Subjective measures have been widely used in ISA research (e.g. Geringer and Hebert, 
1991; Lane, et al., 2001; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1985; Lee 
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and Beamish, 1995). Geringer and Hebert (1991) have shown that subjective and 
objective measures correlate highly with each other. 
Respondents were assessed using five-point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
EFA was run on 5 items measuring the level of satisfaction across different areas. Using 
Kaiser’s criterion SPSS extracted 1 non-overlapping factors with a KMO of (.872) 
which is above the bare minimum of 0.5 (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). The 
correlation matrix was checked, to check the correlation between the variables. Most of 
them correlates significantly wither each other (correlation between .3 and .9). None 
correlated higher than .9, which rule out any possible multicollinearity in the data. The 
determinant is .017, which is greater than the necessary value of 0.00001. This further 
confirms that variables correlate reasonably, and multicollinearity is ruled out. The 
Cronbach’s alpha of the factor was (0.929) within the acceptable value in exploratory 
research (Hair, et al., 1998, p. 118). 









Cronbach   
Factor 1 (Performance satisfaction)  3.893 77.851 77.851 .929 
Our firm is satisfied with the 
financial performance of the 
collaboration. 
.897     
Our firm is satisfied with the overall 
performance of the collaboration. 
.896     
This relationship provides our firms 
with many strategic benefits. 
.882     
The objectives for which the 
collaboration was established are 
being met. 
.882     
Our cooperation with this partner has 
contributed to growth in our firm. 
.853     
 
 
Independent variables: EFA was run on ten trust items. Using Kaiser’s criterion and 
SPSS, three non-overlapping factors (personal trust, distrust, and competence trust) 
were produced, with a KMO of (.808). The three items comprised exactly the items in a 
priori operationalization for measuring distrust, personal trust, and competence trust 
respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha of these factors ranged between (0.831) and (.858); 
see Table 6.2 for more details. The correlation matrix was checked in order to assess the 
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correlation between the variables. Most of them correlated significantly with each other 
(correlation between .3 and .9). None correlated higher than .9, which rules out any 
possible multicollinearity in the data. The determinant is .002, which is greater than the 
necessary value of 0.00001, and rules out any possibility of multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, VIF was to measure multicollinearity level among the independent 
variables. A high value above 10 suggests the possibility of multicollinearity (Hair, et 
al., 2003, p. 305). The VIFs did not show any evidence of multicollinearity, and are well 
within the recommended cut-off of 10 (1.030-1.152). Hence, it is not a problem in the 
regressions analysis (Park, 2011). Cronbach’ alpha of the three independent variables 
ranged from (0.644 to 0.773). 
Table 6.2: Factor- ISA Trust 








Cronbach   
Factor 1 (Personal trust)  2.812 28.123 28.123 .838 
My counterpart and I can always 
find appropriate solutions through 
compromise when conflicts arise  
 
.823 
    
I always feel confident when my 
counterpart tells me he will do 
something 
.809     
My counterpart is trustworthy .777     
The JV is characterized by personal 
friendship between partner at 
multiple levels  
 
.672 
    
Factor 2 (Distrust)   2.436 24.362 52.486 .858 
Our partner is generally doubtful of 
the information we provide them 
.914     
Our firm is generally doubtful of the 




    
Our partner in our IJV would be 
quite prepared to gain advantage by 
deceiving our firm 
 
.800 
    
Factor 3 (Competence trust)  2.244 22.444 74.930 .831 
We can always rely on our partner to 
do its part in our IJV 
.843     
We feel very confident about partner 
firm’s skills 
.811     
Partner firm is very capable of 
performing its job 
.708     
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Control Variable: Alliance age was calculated as the difference between the time of 
data collection (2012) and the year of the alliance formation. Number of foreign 
employees in the organization was entered as a control variable. 
EFA was run on the 4 items measuring cultural distance. After the initial test, one 
variable was removed “Language differences are major obstacles in communicating and 
understanding the partner”, due to low communalities. After the deletion process, EFA 
was run again using Kaiser’s criterion SPSS extracted 1 factor, with a KMO of (.694). 
The items correlated significantly with each other (correlation between .3 and .9). None 
correlated higher than .9. This ruled out any possible multicollinearity in the data. The 
determinant was (0.180) which is greater than the necessary value of 0.00001. This 
further confirms that variables correlate reasonably, and multicollinearity is ruled out. 
Table 6.3: Factor- Control Variables 








Cronbach   
 Communication  2.006 66.857 66.857 .747 
The quality of communication 




    
We always keep each other 
informed about events or changes 
that may affect the other firm. 
 
.837 
    
Regular contacts are maintained 
between senior managers of our 
firm and our partner. 
 
.744 
    
Culture  2.330 77.662 77.662 .855 
Their national culture is quite 
different from ours. 
 
.927 
    
There is much cultural dissimilarity 
between us and our foreign partner. 
 
.891 
    
There are significant cultural 
differences between us and our 
foreign partner . 
 
.823 
    
 
Communication: This scale was designed to measure the efficiency and quality of 
communication between the partners. Respondents were asked to assess to what extent 
they would agree with the following statements about the status of communication 
between their company and its partner:  
(1) There are few difficulties in communicating with our partner;  
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(2) Regular contacts are maintained between senior managers of our firm and our 
partner;  
(3) The quality of communication between the parents is extremely good;  
(4) We always keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the 
other firm.  
This was measured using a five point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 ‘‘strongly 
disagree’’ to 5 ‘‘strongly agree’’. EFA was run; however, after the initial test, the 
statement (There are few difficulties in communicating with our partner) was removed 
because of its low factor loading. EFA was run again and produced one factor (Alpha = 
0.747) with KMO of (.656). See table 6.3 for more details.  
 
6.3.3. Statistical Analysis: 
The choice of an appropriate strategy could be derived from the research question and 
objectives (de Vaus, 1990: p.121). The study questions consider the factors that affect 
the performance of ISAs from the Saudi firm perspective. Hence, this study is 
examining the causal relationship between the factors influencing the performance in 
the ISA. Multiple regression is one of the most effective techniques used to examine the 
cause-effect relationship between a dependent variable and several independent 
variables (Park, 2011). There are many studies that have used multiple regression to 
look into the relationship between a particular factors and ISA performance (Sim, and 
Ali, 1998; Child and Yan, 2003; Ng, et al., 2007; Pothukuchi, et al., 2002; Zollo, et al., 
2002). According to Hair, et al. (1995: p. 20), “multiple regression analysis is a 
statistical technique that can be used to analyse the relationship between a single 
dependent (criterion) variable and several independent (predictor) variables. The 
objective of multiple regression analysis is to use the several independent variables 
whose values are known to predict the single dependent value the researcher wishes to 
know”. In this paper, we have had used multiple regression to test the relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Same test was used to 
determine the relation of the moderating variables. Data have passed normality and 
multicollinearity tests. The VIFs did not show any evidence of multicollinearity, and are 
well within the recommended cut-off of 10 (1.030- 1.152). Hence, it is not a problem in 
the regressions analysis (Park, 2011). 
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6.4. Finding and discussion: 
6.4.1. Results 
Regression Model 2 (in Table 6.4) shows a significant relationship between 
performance satisfaction and the three independent variables personal trust, distrust, and 
competence trust. It shows positive and significant relationships with personal trust and 
competence trust, with coefficients of 0.366 (P < .01) and 0.242 (P < .01) respectively. 
It also shows a significant and negative relationship with distrust, with a coefficient of -
0.229 (P < .01). The model has a significant F value (P < .01), and it has a large 
explanatory power (R2) of 35.5 %. Thus, the results give support to Hypotheses 1, 2, 
and 4.  
The control variable ISA age, and cultural distance showed a significant and positive 
relationship, albeit small for age, with performance satisfaction with coefficient of 0.014 
(P < .01), and 0.195 (P < .05). On the other hand, the number of expatriates did not 
show any significant relationship with performance. 
 
Table 6.4: Multiple Regressions 
 Variables Model one Model 2 Model 3 
 Constant  -.329 -.372 -.001 
Control JV age .014 .014
*
  
 Non-Saudi number -.081 -.044  










Independent Personal Trust   .366
***
  
 Distrust   -.229
***
 -.100 
 Competence   .242
***
 .125 
M. Factors Communication    .374
***
 
 Form   .225 
 Industry unpredictability   .085 
Moderators   Communication X Form   .550
***
 
 Distrust X Industry unpredictability   .233
***
 




2  .129 .368 .412 







***p< 0:01; **P<0:05; *P<0:1; the F-test on R2 is one-tailed; the t-test on each regression coefficient is two-tailed 
 
The result of the interaction effect in Table 6.4 (Model 3) is interesting. The level of 
communication X ISA form (0 if non-equity) shows a positive and significant 
interaction with performance satisfaction, with a coefficient of 0.550 (P < 0.01). This 
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means that the positive effect of the perceived level of communication on performance 
is higher in EJV than in NEJ. The results give support to Hypothesis 7; Figure 6.1 
shows the interaction effect of form on communication. The other interaction between 
competence trust X distrust trust is showing a significant and negative relationship with 
performance, with a coefficient of -0.160 (P < 0.1). This means that competence trust is 
not showing any positive effect on performance due to the existence of distrust. Figure 
6.2 is showing that competence trust is moderated when distrust is high. The interaction 
is negative, though low in significance, which provides support for Hypothesis 5. The 
last of interaction is between distrust X industry unpredictability, which is showing a 
positive and significant relationship with performance, with a coefficient of 0.233 (P < 
0.01). The result means that industry unpredictability has moderated the negative effect 
of distrust on performance; which is opposite to what we hypothesized. Thus, the result 
gives no support to Hypothesis 3.  
 
Table 6.5: Multiple Regressions– Mediations Personal Trust, Performance, and 





 change Beta 
Analysis one: 
Personal Trust on Performance  




Personal Trust on Communication  
.547 .299  .547
*** 
Analysis three:     
Step 1: Communication on Performance  .506 .256  .506
***
 
Step 2: Personal Trust on Performance  .528 .278 .022 .178
*
 
Note: *= P< .1, **= P <.05, ***= P <.01 
To test Hypothesis 6, multiple regression analyses were conducted (see Table 6.5) to 
assess each component of the proposed mediation model. First, it was found that 
personal trust was positively associated with performance satisfaction 0.402 (P < .01). It 
was also found that personal trust was positively related to level of communication 
0.547 (P < .01). Lastly, results indicated that the mediator, level of communication, was 
positively associated with performance 0.506 (P < .01). Because both the a-path and b-
path were significant, mediation analyses were tested using the bootstrapping method 
with bias-corrected confidence estimates (MacKinnon, Lockwood and Williams, 2004; 
Preacher and Hayes, 2004). In the present study, the 95% confidence interval of the 
indirect effects was obtained with 1000 bootstrap resamples (Preacher and Hayes, 
2008). Results of the mediation analysis confirmed the mediating role of level of 
communication in the relationship between trust and performance (B = .224; CI = .082 
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to .406). In addition, results indicated that the direct effect of personal trust on 
performance were reduce in term of b-value and significance from 0.402 (P < .01) to 
0.178 (P < .1) when controlling for level of communication, thus suggesting full 
mediation. The Sobel test shows that the indirect effect of personal trust on performance 
through level of communication is significant (p < .01). The result gives strong support 
to Hypothesis 6.  
 
 
     ______________________________________________________________ 
 
   




The results in this study have given strong support to the proposed hypotheses. The 
study has re-affirmed the weight of trust on ISAs and offered a more detailed 
understanding of its role. The context, Saudi Arabia, was an excellent place to conduct 
this study. The role of trust in Eastern culture, and particularly in Saudi culture, is large. 
More so, with the role of regulation is still not detrimental as it is in other developed 
economies.  
The relationship between trust and performance is not as straightforward as some might 
think. The complexity of the relationship has been discussed by Lado, et al., (2008), 
who have identified the complexity and paradoxes in the literature which looks into the 
relationship between trust and opportunism. Lado, et al. (2008) found a significant 
positive relationship between trust and opportunism in inter-firm relationships, which, 
in return, has a positive impact on performance.  
The first hypothesis “From the perspective of Saudi firms, personal trust is positively 
related to ISA performance” was supported. In this study, we tested the personal trust 














     Total effect  
  
Figure 6.2: The indirect effect of personal trust on performance through 
level of communication.  
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between the top executive of the Saudi partner firm and their counterpart in the foreign 
partner firm. The existence of trust makes negotiations less costly, and agreements can 
be reached more quickly (Zaheer, et al., 1998). It lowers transaction costs, facilitates 
investments in relationship assets, and encourages information sharing, which gives 
firms a competitive advantage (Zaheer, et al., 1998). It encourages flexibility in 
negotiations and giving concessions; hence the expectation is that the other partner will 
reciprocate (Zaheer, et al., 1998). The positive impact of trust on performance, although 
limited and indirect, has support from recent literature (Krishnan, et al., 2006; Nielsen, 
2007; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2009). It extends to affect the efficiency of the knowledge 
exchange process (Parkhe, 1998) and the extent of knowledge (Inkpen, 1997). 
Furthermore, mutual trust widens the scope of relational learning, as both partners are 
encouraged to take more risks in sharing unrelated knowledge (Nielsen and Nielsen, 
2009). 
This study has distinguished the personal trust that individuals hold for each other from 
organizational trust. It has also identified the effect that trust (or distrust) between top 
executives has on the partner firm's abilities. Personal trust has proved to be the most 
influential of all kinds of trust. Previous studies have discussed the influence of personal 
trust, though the results were not conclusive. Some studies have claimed that inter-
partner trust is less influential than inter-firm trust (Ng, et al., 2007). Their rationale is 
that key personnel face changes, which makes interpersonal trust exposed to change and 
fluctuation (Ng, et al., 2007). However, this might not apply to Saudi firms, where the 
owners usually run the business. The different findings can be attributed to the different 
contexts. In the Saudi context, in particular considering the culture, the results are 
logical and very relevant. Generally, it is assumed that collectivist societies have high 
trust, and individualist societies have low trust. The rationale is that collectivist societies 
have a shared world view, and relationships are of high importance within them 
compared to within individualists societies (Triandis, 1989, 1995; Chen, et al., 1998; 
Hofstede, 1980a, 1980b; Huff and Kelley, 2003). 
The second hypothesis “From the perspective of Saudi firms, distrust is negatively 
related to ISA performance” was also supported. Lack of personal trust does not mean 
distrust; it means a no-trust relationship. This is a point that was touched upon by 
Lewicki, et al. (1998), who affirmed that trust and distrust are two separate and different 
constructs. 
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Some business relationship starts with neutral feelings before personal trust develops 
and improves performance, as the results of this study have shown. Alternatively, 
through time, firm rivalry, or reputation, a sense of distrust may develop. The results of 
the study show that this hinders the ISA’s performance. A fear of opportunistic 
behaviour or taking advantage of one partner’s competencies has been established in the 
literature as a hindrance. It stops firms from co-operating with each other, obstructs 
communications, and increases monitoring and control costs. It further reinforces the 
importance of trust as a factor in the success of ISAs. In the absence of trust, or where 
trust is low, the cost of negotiation increases out of the fear of opportunism 
(Williamson, 1975). 
Figure 6.3: Interaction-Industry X Distrust 
 
 
The test for the third hypothesis “From the perspective of Saudi firms, the effect of 
distrust on ISA performance will be higher when industry unpredictability is high” 
shows an interesting result. Figure 6.1 shows that in ISAs in predictable industries, 
distrust has a negative effect on performance. However, this is not the case in highly 
unpredictable industries; distrust is actually showing a positive and significant 
correlation with performance. It is clear that industry unpredictability is moderating the 
effect of distrust in this case. Krishnan, et al., (2006) have considered trust limitation, 
which may explain the result. Changes in economic conditions, such as instability or 
unpredictability of the market, create environmental uncertainty outside firms’ control 
(Dess and Beard, 1984; Wholey and Brittain, 1989; Krishnan, et al. 2006). These 
changes demands quick and decisive action and decisions, which require firms to find 
accurate and reliable information to respond to the threats they are facing (Huber, et al, 
1990; Krishnan, et al., 2006). Krishnan, et al., (2006) have argued that since trust brings 
189 | P a g e  
 
the perception of reliability of information from the partner and cognitive comfort, it 
reduces the need to think thoroughly. This limits the alliance partners’ alertness, and 
thus their ability to respond to environmental uncertainty appropriately (Krishnan, et al., 
2006). These environmental changes will affect the alliance’s performance if not acted 
upon (Kogut, 1989). The results might explain why Mukherjee, et al, (2013) did not 
find support for their hypothesis and the relation with trust did not mitigate the negative 
effect of environmental uncertainty. 
Trust, in a way, encourages partners, with no questioning or verifying, to rely on each 
other’s knowledge and understanding when identifying threats and opportunities 
(Krishnan, et al., 2006). It encourages partners to complement each other’s supposed 
expertise in specialized research (Krishnan, et al., 2006). However, problems might 
arise when information results in a potential loss for the focal partner and interest 
clashes (Nooteboom, 2002; Krishnan, et al., 2006). The partner will be reluctant to 
share information to respond to environment changes that might inflict harm on their 
interest (Krishnan et al., 2006). Thus, an alliance might fail to respond to the demands 
of its environment (Krishnan, et al., 2006). Thus, it is expected that instability and 
unpredictability can each reduce the trust-performance relationship. Therefore, distrust 
in these situations appears to be a blessing in disguise, and helps to overcome the 
limitations of trust. However, the results do not support the arguments of Young-Ybarra 
and Wiersema (1999), which suggested that trust can help to enable partners to respond 
more positively to any unexpected problems or changes in the environment. The 
findings are interesting, and further studies are recommended to better understand this 
relationship.  
The fourth hypothesis “From the perspective of Saudi firms, competence trust is 
positively related to ISA performance” has been strongly supported. Confidence in 
partner competencies is fundamental to the success of ISAs in many ways. Lack of 
confidence will create anxiety, distrust, and conflict. The partner firm will question any 
attempts by the partner, which may cause delays and rifts between the alliance partners. 
It has been argued in the literature that trust in partner reliability is as important as 
personal trust. Das and Teng (1998) have highlighted the value of a firm’s confidence in 
partner cooperation to the success of the alliance. Trust is one of the biggest sources, 
after control, of confidence in partner co-operation (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Das 
and Teng, 1998). 
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The argument here takes us to the fifth hypothesis “From the perspective of Saudi firms, 
the positive effect of competence trust on ISA performance is moderated by distrust”. It 
is assumed that distrust will moderate the effect of competence trust on performance. 
The results of the study supported this hypothesis. This is a clear indication that the 
negative effect of distrust may cancel any gain from competence trust. Furthermore, 
distrust creates doubts and suspicion, which may hinder the development of competence 
trust.   
Figure 6.4: Interaction- Distrust X Competence trust 
 
 
Hypothesis six “From the perspective of Saudi firms, level of communication mediates 
the relationship between personal trust and ISA performance” have contributed to our 
understanding to the role of trust on ISA performance. It explains how personal trust 
can have positive effect on ISA performance. Trust encourages frank exchange of 
information, which reflects on the quality of the communication. Good level of 
communication improves the ISA performance.  
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The seventh hypothesis aims to better understand the relationship between levels of 
communication and performance. Communication has proven to be instrumental to the 
performance of ISAs. However, the effect of the level of communication on 
performance will vary in importance, depending on the form of the ISA. We proposed 
the following hypothesis “From the perspective of Saudi firms, the positive effect of the 
perceived level of communication on ISA performance is more apparent in equity 
alliances”. The result showed strong support for this hypothesis. Communication is very 
important in ISAs; even more so in the Saudi context. An equity alliance involves the 
establishment of equity with bigger resource commitment and risks. Constant 
coordination and effective communication are needed to squash any possible conflicts. 
EJV involves three parties (local partner, foreign partner, and the IJV); hence, more 
coordination is needed. While on NEJ communication is usually two ways between the 
local and foreign partner, with clearer separation of operations and responsibilities, and 
less resource commitment. 
Finally, the IJV’s age shows a very significant (though limited) relationship with 
performance. This further confirms the results from the literature. The same goes for 
cultural distance, which shows a positive correlation with performance. This result 




This study has examined the effects of some trust dimensions on performance. The 
three dimensions are personal trust, distrust, and competence trust. The results showed 
good support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4. It showed that personal and competence trust 
both correlate positively with performance, while distrust has a negative relationship. 
Tests on the interaction effects showed that competence trust was moderated by distrust. 
Distrust when moderated with industry predictability did show, contrary to 
expectations, a positive relationship with performance. 
The originality of this chapter is that it explores a subject which has been under-
researched in the literature: trust effects between ISA partners in developing economies. 
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It also led to a set of empirically based recommendations for practitioners interested in 
the Saudi Arabian markets. 
The results should encourage firms to plan their communication and place more focus 
into keeping communication open and fluid.  
The study has responded to calls from researchers for an in-depth study on trust. By 
breaking the concept of trust into different dimensions and testing them, the study has 
made a valuable contribution to the existing literature. Saudi society is highly 
personalized, and places high importance on trust. Future study could consider the 
perspective of foreign partners. 
Future studies should look into the indirect effect of trust on performance. Moreover, 
future work should consider adopting longitudinal design to test the weight of these 
relationships overtime. Mohr and Puck (2013) have recently published a paper arguing 
that trust and performance influence relationship is reversed, and that good performance 
fosters the development of trust. Future studies may check the validity of these 
assertions, and investigate the direction of the relationship, whether it is unidirectional 
or bi-directional.   
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Chapter Seven: National Cultural Differences 
and ISA Performance 
7.1. Introduction 
Transaction cost theory explains that SAs are preferred when they show higher 
efficiency than market transactions (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Buckley and Casson, 
1988; Hennart, 1988, 1991; Kogut, 1988). A study by Beamish and Delios (1997) noted 
and confirmed the differences in performance between ISAs in developed and 
developing countries. However, they concluded that ISAs in developing countries have 
a higher level of performance than ISAs in developed countries.  
For decades, Saudi Arabia has relied on oil in exportation and oil-based products. Thus, 
the kingdom is attempting to diversify its economy and learn how to compete in 
knowledge-intensive industries (Rice, 2003). The government has placed a strong 
emphasis on education in an attempt to build a solid base of young and highly skilled 
people to strengthen the innovation capability of the country (Rice, 2003).  
State-owned and family-owned businesses in Saudi Arabia are transitioning into 
international and multinational enterprises (Jasimuddin, 2001). Thus, in order to have 
competitive advantages within the global business domain, the ISA is the preferred form 
for both Saudi firms and multinationals alike (Williams, 2009; Mababaya, 2002). This 
arrangement allows companies to pool their resources, combining the technical and 
commercial capabilities and competencies of the Western partner with the local 
knowledge and commercial competitiveness of the local partner (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). It 
allows the Saudis to bring in competencies that will add to their competitive advantage 
(Williams, 2009).  
A set of factors which affect the performance of ISAs has been identified in the 
literature (Please see the literature chapter for detailed list of the different factors 
discussed in the literature). This chapter will provide a detailed exploration of the role 
of cultural distance in ISAs within the Saudi environment. Culture has been recognized 
as one of the major factors affecting multinational companies operating across borders. 
Saudi Arabia has a distinctive and rooted culture, and a developing economy. This 
context makes it an interesting place to conduct this study. 
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When attempting to understand the factors affecting the performance of ISAs, it is 
important to note that there are still difficulties and ambiguities to consider (Gulati, 
1998). Understanding alliance performance is one of the most exciting and unexplored 
areas in the study of ISAs (Gulati, 1998), and this will be discussed thoroughly in the 
next section. 
Furthermore, the assessment of ISAs’ performance has been mostly dominated by the 
perspectives of firms from developed countries. Naturally, their motives are different 
from those of firms from developing countries; the findings of some previous studies 
cannot therefore be generalized to all contexts. Leung, et al. (2005: p. 368) observed 
that “scholars have argued that instead of addressing whether national culture makes a 
difference it is more useful to address the issue of how and when it makes a difference”. 
ISAs provide the perfect platform to test the impact of culture on the relationship 
between alliances (Kumar and Das, 2009). Sambasivan and Yen (2010), discussed the 
lack of empirical studies linking culture and SAs. 
This chapter will begin by reviewing the literature on cultural distance in ISAs, and 
explaining the development of the hypotheses to be considered. This is followed by an 
explanation of the study’s methodology. The results are then presented, and are 
followed by a discussion. The final section concludes the chapter by outlining the 
contribution and limitations of the study and suggestions for future studies. 
National cultural distance has been the centre of much debate among researchers, with 
conflicting results. Further, the perspective of developed Western countries has 
dominated the literature. The study has contributed to our understanding of how cultural 
distance affects performance in developing economies. The study has provided the 
context of when and how it makes a difference. Conceptually and empirically, the study 
has made a valuable contribution to understanding the role of culture on ISAs.  
The findings of this chapter will help us to answer the fourth research question of the 
thesis “How far do cultural factors affect the performance of ISAs?” It will complement 
the results from the previous chapter, and provide an original knowledge of how 
cultural factors affect ISA performance in Saudi.  
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7.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
7.2.1. Measures of performance 
Alliance performance has received relatively little attention. This is due to many 
obstacles facing researchers when they attempt to measure performance. First, there are 
logistical challenges in collecting the data necessary for this kind of research (Gulati, 
1998). Second, there is ambiguity in performance measurement, which makes it 
difficult to capture the true performance of the alliance (Zollo, et al., 2002). Difficulties 
can stem from differences in motives, which require different methods of measurement 
(Artisien and Buckley, 1985; Arino, 2003); for example, enhancing organizational 
learning (Kogut, 1988; Hamel, 1991), or strategic positioning (Contractor and Lorange, 
2008; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Tatoglu and Glaister, 1997). 
This has made it difficult to find a universal approach to measuring the performance of 
ISAs (Lunnan and Haugland, 2008). Previous studies have used different approaches to 
assess ISA performance. Early studies, according to Geringer and Hebert (1991), have 
relied on financial indicators such as profitability (e.g. Tomlinson, 1970; Lecraw, 1983 
cited in Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Other studies have used different objective 
measures: for example, survival (Killing, 1983; Geringer, 1990; Geringer and 
Woodcock, 1995).  In the literature chapter (section 2.5), we have talked in details about 
the different measurements, and the healthy arguments between scholars regarding 
some of the methods.  
The choice of the best method to measure the performance of ISA alliances has been the 
centre of much debate in the literature. Measure of performance should be based on the 
success of the alliance in meeting expectations, rather than purely on financial 
indicators. Arino (2003) defined SA performance, as “the degree of accomplishment of 
partners’ goals, be these common or private, initial or emergent”. Yan and Beamish 
(2004) defined performance of SAs as the satisfaction of managers of the venture about 
the overall performance. The different partners’ motives have resulted, according to 
Zollo, et al. (2002), in failures to reach consensus on the appropriate measurement or on 
a unified definition of ISA performance (Geringer and Hebert, 1991).  
Lunnan and Haugland (2008) have classified measurements as financial, operational, 
and effectiveness. The financial measures, such as profitability, are common methods 
when there is an “explicit” financial goal (Arino, 2003; Geringer and Hebert, 1991). On 
the other hand, as Geringer and Hebert (1991) have argued, in cases where firms focus 
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on key operational factors, using operational measures such as stability and longevity is 
more suitable (Yan and Zeng, 1999; Arino, 2003). Organizational effectiveness is 
probably the most popular and common method. It measures the firm’s satisfaction with 
the ISA’s performance, and the degree to which the partnership has successfully 
fulfilled its original goals (Arino, 2003; Parkhe, 1993b).  
There is some agreement that partner satisfaction is one of the most reliable 
performance measures (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Several researchers (e.g. Killing, 
1983; Beamish, 1985; Inkpen and Birkenshaw, 1994; Lyles and Baird, 1994; Glaister 
and Buckley, 1999) have used perceptual measures of partner satisfaction. Objective 
measures, such as financial indicators, fail to capture inter-partner relationship 
satisfaction (Ring, and Van de Ven, 1994); do not reflect ISA success on reaching its 
long-term goals (Geringer and Hebert, 1991); and fail to capture any experienced 
difficulties (Osland and Cavusagil, 1996; Lu and Lee, 2005). Furthermore, perceptual 
measures can provide, unlike objective measures, an assessment of the ISA’s success in 
achieving its overall objectives (Glaister and Buckley, 1998). Additionally, not all 
countries have a pool of financial data available in the public domain. For example, the 
Saudi market index has only 160 company listed, compared to fifteen thousand in the 
US and more than four thousand in the UK. This makes access to financial data almost 
impossible for researchers. These limitations have been acknowledged by Geringer and 
Hebert (1991), who affirmed that in case of private firms and conglomerates, the data 
are often very difficult to acquire. Furthermore, the financial data can fail to incorporate 
financial returns from mechanisms other than dividends, such as management fees and 
royalties (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Whilst having both sets of data is ideal, but for 
the reported complications, it makes acquiring them a very difficult task (Parkhe, 1993).  
In this study, ISA performance is assessed by measuring perceptions of local partner 
overall satisfaction, following the method used by many studies (Choi and Beamish, 
2004; Lin and Wang, 2008; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Yan and Gray, 1994; Geringer 
and Hebert, 1991). 
 
7.2.2. Alliance modes 
Equity ownership, a mechanism to maintain control, has a strong relation with ISA 
performance and has continued to receive attention from scholars (Lu and Hebert, 
2005). Nevertheless, empirical results have not been conclusive regarding this issue. 
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Studies which have focused on developing economies have backed foreign dominant 
control (Ding, 1997) or shared control (Beamish, 1993). This is because ISAs with 
western partners are associated with technology transfer and sophisticated industry; thus 
they require resource commitment (Li and Xu, 1994 in Lin and Wang, 2008). On the 
other hand, ISAs with firms from fellow developing countries are mostly export-
oriented, thus requiring fewer resource commitments (Beamish, 1993; Luo, 2001). 
Control is assumed to curb opportunism in ISAs; however, it has its downsides (Tiwana, 
2008).  
Lin and Wang (2008), however, point out that ownership is replaced by legalism. This 
is when one party relies on formal legal contracts to enforce compliance. Obligations 
and mechanisms are set out in contracts (Reuer and Arino, 2007). 
Glaister and Buckley (1998) have argued that there is no reason to expect different 
performance outcomes between EJVs and NEAs. Their argument is based on the fact 
that firms choose alliance modes based on their expected outcomes (taking into account 
contingent factors). Thus, they have argued that subjective performance measure will 
not vary between alliance modes. The results are not expected to be different in this 
context. Saudi firms will choose a form that serves their objectives; the same applies to 
the foreign partner. Thus, the alliance performance assessment is not expected to differ 
between alliance modes. 
 
H1. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the mean measure of subjective 
performance will not vary between organizational modes of alliance. 
 
7.2.3. Culture and performance  
Cultural distance and its effect on ISAs has been studied extensively in the literature; 
for example, its effect on entry mode (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Dong and Glaister, 
2007), partner control (Gomes-Casseres, 1989), goal divergence (Yan and Gray, 1994), 
and longevity (Barekma and Vermeulen, 1997; Hennart and Zeng, 2002). It has also 
been perceived to influence management style (Lin and Germain, 1998), and to create 
role conflict and ambiguity between executives (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992).  
Culture is defined as a system of shared values that mainly solves two problems; 
external adaptation and internal integration (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). The first 
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is related to the objectives and strategy of the firm, and how to deal with threats and 
opportunities. This is influenced by the firm’s stance on uncertainty avoidance and 
long-term orientation (Schneider and De Meyer, 1991; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). 
The later, internal integration is linked to the firm’s relationship with its employees, 
which is influenced by their feelings towards power distance, individualism, and 
masculinity (Schneider and De Meyer, 1991; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). 
The effects of cultural differences on management practice have been discussed 
extensively in the literature (Hofstede, 1980, 1994). Culture is a representation of how 
things are traditionally done in that particular context (Spender, 1996). The classic 
argument in relation to the impact of cultural differences on ISAs is simply based on the 
notion that similar cultural settings will reduce misunderstanding and result in fewer 
difficulties (Brown, et al., 1989; Lane and Beamish, 1990). Cultural distance creates 
greater organizational differences, different practices, and different employee 
expectations (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Park and Ungson, 1997). Cross-cultural conflict 
has been cited as one of the reasons behind high dissolution rates (Lane and Beamish, 
1990; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). 
The relationship between cultural distance and performance has also been discussed in 
the literature. There is agreement between researchers that national cultural distance 
influences ISA performance (e.g. England, 1975; Hofstede, 1980; Davidson, 1982; Deal 
and Kennedy, 1982; Schein, 1985; Schneider, 1988; Sim and Ali, 1998; Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991). However, there is some disagreement over the direction of this influence. 
Some empirical studies have noted a negative impact on survival (e.g. Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1997; Hennart and Zeng, 2002), while others observed a positive impact 
(Park and Ungson, 1997; Pothukuchi, et al., 2002). Others found no significant impact 
(Fey and Beamish, 2001).  
On the one hand, cultural distance has been always regarded as a “hindrance” factor to 
the performance of the ISAs (Shenkar, 2001). In early studies, cultural distance has been 
perceived as a negative factor influencing the success of ISAs. The larger the distance 
between the partners, the lower are the chances of success (Brown, et al., 1989; Shenkar 
and Zeira, 1992; Barkema, et al., 1996, 1997). Cultural familiarity theory has claimed 
that firms are more likely to suffer from poor performance when investing in culturally 
distant countries (Lee, et al., 2008). Parkhe (1991, 1993) argues that national cultural 
differences will negatively affect the performance and the success of the alliance, 
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especially their ability to benefit from ‘knowledge spillover’. The relationship between 
cultural distance and performance is complex. Geringer (1998) argues that is it is not the 
cultural distance per se which is the cause of problems, but the implications of such 
differences for structure and operation, as they create a kind of a ripple effect. This has 
prompted Lane and Beamish (1990) to conclude that cultural compatibility is an integral 
factor for the survival of ISAs. Therefore, we expect performance assessment to be 
better in cases where cultural distance is perceived as less important to the performance 
of ISAs, compared to where differences are perceived as important. 
 
H2. The mean measure of overall satisfaction obtained from subjective measures of 
performance will be higher in those alliances where the perception and effect of 
national cultural differences are not important to the Saudi partner, compared to those 
for whom such differences are important. 
 
7.2.4. Culture and performance assessment 
Differences in culture lead to differences in values. Thus, firms with cultural differences 
will find it difficult to agree on common goals, overcome problems, and resolve 
conflicts (Hennart and Zeng, 2002). This can lead to the different objectives, 
coordination techniques, and strategy implementation (Root, 1994; Sullivan and 
Peterson, 1982; Geringer, 1988; Brown, et al., 1989). In contrast, firms from similar or 
the same national cultures are expected to show greater agreement in managing ISAs, 
thus reflecting a positive outcome on performance and satisfaction (Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989). Geringer and Hebert (1991) have concluded that similarities will yield a 
better ISA performance, while differences will have a negative influence on ISA 
performance. 
Differences between partners can have a devastating effect on their partnership (Hennart 
and Zeng, 2002). It has been reported that cross-national SAs, due to partners’ value 
differences, have been suffering communication, cooperation, commitment, and conflict 
resolution problems (Pothukuchi, et al., 2002; Harrigan, 1988; Mohr and Spekman, 
1994; Parkhe, 1991; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Cultural differences between ISA 
partners, in the absence of understanding, could obstruct communication (Rao and 
Schmidt, 1998) and destroy trust and knowledge sharing (Das and Teng, 1998). Cultural 
distance is assumed to affect managerial practices and norms (Ralston, et al., 1993). It 
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affects firms’ ability to adapt to the host country’s environment and business practices 
(Shenkar, 1990). Thus, cultural distance might hinder positive performance (Luo, et al., 
2001).  
Parkhe (1993) argues that cultural diversity within ISAs disrupts effective cooperation; 
while Lane and Beamish (1990) state that the problems emerge from the impact of 
national culture on behaviour and management, which creates unresolved conflicts. 
Conflict resolution methods vary between cultures, as noted by Henderson (1975) and 
Johnson et al. (1990 cited on Pothukuchi, et al., 2002). Cultural differences can 
complicate the relationship between partners. They make integrating the routines and 
repertoires of the partner more problematic (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986), thus 
decreasing any chance for an innovation-oriented venture to succeed (Kaufman and 
O’Neill, 2007). Similarity between the partners can lead to agreement between them 
regarding the ISA’s performance, and since similarity leads to better communication, 
their respective perspectives on performance should be known (Geringer, 1991).  
Emerging from cultural distance are differences in performance measurement. Every 
culture has its own way of assessing performance, and this is sometimes completely 
different from those of other cultures. This is because different cultures embody 
different attitudes, values, and beliefs (Hofstede, 1980; Schein, 1985; Schneider, 1988; 
Geringer and Hebert, 1991).  
Firms from similar cultures will mostly have similar performance evaluation methods. 
Differences in culture will most likely lead to differences in objectives and 
measurements to evaluate them (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Japanese and many 
European firms, for example, do not look for an immediate result and are more 
‘strategic’; they look always for long-term, less accounting-based approaches to 
assessing performance. On the other hand, American firms tend to use financial criteria, 
and value more immediate results; this is considered the main indicator of whether an 
operation is a success or not (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Pothukuchi, et al., 2002). 
Therefore, it can be expected that performance assessment methods will differ between 
the Saudi partner and a foreign one. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H3. From the perspective of the Saudi partner, correlation between partners' 
assessments of ISA performance will be stronger in ISAs involving parents with the 
perception that national cultural differences are not important. 
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7.2.5. Culture, learning, and performance 
It is not surprising that Saudi firms report higher levels of cultural differences. As 
discussed earlier, Saudi culture is heavily influenced by Islamic teachings which are 
drawn from values, customs and practice. Furthermore, Saudis are influenced by strict 
tribal codes and strong patriarchal family structures (Robertson, et al., 2001; Al-
Rasheedi, 2012). Thus, there are easily many notable differences between Saudis and 
Western ‘foreigners’, which have been reported in previous research (Al-Khatib, et al., 
2004; Shane, et al., 1995).  
We cannot simplify the relationship between cultural distance and performance in a 
general statement only. Despite the wealth of cross-cultural research, the relationship is 
not clear. According to De Mattos, et al. (2007) “...there is no single theory that is 
widely recognised as a flawless approach to tackling cultural differences in a cross-
border situation”. The contradicting results in the literature about the effects of cultural 
distance are proof that the relationship is more complicated (Park and Ungson, 1997). 
Cultural distance by itself does not lead to problems (Geringer, 1998). There are many 
factors, whether institutional or at micro-level, that may mediate the influence of 
cultural distance (Park and Ungson, 1997). Many firms enter into alliances to access 
complementary resources (e.g. know-how, technology, local knowledge) which they 
lack (Geringer and Woodcock, 1995). It has been argued that, in some cases, differences 
may facilitate learning between organizations, which in return contributes to satisfactory 
alliance performance (Geringer, 1998). Differences might cause a collision which has a 
negative impact, or might be complementary and lead to improved operation (Geringer 
and Frayne, 1990). This shows the importance of choosing an appropriate partner with 
complementary resources for a successful alliance (Geringer, 1988, 1991; Geringer and 
Frayne, 1993). 
The link between successful learning and satisfactory performance of SAs has long been 
noted in the literature. We have touched upon this relation in the literature chapter 
(section 2.4); and in the forthcoming discussion, we will be talking about it in more 
details. 
Lyles and Salk (1996) and Steensma, et al. (2000) have noted the connection between 
successful learning and performance of the ISA, especially in young ISAs. Furthermore, 
there is a positive and direct relationship between innovation and performance (Rice, 
2003). Through inter-firm learning, firms accumulate knowledge, gain experience in 
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how to avoid mistakes, reduce costs, increase efficiency, and improve problem-solving 
techniques (Jiang and Li, 2008). Organizational learning facilitates knowledge transfer, 
which in return leads to improved performance (Jiang and Li, 2008).   
Knowledge acquired by ISAs leads to strong organizational capabilities and thus creates 
better performance (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004). The acquired knowledge can then be 
transferred into new products, processes and services, which contribute to better 
financial performance. 
Dhanaraj, et al. (2004) also found that the transfer of explicit knowledge has a positive 
effect on ISA performance. They argue that explicit knowledge’s low cost and clarity 
have a direct impact on positive performance. Furthermore, Subramaniam and 
Venkatraman (2001) have noted a positive link between tacit knowledge and positive 
ISA performance.  
The idea that cultural differences can lead to learning is not a new notion; according to 
many researchers, differences in values and beliefs foster learning and innovation (Fiol, 
1994; Huber, 1991; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Morosini, et al. (1998) argued that 
due to their differences, firms are more likely to hold capabilities and competencies 
which are different from their partner firm; thus, there is a lot for each firm to learn. 
Vaara, et al. (2012) found that differences in national and organizational culture are 
positively associated with knowledge transfer in international acquisitions. Reus and 
Lamont (2009) argued that cultural differences have dual effects – both positive and 
negative. The positive effect of culture enhances understandability and communication, 
which indirectly improves learning and performance. Nevertheless, all these studies 
took place in the context of mergers and acquisitions rather than ISAs; though they have 
similarities, the findings of these studies cannot be generalized into the ISA context. 
Chakrabarti, et al., (2009) have argued that cultural differences can actually become a 
source of ‘value creation and learning’; they can, according to theoretical studies, spur 
learning and innovation.  
However, not everyone shares the argument above. Parkhe (1991, 1993) has argued that 
cultural differences have a negative influence on a firm’s ability to benefit from 
knowledge spillover. Lane and Beamish (1990) have also supported this argument, and 
Hennart and Zeng (2002) have affirmed that differences disrupt learning and 
collaboration. Lane, et al. (2001) and Sirmon, et al. (2004) have all confirmed that 
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similarities have a very positive effect. Subsequently, all these researchers have agreed 
that cultural differences have an impeding effect on learning.  
However, some of the previous arguments were based on assumptions and propositions 
and had no empirical support for the effect of cultural distance on knowledge 
acquisition. Furthermore, they were mainly from the perspective of the foreign 
“developed” partner. In the literature, researchers started to question the strong hold 
assumption that culture distance is an obstacle to transactions due to the lack of fit 
(Shenkar, 2012). Shenkar (2012) argued that not every cultural gap is critical to 
performance; and some differences may be complementary, and hence have a positive 
impact on performance. Tallman and Shenkar (1994: p. 108) argued that “different 
aspects of firm culture may be more or less central, more or less difficult to transmit, 
and more or less critical to operations”. The reason for the link between culture distance 
and lack of cooperation, is it relation with identity building (Weber, et al., 1996; Vaara, 
2003). There is general tendencies to link cultural similarities with trustworthiness, and 
differences with negative feelings and associations (Hogg and Terry, 2000). These 
assumptions impede us from assessing the differences beyond the stereotypical 
conceptions that, mostly, does not reflect the reality of an organization (Sarala and 
Vaara, 2010). 
Stahl and Voigt (2008) have argued that cultural differences affect firms in two 
“opposing” ways, depending on the degree of cultural difference and relatedness, 
although the study was related to M&A, in which employees’ reactions were different 
from those in ISAs. However, Pothukuchi, et al., (2002) have found that it is 
organizational cultural differences rather than national cultural distance which have an 
embedding effect on an ISA’s performance. This made them question the assertion that 
cultural differences alone disrupt resource sharing.  
Dussauge, et al., (2000) have concluded that different alliance types lead to different 
learning outcomes. They argue that link alliances (inter-firm partnerships to which 
partners contribute different capabilities) enjoy a higher level of inter-firm learning and 
skills transfer compared to scale alliances (partnerships to which partners contribute 
similar capabilities). Lyles and Salk (1996), in their Hungarian based study, found 
limited evidence to support the claim that cultural distance impedes knowledge 
acquisition. Moreover, Bjorkman, et al. (2007), though the focus was on international 
acquisition, found that differences weakened absorptive capacity. However, they also 
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argued that the relationship is not linear, and that there are factors which moderate or 
mediate the relationship.   
He and Wei (2011) argued that market-oriented firms would choose culturally distanced 
markets. This choice will allow them to better exploit their resource and capabilities. 
Their argument is based on resource-based view, the higher the resources firms possess 
the more they have to offer. Through learning firms can overcome the “foreignness” 
barriers and the risks associated with culturally distance markets. The findings of their 
study have supported their hypothesis. This shows a positive relation between cultural 
distance and learning, hence a better performance. Glaister and Buckley (1999) found 
no evidence to support the negative relationship between cultural distance and 
performance, which was not surprising for them. They argued that similarities are not a 
necessary condition for success. It may be more beneficial to have a partner from 
culturally distant country, as there will be something to learn from the relationship. 
These relationships will give the partner the opportunity to learn new things and add to 
their existing capabilities, which will reflect positively on the alliance. In Sarala and 
Vaara (2010), culture distance has been viewed as a source of potential knowledge 
transfer in international acquisitions. 
ISAs allowed Saudi firms to pool their resources, combining the technical and 
commercial capabilities and competencies of the Western partner with the local 
knowledge and commercial competitiveness of the local partner (Williams, 2009; 
Mababaya, 2002; Al-Rasheedi, 2012). They allow the Saudis to bring in competencies 
that will add to their competitive advantage (Williams, 2009).  
Learning is a strategic choice for Saudi firms as they attempt to diversify their economy, 
away from over-reliance on oil to knowledge-intensive industries (Rice, 2003). The 
country is a net importer of technology, and heavily dependent on a foreign workforce 
and foreign partners to supply them with the required skills and technology (Idris, 2007; 
Al-Kibsi, et al., 2007). Thus, successful learning from the foreign alliance will reflect 
positively on the performance of the ISA. 
Saudi firms form alliances mainly to access foreign partner competencies and skills 
rather than their financial resources. Furthermore, Saudi partner does not pose a threat 
to the foreign partner market position. It creates mutual benefits and dependencies with 
“complementary alliances” partners. Therefore, no partner will act opportunistically, 
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and there is no need for protective behaviour. Hence, it reduces the chances of conflicts. 
Thus, taking into account the Saudi firm’s motivation and the need to partner with a 
Western (developed economy) firm to stay competitive, it could be expected that 
cultural distance differences would be a source of knowledge and learning, and would in 
return reflect positively on an ISA’s performance. Hence, it will create what Dussauge, 
et al. (2000) called “link alliances”. On this basis, the following hypotheses are 
proposed:   
H4. From the perspective of the Saudi partner, perceived cultural distance will be 
positively related to alliance performance. 
H5. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the relation between cultural distance and 
performance is mediated by knowledge acquisition. 
 
Since it is expected that cultural distance will play an enriching part, it is also expected 
that manufacturing alliances will, due to the technical requirements of those alliances, 
perceive cultural distance more positively than will tertiary alliances. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H6. From the perspective of the Saudi partner, the perceived relationship between 
cultural distance and alliance performance will be moderated by the alliance industry. 
 
7.2.6. Culture understanding, communication, and performance 
Cultural values are not fully captured by nationality. However, national boundaries 
define institutional differences (Ronen and Shenkar, 1985). Along with cultural 
differences, there are institutional differences (Hitt, et al., 2006). Shenkar (1990) has 
suggested that one of the main problems facing ISAs in developing economies is the 
existence of institutional differences; that is, differences in the political, economic, 
cultural, and legal environments. As with cultural differences, intuitional differences 
have a devastating effect (Globerman and Nielsen, 2007).  
Teitelbaum (2002) has noted that the introduction of the internet, satellites, and ease of 
travel have opened a window for Saudis to the outside world. This, along with other 
reasons, might have raised the cultural understanding. Ali (2009) has pointed out that 
Arabs are fascinated by Western culture, especially American culture, and thus tend to 
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be more receptive to their messages. Furthermore, most of the Saudi executives and 
managers are familiar with the English language, which further helped understanding 
and communication.  
Discussing all the areas influenced by cultural distance makes cultural understanding of 
paramount importance in cross-border alliances. Cultural understanding or awareness is 
“the degree of knowledge about the way of thinking and behaving of people from a 
different culture” (Buckley, Clegg and Tan, 2006: p. 275). Cultural misunderstanding 
and lack of knowledge can be a cause of stress between the ISA partners (Brunner, et 
al., 1992; Baired, et al., 1990). However, the tacit nature of culture makes it difficult to 
learn in an articulated format, it has to be experienced to be understood (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995). Experience involves the chance for observation, which subsequently 
can enhance understanding and, hence, success. Cultural understanding, as opposed to 
misunderstanding, can help defuse arguments and build bridges of communication 
channels. Brown, et al. (1989), and Lane and Beamish (1990) have reached a conclusion 
that compatibility of organizational culture is more important than similarity of national 
culture. Cultural differences, if moderated by cultural understanding, will have a 
positive effect and will actually enhance learning. This in return will reflect positively 
on the performance of ISAs. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H7. From the perspective of the Saudi partner, cultural understanding will be positively 
related to alliance performance. 
 
Cultural understanding and communication 
The importance of effective communication in ISAs has been recognized, as it allows 
firm to cooperate better and hence improve performance (Doz, 1996; Inkpen and 
Birkinshaw, 1994; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Hennart and Zeng, 2002). Cultural 
differences between SA partners, in the absence of understanding, can obstruct 
communication (Rao and Schmidt, 1998; Park and Ungson, 1997) and can destroy trust 
and knowledge sharing (Das and Teng, 1998). Cultural distance is assumed to affect 
managerial practices and norms (Ralston, et al., 1993). It affects firms’ ability to adapt 
to their host country’s environment and business practices (Shenkar, 1990). 
Furthermore, the obstructed communication between partners hinders their ability to 
resolve conflict and inflates the cost of knowledge transfer (Lane and Beamish, 1990; 
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Clegg, 1990; Kaufman and O’Neill, 2007). Cultural differences breed 
miscommunication. Differences in language can affect the verbal communication of 
“perceptual and encoding/decoding gaps” (Root, 1994; Hennart and Zeng, 2002). On 
the other hand, cultural similarities promote communication between partners (Geringer 
and Hebert, 1991).  
Communication has greater importance in high context cultures compared to low 
context cultures, like the US, where the context of the meeting is perceived as less 
important (Hennart and Zeng, 2002). Effective communication is crucial for the 
management of ISAs. It allows partner firms to communicate their goals and 
capabilities, and to understand each other’s behaviour well before the start. It allows 
firms to learn about each other, avoiding misunderstandings and suspicion. Failure to do 
this will cause lower commitment and poor performance (Doz, 1996; Inkpen and 
Birkinshaw, 1994; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). It has been reported that cross-national 
SAs, due to partners’ value differences, have been suffering communication, 
cooperation, commitment, and conflict resolution problems (Pothukuchi, et al., 2002; 
Harrigan, 1988; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Parkhe, 1991; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).  
Partners usually lack full understanding of each other’s goals and behaviours at the start 
of an alliance, which may have devastating effects if they fail to establish understanding 
(Hennart and Zeng, 2002). It may lead to suspicion and lower commitment (Doz, 1996; 
Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). Furthermore, it hinders firms’ ability to coordinate, therefore 
making the partnership vulnerable to conflicts (Lane and Beamish, 1990). Cultural 
understanding can develop empathy and reduce suspicion between partners; it allows 
the partners to be open and improve communication. Lack of understanding of a 
partner’s behaviour might cause a breakdown in communication and lower 
commitment.   
 
Communication and language barriers can be considered the most common problems as 
a result of cultural distance (Yavaş, et al., 1994). Communication plays an important 
role in conducting business in Saudi Arabia. Business is conducted between people, not 
between companies or contractually (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). Socialising plays an 
important part in establishing business relations in Saudi (Moran, et al., 2007). 
Westerners place more emphasis on oral communication, while Saudis emphasize both 
oral and aural communication. This is rooted in the traditional Bedouin culture that 
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places emphasis on both speaking and listening (Al-Rasheedi, 2012). Saudis prefer face-
to-face meetings, as personal dealings enhance personal trust and relationships (Ali, 
2009). This makes communication an essential tool for conflict resolution, especially 
for ISAs in Saudi.  
Previous research (Brown, et al., 1989; Lane and Beamish, 1990; Kogut and Singh, 
1988) has confirmed the notion that similarities can reduce misunderstanding and 
differences can create misunderstanding; the latter can in turn create communication 
difficulties and conflicts. Cultural understanding can reduce the negative effect of 
cultural distance on communication, which is vital to the success of cross-country ISAs. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H8. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the relationship between cultural 
understanding and performance is mediated by levels of communication. 
 
 



































The survey questions measured the Saudi and foreign partner firms’ performance 
satisfaction and perceptions of their local partners, as well as the effect of culture on 
ISA performance. Responses were assessed using five-point Likert-type scales: for 
performance assessment, a scale of 1 (not very good) to 5 (very good); and for success 
assessment 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). These instruments were used in 
previous studies (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Lane, et al., 2001; Glaister and Buckley, 
1998; Tatoglu and Glaister, 1998; Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1985; Walter, et al., 2008).   
For cultural distance, a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal) has been used. These 
instruments have been used in previous studies (Lyles and Salk, 1996; Simonin, 1999b). 
Glaister and Buckley (1998) have argued against using perceptual measures, such as 
nationality or location, when attempting to capture cultural distance. They argue that it 
is important to “accommodate the respondent's perception of national cultural 
differences”, rather than assuming the differences. Cultural understanding was 
measured using two items scales ranged from 1 (not true) to 5 (very true); one of the 
scales was reverse-coded. Schweiger and Goulet (2005) previously used the scale. For 
knowledge acquisition, a scale of 1 (none) to 5 (very much) was used. This instrument 
has been used in previous studies (Dhanaraj, et al., 2004; Nooteboom et al., 1997; 
Zaheer, et al., 1998; Simonin, 1999b; Simonin, 2004; Lane, et al., 2001). For 
communication, a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) was used. This 
instrument has also been used in previous studies (Simonin, 2004; Simonin, 1999a; 
Park, 2011). The appropriateness of the instruments was tested during the pilot study. 
The study explored the perspective of the local “Saudi” partner. Ideally, the researcher 
would have included representatives of both parent firms as well as the ISA, but the 
limited resources, access restrictions, absence of a database, and the size and nature of 
the study precluded such an approach. Many ISA studies have relied on data from one 
of the partner’s perspectives. 
ISAs performance has been measured in past studies by both objective and subjective 
measures (Beamish, 1993). However, previous studies have proved that both measures 
correlate highly (Geringer and Herbert, 1991; Beamish, 1993). The choice of subjective 
data was influenced by the difficulties in obtaining reliable, objective data in Saudi. 
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Furthermore, many studies have employed subjective measures to assess ISA 
performances (Yavaş, et al., 1994; Ainuddin, et al., 2007; Kele, et al., 2002). 
 
7.3.2. Variables 
Dependent Variable: This scale was designed to measure ISA performance from the 
Saudi partner perspectives of overall success, financial performance, and strategic 
contribution of the alliance (see Table 7.1 for more details about the items). Subjective 
measures have been widely used in SA research (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Lane, et 
al., 2001; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1985; Lee and Beamish, 
1995). Geringer and Hebert (1991) have proved that subjective and objective measures 
correlate highly with each other. Respondents were assessed using five-point Likert-
type scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
 
Independent variables: Researchers have used different measurement, secondary and 
primary data, to capture cultural distance between partners. Shenkar (2012) argued that 
cultural distance does not capture many of the real differences that firms face when 
operating off base. Thus, Brouthers (2013: p. 15) argued against the use of secondary 
measures as a “proxy for disparate institutional environmental dimensions” or 
institutional contexts. He argued that secondary measures “results in oversimplification 
and a narrow focus on specific differences”. In this study, we have relied on primary 
data that reflects the managers’ real views on these differences. 









Cronbach   
Factor 1 (Performance satisfaction)  3.89 77.851 77.851 .929 
Our firm is satisfied with the 




    
Our firm is satisfied with the overall 
performance of the collaboration. 
 
.896 
    
This relationship provides our firms 
with many strategic benefits. 
 
.882 
    
The objectives for which the 




    
Our cooperation with this partner has 
contributed to growth in our firm. 
.853     
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EFA was run on the 6 items measuring cultural distance and culture understanding. 
After the initial test, one variable was removed “Language differences are major 
obstacles in communicating and understanding the partner”, due to low communalities. 
After the deletion process, EFA was run again using Kaiser’s criterion SPSS extracted 2 
factors cultural distance (3 items) and cultural understanding (2 items), with a KMO of 
0.648 (see Table 7.2 for more details about the items). Cronbach’ alpha of the 
independent variables ranged from (0.644 to 0.773). The items correlated significantly 
with each other (correlation between .3 and .9). None correlated higher than .9. This 
ruled out any possible multicollinearity in the data. The determinant was (0.180) which 
is greater than the necessary value of 0.00001. This further confirms that variables 
correlate reasonably. Furthermore, VIF was to measure multicollinearity level among 
the independent variables. A high value above 10 suggests the possibility of 
multicollinearity (Hair, et al., 2003: p. 305). The VIFs did not show any evidence of 
multicollinearity, and are well within the recommended cut-off of 10 (1.014-1.265). 
Hence, it is not a problem in the regressions analysis (Park, 2011).  
For hypothesis two and three national culture was measured using single item. The item 
was “How important have the differences in national culture been on the overall 
performance of the alliance'? “. This is a similar item to the one used by Glaister and 
Buckley (1998).  
Table 7.2: Factor- ISA Culture 








Cronbach   
Culture  2.349 46.986 46.986 .855 
Their national culture is quite 
different from ours 
.927     
There is much cultural dissimilarity 
between us and our foreign partner 
.891     
There are significant cultural 
differences between us and our 
foreign partner  
.823     
Culture Understanding   1.659 33.190 80.176 .787 
I find the other firm’s culture 
ambiguous to me (RC) 
.919     
I believe that I understand the other 
firm’s culture 
.888     
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Control Variable: Saxton (1997, p. 450) notes the administrative form of an alliance 
may indicate the motives of the partner companies and have a considerable impact on 
the expected performance outcomes. To control for alliance form, this variable was 
entered as a dummy, coded 1 for equity ISAs and 0 for non-equity ISAs. The industry 
sector of the alliance was also entered as a dummy variable, coded 1 for the 
manufacturing sector and 0 for the tertiary sector. The partner company economic stage 
was entered as dummy as well; it was coded 1 for firms from developed economies and 
0 for firms from developing economies. We also controlled for alliance age which was 
calculated as the difference between the time of data collection and the year of the 
alliance formation (2012). Number of the employees were entered as a control variables 
as an indication of size. 
 
Mediating variables: 
Communication: This scale was designed to measure the efficiency and quality of 
communication between the partners. Respondents were asked to assess to what extent 
they would agree with the following statements about the status of communication 
between their company and its partner:  
(1) There are few difficulties in communicating with our partner;  
(2) Regular contacts are maintained between senior managers of our firm and our 
partner;  
(3) The quality of communication between the parents is extremely good;  
(4) We always keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the 
other firm.  
This was measured using a five point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 ‘‘strongly 
disagree’’ to 5 ‘‘strongly agree’’. EFA was run; however, after the initial test, the 
statement (There are few difficulties in communicating with our partner) was removed 
because of its low factor loading. EFA was run again and produced one factor (Alpha = 
0.747) with KMO of (.656). See table 7.3 for more details.  
Knowledge acquisition: This scale was designed to measure the learned knowledge 
from foreign partners across seven areas: new technological expertise, new marketing 
expertise, product development, process know-how, knowledge about foreign cultures 
and tastes, managerial techniques, and manufacturing processes. Respondents were 
assessed using five point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 (little) to 5 (to great extent). 
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Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was run to produce one learning factor in line with 
previous studies (Geringer, 1988; Glaister, 1996, 1997; Dong and Glaister, 2006). 









Cronbach   
Factor:  Communication  2.006 66.857 66.857 .747 
The quality of communication 




    
We always keep each other informed 
about events or changes that may 
affect the other firm. 
 
.837 
    
Regular contacts are maintained 
between senior managers of our firm 
and our partner. 
.744     
Factor:  Knowledge acquisition   3.395 48.503 48.503 .819 
Managerial technique .732     
Process know-how .713     
Product Development .700     
New technological expertise .696     
Manufacturing processes .695     
New marketing expertise  .684     
Knowledge about foreign cultures 
and taste 
.653     
 
7.3.3. Statistical analysis 
The choice of an appropriate strategy could be derived from the research question and 
objectives (de Vaus, 1990: p.121). The study questions consider the factors that affect 
the performance of ISAs from the Saudi firm’s perspective. Hypothesis 1 was tested 
using parametric two sample t-tests to test the differences in means between the local 
partner and a foreign partner ISA’s performance assessment. For Hypotheses 2, an 
independent sample t-test was used in order to compare the means of ISA performance 
controlled by culture distance. To test Hypothesis 3, Spearman rank-order correlation 
coefficient was used. This was computed using SPSS. This method is supported by 
Geringer and Hebert (1991) and Glaister and Buckley (1998), who argue that this non-
parametric statistic is the most appropriate given the measures used and the sizes of 
samples and sub-samples. We followed Glaister and Buckley (1998) and used Kendall 
tau-B and Pearson correlation coefficients to assess the reliability of the results. The 
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results from the test were consistent with those obtained from Spearman-based analysis 
(see Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix D).  
Hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 examine the causal relationship between the factors which 
influence the performance of the ISA. Multiple regression is one of the most effective 
techniques used to examine the cause-effect relationship between a dependent variable 
and several independent variables (Park, 2011). There are many studies that have used 
multiple regression to look into the relationship between particular factors and ISA 
performance (Sim and Ali, 1998; Child and Yan, 2003; Ng, et al., 2007; Pothukuchi, et 
al., 2002; Zollo, et al., 2002). According to Hair, et al., (1995: p.20): 
multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique that can be used to analyse the 
relationship between a single dependent (criterion) variable and several 
independent (predictor) variables. The objective of multiple regression analysis is to 
use the several independent variables whose values are known to predict the single 
dependent value the researcher wishes to know.  
Data have passed normality and multicollinearity tests. Data have passed normality and 
multicollinearity tests. The VIFs did not show any evidence of multicollinearity, and are 
well within the recommended cut-off of 10 (1.014- 1.265). Hence, it is not a problem in 
the regressions analysis (Park, 2011). 
 
 
7.4. Finding and discussion 
7.4.1. Results 
The results in Table 7.4 show strong support for Hypothesis 1. The subjective 
performance between EJVs and NEAs does not show any significant differences 
between the means. The results are consistent with those of Glaister and Buckley 
(1998). This study has looked further into the extent to which the alliance modes have 
managed to successfully create new opportunities and contribute to the growth of the 
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Table 7.4: T-test (Performance and Form) 
 Group N Mean SD t-value 
From the perspective of your firm, how is the 
performance of the IJV evaluated? 
EIJVs 73 4.08 .968 -.879 
NEIJVs 38 4.24 .675 
From the perspective of your partner, how is the 
performance of the IJV evaluated? 
EIJVs 73 4.10 1.043 -.609 
NEIJVs 38 4.21 .704 
Our firm is satisfied with the financial performance of 
the collaboration.  
EIJVs 73 3.99 .965 1.215 
NEIJVs 38 3.76 .820 
Our partner firm seems to be satisfied with the 
financial performance of the collaboration 
EIJVs 73 3.99 1.007 1.132 
NEIJVs 38 3.76 .943 
Our firm is satisfied with the overall performance of 
the collaboration.  
EIJVs 73 4.00 1.00 1.663* 
NEIJVs 38 3.68 .842 
Our partner firm seems to be satisfied with the overall 
performance of the collaboration 
EIJVs 73 4.04 1.047 .887 
NEIJVs 38 3.87 .811 
To what extent has the IJV created new opportunities 
for your firm? 
EIJVs 73 3.97 1.105 1.362 
NEIJVs 38 3.68 .962 
Our cooperation with this partner has contributed to 
growth in our firm. 
EIJVs 73 3.86 1.018 .802 
NEIJVs 38 3.71 .802 
This relationship provides our firm with many 
strategic benefits. 
EIJVs 73 4.11 1.008 .945 
NEIJVs 38 3.95 .769 
The objectives for which the collaboration was 
established are being met. 
EIJVs 73 3.95 1.039 .664 
NEIJVs 38 3.82 .834 
* P < .1; ** P < .05; *** P < .01  
 
Table 7.5 shows the results for Hypothesis 2. The differences in means are not 
significant for the overall performance measures. It is clear that the perception of the 
importance of national cultural differences does not affect the overall perception of 
performance. However, small differences in the extent to which the ISAs have created 
new opportunities in non-equity alliances are apparent. The perceived cultural 
differences have, to a small degree, helped firms in NEAs to create future business 
opportunities. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
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Table 7.5: T-test (Culture and Performance) 
 How important have the differences in national culture been on the overall performance of the alliance'? 
All Sample Equity IJV Non-equity IJV 
 Groups N Mean SD t-value N Mean SD t-value N Mean SD t-value 
P1 Important 64 4.19 .794 .731 42 4.12 .916 .376 22 4.32 .477 .868
 
Not Important 47 4.06 .987 31 4.03 1.048 16 4.13 .885 
P2 Important 64 4.17 .918 .479 42 4.17 1.010 .672 22 4.18 .733 -.291 
Not Important 47 4.09 .974 31 4.00 1.095 16 4.25 .683 
P3 Important 42 4.33 .928 1.185 42 4.33 .928 1.185 0    
Not Important 31 4.06 .998 31 4.06 .998 0   
P4 Important 67 4.05 .916 1.947
*
 42 4.10 1.008 1.105
 
22 3.95 .722 1.984
*
 
Not Important 47 3.64 1.206 31 3.81 1.223 16 3.31 1.138 
P1: From the perspective of your firm, how is the performance of the IJV evaluated? 
P1: From the perspective of your partner, how is the performance of the IJV evaluated? 
P3: From the perspective of the IJV, how is the performance of the IJV evaluated? 
P4: To what extent has the IJV created new opportunities for your firm? 
* P < .1; ** P < .05; *** P < .01  
Cut off point (3) 
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The results in Table 7.6 show the degree of correlation between partners’ performance 
assessments. It shows that the differences between partners’ ISA performance 
assessments are not far from each other. The assessment between the partners correlates 
slightly more highly when the local partner perceives national cultural differences as not 
important, compared to when they are perceived as important. Thus, the results offer 
weak support for Hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 7.6: Correlation- Performance and cultural Distance 
Subjective performance All
 












The firm is satisfied with the financial 








The firm is satisfied with the overall 








* P < .1; ** P < .05; *** P < .01  
 
Regression Model Two (in Table 7.7) shows a significant relationship between 
performance satisfaction and the two independent variables, cultural distance and 
cultural understanding. It shows positive and significant relationships with both of them, 
with coefficients of 0.215 (P < .05) for cultural distance, and 0.300 (P < .01) for cultural 
understanding. The model has significant F value (P < .01), and it has an explanatory 
power of (R2) of 22.5 %. Thus, the results offer strong support to Hypotheses 4 and 7.   
The control variable ISA age shows a significant and positive, albeit small, relationship 
with performance satisfaction, with a coefficient of 0.015 (P < .1). Other control 
variables do not show any significant relationship with performance. 
 















 .074  
Form .192 .194  
Industry -.073 -.166 .155 
Partner economic status .222 .196  





 Culture understanding  .300
***
  





 .078 .225 .143 





* P < .1; ** P < .05; *** P < .01  
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Figure7.2: Interactions- Industry X Culture Distance 
 
The result of the interaction effect in Table7.7 (Model 3) is showing a significant result. 
The interaction between cultural distance X industry (0 if tertiary) is showing a positive 
and significant relationship with performance, with a coefficient of 0.618 (P < 0.01). 
The result means that the cultural distance significantly enhances manufacturing 
alliances’ performances (see figure 7.1). On the other hand, tertiary alliances seem to 
react negatively the higher the cultural distance. The result gives support to Hypothesis 
6. 






 change Beta 
Analysis one: 
Culture distance on Performance  




Culture distance on Knowledge acquisition 
.367 .135  .367
*** 
Analysis three:     
Step 1: Knowledge acquisition Performance  .275 .075  .231
**
 
Step 2: Culture distance Performance .296 .088 .012 .120 
Note: *= P< .1, **= P <.05, ***= P <.01 
To test Hypothesis 5, multiple regression analyses were conducted (see Table 7.8) to 
assess each component of the proposed mediation model. First, it was found that 
cultural distance was positively associated with performance satisfaction 0.242 (P < 
.05). It was also found that cultural distance was positively related to knowledge 
acquisition 0.367 (P < .01). Lastly, results indicated that the mediator, knowledge 
acquisition, was positively associated with performance 0.275 (P < .01). Because both 
the a-path and b-path were significant, mediation analyses were tested using the 
bootstrapping method with bias-corrected confidence estimates (MacKinnon, et al., 
2004; Preacher and Hayes, 2004). In the present study, the 95% confidence interval of 
Tertiary 
Manufacture 
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the indirect effects was obtained with 1000 bootstrap resamples (Preacher and Hayes, 
2008). Results of the mediation analysis confirmed the mediating role of knowledge 
acquisition in the relationship between cultural distance and performance (B = .085; CI 
= .016 to .199). In addition, results indicated that the direct effect of cultural distance on 
performance became non-significant 0.120 (P > .1) when controlling for knowledge 
acquisition, thus suggesting full mediation. The Sobel test shows that the indirect effect 
of culture distance on performance through knowledge acquisition is significant (p < 
.05). The result gives strong support to Hypothesis 5.  
 
 
             ______________________________________________________________ 
 
   




To test Hypothesis 8, the same procedure was followed as for Hypothesis 5 (see Table 
7.9). First, it was found that cultural understanding was positively associated with 
performance 0.282 (P < .01). It was also found that cultural understanding was 
positively related to level of communication 0.467 (P < .01). Lastly, results indicated 
that the mediator, level of communication, was positively associated with performance 
0.506 (P < .01). Because both the a-path and b-path were significant, mediation analyses 
were tested using the bootstrapping method with bias-corrected confidence estimates 
(MacKinnon, et al., 2004; Preacher and Hayes, 2004). In the present study, the 95% 
confidence interval of the indirect effects was obtained with 1000 bootstrap resamples 
(Preacher and Hayes, 2008). Results of the mediation analysis confirmed the mediating 
role of knowledge acquisition in the relationship between cultural understanding and 






Acquisition  .275***  .367
***
 
 .120 (.231**) 





Figure 7.3: The indirect effect of Cultural distance on performance 
through Knowledge acquisition.  
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Table 7.9: Multiple Regressions–Mediations Culture Understanding, Performance, 





 change Beta 
Analysis one: 
Culture understanding on Performance  




Culture understanding Level of communication 
.467 .219  .467
*** 
Analysis three:     
Step 1: level of communication on Performance .506 .256  .479
***
 
Step 2: Culture understanding on Performance .509 .259 .003 .058 
Note: *= P< .1, **= P <.05, ***= P <.01 
In addition, results indicated that the direct effect of cultural understanding on 
performance became non-significant 0.058 (P > .1) when controlling for level of 
communication, thus suggesting full mediation. The Sobel test shows that the indirect 
effect of culture understanding on performance through level of communication is 
significant (p < .01). The result gives strong support to Hypothesis 8. 
 
 
             ______________________________________________________________ 
 
   





The study first considered the relationship between alliance modes and subjective 
alliance performance. It then looked into how cultural distances affect alliance 
performance. We compared alliance performance perceptions between partners who 
perceived cultural distance as important or not important. The first two hypotheses were 
derived from the work of Glaister and Buckley (1998). It should be noted though, that 
this study has a different research context. Glaister and Buckley (1998) used UK data, 





communication  .506***  .467
***
 
 .058 (.79***) 





Figure 7.4: The indirect effect of Cultural understanding on 
performance through level of communication.  
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Saudi Arabian perspectives. Thus, the conclusion of this study will build upon existing 
findings and help to build understanding within the alliance performance literature. 
Adding this different perspective to the literature will increase depth of knowledge.  
The study attempted to better understand and explain the role of cultural distance, 
especially in the Saudi context. The Saudi business environment is dominated by 
speculations and stereotypes rather than hard facts, although stereotypes are usually 
based on similar experiences within a similar culture and context or within the same 
country. However, for a country that is part of the G20, a rigorous empirical study is 
needed to know how international partnerships work in Saudi Arabia. The context is 
interesting because it is different from many developing countries, and some may say 
unique. 
The first hypothesis looked into the differences in means between the different alliance 
modes. The results were not significant, which in some ways was not surprising. They 
confirmed the findings of Glaister and Buckley (1998), who also found no significant 
differences. Firms enter alliances with goals in their minds, and usually will choose the 
best mode that serves their interest. Furthermore, to understand the differences better, 
we analysed the data and looked at how the differences in modes varied across 
industries (see Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix D). The results were consistent, and no 
differences between means were significant. Thus, we can comfortably generalize the 
findings across industries.   
The second hypothesis states that performance assessment of the local partner is not 
affected by cultural distance. The results showed that whether cultural distance is felt to 
be important or not has no effect on performance, as both are enjoying relatively high 
performing alliances. Table 7.5 shows that alliances where cultural distance is perceived 
to be important have relatively higher means, though not significantly so. This is in 
contrast to what was expected, and in line with Glaister and Buckley’s (1998) findings. 
The results show that even across alliance modes the performance evaluation is 
consistent with the whole sample. This shows that cultural distance did not affect the 
performance evaluation.  
Limited support is shown for the third hypothesis. A partner whose cultural distance is 
not important will most likely have similar performance assessments. However, the 
differences were not high, and they were very close to each other. It was expected that 
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cultural similarities would mean compatibility of goals, while partners from culturally 
distant countries might have different goals. Differences mean that despite the different 
goals there is understanding of foreign partners’ goals and mutual satisfaction. Ali 
(2009: p. 172) has touched on this issue slightly, raising points that might justify these 
results. He argued that Arabs in general look for a win-win situation “where 
compromise and parity are enhanced”. This means that Saudis may be aware of their 
foreign partners’ goals, and do their best so they can reach their goals. 
 
The Saudi culture is different, with huge influences from Islamic and Bedouin 
traditions, which are reflected in how business is conducted and managed in this 
country. However, it is these particular differences which make the relationship between 
cultural distance and performance different and enriching. The need to access a new, 
lucrative market and the need to access certain competencies and learn new skills have 
created a favourable partnership. This study has considered the role of cultural distance 
in alliance performance. A positive relationship was expected because of the learning 
effect of cultural distance, which has been supported in the literature. Knowledge 
acquisition has mediated the relationship between culture and performance. Learning is 
instrumental to Saudi firms, their fast-growing economy, and huge government 
spending on infrastructure projects have pushed Saudi firms to seek partners who 
possess skills and technology they lack. This has provided an opportunity to foreign 
firms looking to enter the Saudi market. Glaister and Buckley (1999) have 
acknowledged the benefits of choosing a partner with a dissimilar culture in order to 
learn, and “thus expand the capabilities of the organisation then this may be a source of 
strength to the alliance”.  
Culture similarities have been argued in some part of the literature as a main factor for 
alliance success (Murray and Kotabe, 2005). Moreover, differences for many 
researchers can be a cause for a failure (Lyles and Salk, 1996; Killing, 1983; Beamish 
1985; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). Sambasivan and Yen (2010) argued that the success 
spur form the fact that similarities build transparency, mutual respect, and trust. They 
argued that successful alliances between culturally distance partners are difficult to 
achieve. However, the findings of this study prove that culture distance has, through 
learning, a positive impact on the alliance performance. Sirmon and Lane (2004) have 
noted that cultural differences may have an indirect positive effect; they may alert 
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managers and prompt careful planning and communication to overcome any difficulties, 
which in return will have a positive impact on performance. 
The study has explored the role of cultural understanding in performance, which is 
essential for the success of alliances. The absence of cultural understanding may hinder 
the benefits of cultural distance; a stance shared by Glaister and Buckley (1999), who 
linked the benefits of cultural distance with the condition that partners “recognise and 
appreciate the differences in culture”. The findings have empirically confirmed the 
importance of cultural understanding. In our view, the importance of cultural distance 
lies in its role in establishing a healthy communication between alliance partners, which 
is essential to alliance success; which has been confirmed in this study as well.  
Saudis influenced by the Western quest for oil might have shaped in part the Saudi 
management and business culture through the presence of big oil companies (Hickson 
and Pugh, 1995). The presence of large Western oil companies accompanied the 
building of the country. Some Saudi firms were started by former employees of these 
large oil companies, or have to adhere to the standards set by these companies. Thus, 
these firms became familiar with the culture of multinationals and their business 
structures, despite the wide national culture. This explanation might be true for firms in 
oil, and petrochemical supporting industries, especially the firms located in the eastern 
region. However, it cannot be generalized to all firms in Saudi. This might explain the 
understanding of large multinationals and Saudi firms of each other’s national culture.  
Teitelbaum (2002) has noted that the introduction of the internet, satellites, and ease of 
travel have opened a window for Saudis to the outside world. This, along with other 
reasons, might have raised understanding, but we cannot be certain as there is no 
comparative study to measure the differences between the past and the present. Ali 
(2009) has pointed out that Arabs are fascinated by Western culture, especially 
American culture, and thus tend to be more receptive to their messages. The results 
challenge Alnatheer and Nelson (2009) who have claimed that cultural differences in 
the Saudi context will hinder technology transfer. They also contradict the claims of 
Hill, et al. (2000), who have argued that Saudis (apart from the few educated abroad) 
lack understanding of Western culture, which has hindered the assimilation of Western 
technology. 
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Brown, et al. (1989) and Lane and Beamish (1990) have reached a conclusion that 
compatibility of organizational culture is more important than similarity of national 
culture. Sirmon and Lane (2004) have noted that cultural differences may have an 
indirect positive effect; they may alert managers and prompt careful planning and 
communication to overcome any difficulties, which in return will have a positive impact 
on performance. 
The study has helped to explain to some extent the relationship between culture and 
performance, which has been puzzling. There were many contradicting findings where 
culture effects swing between positive, negative, or no effect. The findings here may 
allow the argument that with the existence of learning intent, cultural distance can prove 
to be beneficial. Nevertheless, it is difficult to generalize the findings across all 
alliances. This argument should be tested in relation to competing firms, or in cases 
where both partners are from developed economies, where the risks of losing certain 
competencies outweigh gains.  
 
7.5. Conclusion 
This study has presented interesting findings that will add to the existing rich strategic 
alliance literature. National cultural distance has been the centre of much debate among 
researchers, with conflicting results. The findings of this study have proved the positive 
effects of cultural distance through facilitating learning. It has also shed light on the 
sensitivity of cultural understanding and its effects on performance and communication 
between partners. The Saudi context is an ideal context for this study. A country with a 
culture deeply rooted in its heritage and religion, whilst also developing, has an 
international appeal and mystery.  
The results of this study pave the way for future studies to better understand the 
relationship established in this study; in particular, the nature of knowledge acquired 
and its relationship to cultural distance. Future studies could look into partner 
motivation and how it has shaped the culture/performance relationship. Furthermore, it 
would be ideal to look into the perspectives of foreign partners operating in Saudi 
Arabia. Longitudinal studies will provide deeper understanding of alliance performance, 
and how cross relations evolves.  
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Chapter Eight: Summary and Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
This thesis has begun by examining theoretical perspectives on ISA formation. It has 
also reviewed the classic literature on culture, learning, and performance in ISAs. 
Considering the uniqueness of the context and the fact that some of the hypotheses are 
context-related, an overview of Saudi Arabia has been included as a part of the literature 
review. Following this, a detailed presentation of the study’s methodology is followed 
by analysis of the study data, divided on four empirical chapters. The main aim of this 
chapter is to re-present the study and summarize the findings, and to discuss the 
managerial implications of the findings. Finally, the chapter will conclude by 
acknowledging the study’s limitations, and making suggestions for future research 
areas. 
 
8.2. Background and Aims of the Study 
The lack of any empirically supported assumptions regarding the nature of ISAs in 
Saudi Arabia provided the main motivation to conduct this study. Furthermore, there is 
a need to better understand strategic motives and partner selection criteria, knowledge 
acquisition success factors and impediments, and how culture can positively or 
negatively influence ISA performance.  
The thesis has two main aims. The first is to identify Saudi firms’ motivations and 
selection criteria. The second is to understand the factors affecting the performance of 
ISAs. The study aims were to answer the following questions: 
 Question 1: What are the main motivations for engaging in ISAs in Saudi 
Arabia? (Chapter 4) 
 Question 2: On what basis do firms select their partners? How far are their 
decisions influenced by their motivations? (Chapter 4) 
 Question 3: What are the factors affecting learning within ISAs? (Chapter 5) 
 Question 4: How far do cultural factors affect the performance of ISAs? 
(Chapter 6 and 7) 
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The findings of this study are a stepping-stone towards comprehensive understanding of 
the success factors of ISAs. The study contributes to fill the gap left by the lack of the 
research on the Middle East. The study has proved that particular assumptions relating 
to developing economies’ motivations and partner selection criteria are not universal. 
Socio-political factors play an important role in shaping firms’ strategies. The study has 
provided empirically backed assumptions on the nature of the relationship between 
performance, trust and culture. 
 
8.3. Research Methods of the Study 
The main aim of the methodology is to adopt the most appropriate methods to answer 
the study’s research questions. Despite the global interest in investing in the Saudi 
market, there is an absence of academic studies relating to ISAs in the Saudi context. 
The country has received little management research attention, even in comparison with 
other Middle Eastern countries (Dedoussis, 2004; Noer, et al., 2007; Alnatheer and 
Nelson, 2009). This has resulted in a shortage of data concerning many business and 
management areas (Alnatheer and Nelson, 2009; Al-Yahya, 2009; Al-ajmi, 2003; Al-
Khatib et al., 2004), including studies on organizational performance and the effects of 
culture on business in Saudi Arabia (Idris, 2007). The key dimensions of the study 
could not, therefore, be obtained from any publicly available database. These limitations 
meant that the researcher had to contact the Saudi firms directly to obtain the necessary 
level of detail needed. The goal was to generate data from as large a sample as possible. 
Taking into account time and cost constraints, questionnaire survey was the ideal tool 
with which to achieve the study’s goals.  
The development of the questionnaire was guided by the literature review, consultation 
with experts, and a pilot test. Furthermore, to confirm the accuracy of the translation, 
the questionnaire went through a process of back-translation. The items used in the 
study were adopted from measures previously tested within existing literature. These 
were then tested in new contexts. It is common to use methods from established 
previous studies as criterion for choosing data collection methods. The survey was 
conducted by a self-administered instrument, delivered via the internet to the target 
sample. The target group was internet, and email dependent when conducting business 
(Idris, 2007). 
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The study was based on a statistical quantitative survey, which tested the developed 
hypotheses. It took a cross-sectional approach, with minimal interference. The 
questionnaires on ISA performance were collected directly from those involved. The 
survey was carried out in Saudi Arabia between January and May 2012.  
Given the nature of the information being sought, the sample units (which included 
CEOs, VPs, GMs, and PMs) could be expected to have had first-hand experience in 
managing or negotiating ISAs in Saudi Arabia. No data were available regarding the 
precise size of the survey population; the estimated number of units varied considerably 
between government agencies and other publications. Empirical studies have always 
faced a number of limitations and challenges, especially in emerging markets and in 
Saudi in particular (Robertson, et al., 2013). In order to overcome this limitation, the 
study’s sample was built using “The literature counting method”.  
There is a general lack of interest and unresponsiveness in Saudi towards participation 
in questionnaires and research-related activity. Thus, to increase the response rate we 
employed more than one method for collecting survey data. In addition, respondents 
were guaranteed anonymity, and were promised a summary report of the study’s 
findings if requested. No systematic non-response bias was found.  
 
8.4. Summary of the Findings 
A summary of the hypotheses developed for this study can be found in Table 8.1, which 
also includes the level of support found for those hypotheses, and the type of statistical 
analysis used to test the hypotheses.  
The study began by examining the strategic motivations for ISA formation, as well as 
partner selection criteria. It then examined the factors that influence knowledge 
acquisition. Finally, it analysed how trust and culture distance affect ISA performance. 
The study analysis is based on a sample of 134 ISAs in Saudi Arabia. The data were 
obtained from the Saudi partner. The main empirical findings of the study are 
summarized following the chapter order. 
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Table 8.1: Summary of Hypotheses 




Chapter 4: Strategic Motives of ISAs: Saudi Firms’ Perspective 
H1. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the 
importance of the strategic motives for ISA formation in 
Saudi Arabia will differ significantly between Saudi 
partners and foreign partners. 
Supported Two Sample t-
test 
H1b. From the perspective of Saudi partners, foreign 
firms’ main motives would be market access and partner 





H1c. From the perspective of Saudi partners, local Saudi 






H2a. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the Saudi 
firms’ task-related selection criteria will be determined by 
the strategic motives for ISA formation. 
Supported Factor Analysis; 
Multiple 
regression 
H2b. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the Saudi 
firms’ partner-related selection criteria will be determined 
by the strategic motives for ISA formation. 
Supported Factor Analysis; 
Multiple 
regression 
H3. From the perspective of Saudi partners, the Saudi 
firms’ task-related selection criteria will be determined 
more strongly by the strategic motives for ISA formation 
than will the Saudi firms’ partner-related selection 
criteria. 




Chapter 5: The Determinants for Knowledge Acquisition in ISAs 
H1. From the perspective of Saudi ISA partners, 
knowledge acquisition is negatively related to the extent to 
which the knowledge of the foreign partners is tacit 






H2. From the perspective of Saudi ISA partners, 
knowledge acquisition will be higher in the Saudi firms 
with greater number of foreign expatriates compared to 
those with smaller number of foreign expatriates. 
Not 
Supported 
H3. From the perspective of Saudi ISA partners, 
knowledge acquisition is positively related to the level of 
communication between the Saudi firms and the foreign 
partners. 
Supported 
H4. From the perspective of the Saudi ISA partners, 
knowledge acquisition is positively related to the level of 
personal trust between the top managers of the Saudi 




Chapter 6: Trust on ISAs 
H1. From the perspective of Saudi firms, personal trust is 
positively related to ISA performance. 




H2. From the perspective of Saudi firms, distrust is 
negatively related to ISA performance. 
Supported 
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H3. From the perspective of Saudi firms, the negative 
relation between distrust and ISA performance will be 





H4. From the perspective of Saudi firms, competence trust 
is positively related to ISA performance. 
Supported 
H5. From the perspective of Saudi firms, the positive 
effect of competence trust on ISA performance is 
moderated by distrust. 
Supported 
H6. From the perspective of Saudi firms, level of 
communication mediates the relationship between 
personal trust and ISA performance. 
Supported 
H7. From the perspective of Saudi firms, the positive 
effect of the perceived level of communication on ISA 
performance is more apparent in equity alliances. 
Supported 
 
Chapter 7:National Culture Differences and ISAs Performance 
H1. From the perspective of Saudi firms, the mean 
measure of subjective performance will not vary between 





H2. The mean measure of overall satisfaction obtained 
from subjective measures of performance will be higher in 
those alliances where the perception and effect of national 
cultural differences are not important to the Saudi 






H3. From the perspective of the Saudi partner, correlation 
between partners' assessments of ISA performance will be 
stronger in ISAs involving parents with the perception of 






H4. From the perspective of the Saudi partner, perceived 





H5. From the perspective of Saudi firms, the relation 





H6. From the perspective of the Saudi partner, perceived 
cultural distance relation to alliance performance will be 




H7. From the perspective of the Saudi partner, cultural 





H8. From the perspective of Saudi firms, the relation 
between cultural understanding and performance is 
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8.4.1. Strategic Motives of ISAs: Saudi Firms’ Perspective 
This chapter examines strategic motivations for ISA formation, as well as partner 
selection criteria. The highest ranked-strategic motives of Saudi firms are to enable 
diversification of products or services, to establish a presence in the market, and to 
enable faster entry to the market. On the other hand, the major strategic motives for 
alliance formation of the foreign firms are characterised by market entry and 
establishing business successfully. The relative importance of strategic motives for ISA 
formation is found to vary a little between Saudi firms and foreign firms.  
The study also examines aspects of partner selection criteria for ISA formation from the 
perspective of Saudi partners. The study’s findings show that the task-related selection 
criteria are determined slightly more by the strategic motives for ISA formation than are 
the partner-related selection criteria. This confirms that task-related selection criteria 
tend to be specific to the alliance, whereas partner-related selection criteria are more 
general in nature. However, the slight differences are an indication of the importance of 
the nature of the partner from the perspective of the Saudi firm. The chapter answers the 
first and second research questions “What are the main motivations for engaging in 
ISAs in Saudi Arabia?” and “On what basis do firms select their partners? How far are 
their decisions influenced by their motivations? “.  
 
8.4.2. The Determinants for Knowledge Acquisition in ISAs 
The fifth chapter aimed to answer the third research question “What are the factors 
affecting learning within ISAs?” It examined the determinants of knowledge acquisition 
in ISAs. It looks into the impact of the following factors: knowledge tacitness, the role 
of expatriates, communication, and trust in knowledge acquisition. 
The results illustrated that knowledge tacitness negatively affects knowledge transfer. 
The result is consistent with the literature findings. The study offers an extension to the 
hypothesis and tests it in a different institutional context. The nature of the tacit 
knowledge makes it difficult for Saudis to transfer it successfully. This is due to their 
nature of their institutions and their lack of skills in comparing themselves with their 
partner firms.  
The second factor, which shows a significant relationship with knowledge acquisition, 
is the level of communication. It is a factor that, generally, has been mainly treated as a 
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control or passive factor in the strategic alliance literature. However, we argue that, in a 
high context culture, it has great importance and impact. The results are important, 
because it proves the positive weight of the satisfactory level of communications 
between partners in the ISA.  
The third factor is trust. Trust is of high importance in Saudi society; it extends to 
business dealings. The results in the first chapter have illustrated that trust can influence 
the partner selection criteria. Hence, we expect trust between partners to be influential 
in effectively acquiring knowledge. The results, although the hypothesis was rejected, 
are of high importance in better understanding the role of trust in ISAs, especially in 
terms of knowledge acquisition. It shows that trust, although important in the selection 
of the partner and overall performance, cannot affect the rate of knowledge transfer. It 
adds to the ISA trust literature and contributes to our understanding of where and when 
trust can be the most influential. 
The fourth is how expatriates are affecting the knowledge transfer rate. In Saudi Arabia, 
the number of expatriates is huge in the private sector; they are the dominant force. 
Despite the fact that the Saudi markets attract foreign workers all over the world with its 
opportunity and economic growth, Saudi Arabia is facing local unemployment issues. 
Among the many reasons for this is the Saudi preferences and trust in foreign workers 
who are considered superior and better skilled than their Saudi counterparts. However, 
there are no empirical studies that have assessed the expatriates in Saudi Arabia (a 
situation shared by other gulf states) and how they affect ISAs in Saudi Arabia.  
The results have illustrated that the number of expatriates has no effect on knowledge 
transfer, despite their expertise, skills, training, and cultural understanding. As in trust, 
although the hypothesis was rejected, the results will be of huge importance. The effect 
of expatriates was taken for granted by firms and policy-makers. However, it shows that 
the mere presence of a skilled and experienced workforce is not enough to achieve the 
goals of acquiring knowledge. The results could encourage further research on the role 
of expatriates in transferring knowledge, including what the factors are that might boost 
or hinder their contribution. In the discussion section of Chapter 5 (Section 5.4), we 
attempted to explain the results from the literature; however, future empirical studies are 
encouraged. 
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8.4.3. Trust in ISAs 
This chapter has distinguished personal trust, which individuals hold for each other, 
from organizational trust. It has also identified the effect that trust (or distrust) between 
top executives has on the partner firm's abilities. This chapter examines the effects of 
trust dimensions (trust, distrust, and competence trust) on the performance of ISAs 
within the Saudi context. The results show that personal and competence trust both 
correlate positively with performance, while distrust has a negative relationship. 
Personal trust has proved to be the most influential among the other kinds of trust in this 
study. It also shows that competence trust is moderated by distrust. However, distrust, 
when moderated with industry predictability, did (surprisingly) show a positive 
relationship with performance. In chapter 6, discussion section, we have explained the 
results in details. Communication was found to mediate the relationship between 
personal trust and performance, which reflects positively on ISA performance. The 
positive influence of communication on ISAs is found to be more apparent in equity 
alliances. The chapter partially answers the research question 4 “How far do cultural 
factors affect the performance of ISAs?” 
 
8.4.4. National Cultural Differences and ISA Performance 
This chapter and analysis presents interesting findings which add to the existing rich 
ISA literature.  
Chapter 7 looks into the factors that affect ISA performance with focus into cultural 
distance. Cultural distance has been researched extensively in the literature; however, 
the conflicting results and findings have made it difficult to have conclusive evidence 
on the cultural distance effects on ISA performance.  
The conflicting results in the literature have created a gap in better understanding when 
and where cultural distance has a negative, positive, or no effect on ISA performance. 
This has created a gap that we have attempted to bridge. 
Malik and Zaho (2013) illustrated a correlation between cultural distance and learning. 
The knowledge transferred and the learning in ISA enhances alliance performance (Pak, 
et al, 2014). Since Saudi are motivated by combining resources and foreign knowledge, 
knowledge acquisition forms a big part behind the creation of the ISA. Thus, we expect 
that cultural distance will have a positive effect on ISA performance through its positive 
influence on knowledge transfer. 
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The data analysis shows that cultural distance has a positive impact on ISA 
performance, contrary to the general assumption of a negative effect. Cultural distance 
has a positive effect on learning, and thus, on performance.  
We expect that the alliance industry will moderate the relationship between cultural 
distance and performance. The results have supported the hypothesis, with 
manufacturing alliances reaping most of the benefits. This result further contributes to 
our understanding as to where and when cultural distance can influence ISA 
performance. 
Understanding of a partner’s culture shows a positive association with ISA 
performance. It also explains the relationship between cultural understanding, 
communication, and performance. It shows that communication mediates the 
relationship between culture, understanding and performance. 
  
8.5. Contributions of the Study 
By tapping into the Saudi sphere, the study has made a valuable contribution to the 
literature. In international business research, context is highly significant, due to the 
different macro and micro factors present. The Middle East in general and the GCC in 
particular are lacking empirical research, despite the increasing investment interest 
across the world. Inflow FDI to the GCC increased by over 3800% between 2002 and 
2008 alone (Toone, 2012), although in the wake of the global financial crisis the FDI 
inflow has recently plummeted. The importance of developing world economies is 
increasing; according to UNCADT (2013), for the first time in history, developing 
economies absorbed more FDI than developed countries.  
It is therefore important to test existing established theories against the empirical 
evidence from developing countries, which are surrounded by factors different from the 
conventional developed economies. As we have stated earlier in the first chapter, the 
local context is of extreme importance in international business research. MacDuffie 
(2011) argues that it is best to provide country-specific as well as general hypotheses 
where the data allows for testing both types. 
This thesis faced many obstacles in terms of collecting the necessary data to conduct 
this study. There were no databases available to withdraw data from. Hence, I had to 
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build a database from scratch. To accomplish this, I followed “the literature counting 
method”.  
Thus, by explaining the difficulties I experienced, I believe that I will help people that 
conduct future studies on Saudi Arabia to avoid some of the associated difficulties that I 
faced. The suggestions for future studies can also be of great help for future researchers 
interested in doing their studies on Saudi Arabia and in the context of the ISA.  
The study contributed substantially to scholars and practitioners interested in ISA 
performance antidotes in developing economies, and Saudi Arabia, in particular. The 
difficulty was the lack of research concerning this area; this means that data was rare. 
Despite that, in this study, we managed to achieve the research objectives. 
Many theories, studies, and approaches have attempted to explain the rationales for 
ISAs formations. There is no grand theory that explains all the different motives for 
engaging in international alliances. Hence, this study, to avoid pluralism, has adopted 
multiple theoretical frameworks. The study attempts not to develop a new theory of 
ISAs, but to examine existing perspectives in different settings. The existing theories 
are based on Western developed economies; this study provides an interesting test as 
Saudi Arabia is a unique, and single-crop economy, it is vast and growing. It is a 
developing economy, yet very wealthy. The motivation of Saudi firms is not explained 
by transaction cost theory. Rather, the resource-based view and organizational learning 
provide better explanations for the motivations of Saudi firms.  
The findings of chapter 4 contribute to the strategic alliance motivation and partner 
selection criteria literature in several ways. First, the empirical results contribute to 
better our understanding of firms’ strategic motivations, differentiating between the 
different developing economies, taking into account key institutional differences. Thus, 
the results help us to better understand the similarities and differences among the firms 
from developing economies. It also identified the foreign firms’ motivations, when 
partnering with Saudi firms.  
The study differentiates between developing countries and argues that the motives of 
ISA formation are context dependent. The study has argued that emerging markets 
firms’ motivations and selection criteria differ. This adds to the existing literature by 
breaking the cluster into different groups according to their institution and economic 
state. The results will further enrich the existing literature with important details. 
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Furthermore, the results from this study uncover information about Saudi firms and 
their motivations.  
The Middle East is a largely neglected area in term of business and management 
research studies, although in the past decade, it witnessed a great influx of western 
investment. The Middle East was largely treated as one entity in the literature; this 
research will encourage future studies in the GCC area. Theoretically, the study has 
given empirical support to the Hitt, et al. (2000, 2004) studies by proving that 
institutional factors affect the partner selection criteria. 
The results of the study have highlighted the role of trust and reputation in alliance 
formation decisions. Recently, Stern, et al, (2014) called other scholars to incorporate 
reputation and status in any model examining alliance formation. This study illustrates 
how important reputation is for Saudi firms when selecting their foreign partners. 
Stern et al. (2014) investigated how reputation and the status of firms’ founders can 
influence firms’ decisions to form an ISA with emerging firms. Their results indicate 
that a negative reputation and status have stronger effects than positive signals. 
Although their study context is in technology-driven industries, along with the results 
from this study, it shows the weight of reputation in the strategic selection criteria.  
This study also illustrated how important trust is for alliance formation, especially in the 
Saudi context. Although partner selection criteria are generally less important than task 
selection criteria, in this context, trust is showing a strong association with the ISA 
selection criteria. 
Learning and knowledge transfer are one of the main motivations for firms to engage in 
SAs. The results from chapter 5 offer an insight to some of the factors that can 
contribute to positive outcomes. Although, the study does not offer a complete test of all 
complex factors that affect knowledge acquisitions, it does provide an important 
contribution to understanding the factors that contribute to better understanding. The 
findings lay foundations and provide direction for future studies to consider in detail 
how Saudi firms can maximize their learning. The failure (over many decades) of Saudi 
firms to break away from complete dependence on foreign knowledge and expertise 
make the findings more instrumental.  
This study has examined the effects of knowledge tacitness, numbers of expatriates, 
levels of communication, and personal trust on knowledge acquisitions. The argument 
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relating to knowledge tacitness is straightforward: we expected that the weak Saudi 
knowledge base would mean that they were affected by this factor. The number of 
expatriate workers is very high in the Saudi private sector; the reason for this is their 
superiority in terms of skills and expertise in comparison to local workers. The role of 
expatriates in firms has been neglected, and the study contributes to awareness of how 
numbers of expatriates can affect knowledge acquisitions. The role of expatriates in 
firms has been neglected; hence, the study contributes to the awareness of how numbers 
of expatriates can affect knowledge acquisition. Although expatriates had no effect on 
knowledge acquisition in ISAs, the possible reasons could be valuable for Saudi in 
understanding their failure at reaping the benefits. The lack of intrinsic motivation, 
uncertainty, sense of belongings, and strong in-group culture all might be possible 
explanations of why expatriates, despite their technical skills and competence, are not 
significant factors in knowledge acquisition.   
The study also contributes to understanding of how personal trust affects ISAs through 
knowledge acquisitions, which despite its weight on ISA has not effect on the success of 
knowledge acquisition. Trust can facilitate the transfer, but it does not help assimilating 
the knowledge, which requires a different set of competencies. The role of 
communication in SAs is minimized in the literature. It is expected that communication 
is an influential factor in determining the success of knowledge acquisition in ISAs, and 
the findings therefore proved to be valuable contributions towards understanding of 
what can affect knowledge acquisitions between partners.  
Alliance performance has received relatively little attention in the literature. This is due 
to many obstacles facing researchers when they attempt to measure performance. The 
study’s main contribution is towards understanding of the factors that affects ISA 
performance.  
The study in chapter 6 has examined the effects of trust on performance. Existing 
literature is full of contradicting and mixed results on trust, and has failed to establish 
direct or clear links between trust and performance. There is therefore a lack of 
empirical evidence on trust. The study has responded to calls from researchers for an in-
depth study on trust. By breaking the concept of trust into different dimensions 
(personal trust, distrust, and competence trust) and testing them, the study has made a 
valuable contribution to the existing literature. Conceptually, the study has 
distinguished between trust dimensions; trust in previous studies has been treated as a 
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single construct. Dividing trust into different dimensions provides us with better 
understanding of how and when trust affects performance. Second, it also showed, 
through the use of mediating and moderating factors, how and where trust could 
influence ISA performance. Empirically the results showed that the trust dimensions are 
one of the main determinants of ISA performance.  
This study has distinguished the personal trust that individuals hold for each other from 
organizational trust. It has also identified the effect that trust (or distrust) between top 
executives has on the partner firm's abilities. Personal trust has proved to be the most 
influential of all kinds of trust. Previous studies have discussed the influence of personal 
trust, though the results were not conclusive. Some studies have claimed that inter-
partner trust is less influential than inter-firm trust (Ng, et al., 2007). Their rationale is 
that key personnel face changes, which makes interpersonal trust exposed to change and 
fluctuation (Ng, et al., 2007). However, this might not apply to Saudi firms, where the 
owners usually run the business. The different findings can be attributed to the different 
contexts. In the Saudi context, in particular considering the culture, the results are 
logical and very relevant. Generally, it is assumed that collectivist societies have high 
trust, and individualist societies have low trust. The rationale is that collectivist societies 
have a shared worldview, and relationships are of high importance within them 
compared to within individualists societies (Triandis, 1989, 1995; Chen, et al., 1998; 
Hofstede, 1980a, 1980b; Huff and Kelley, 2003). 
The study contributes to the literature by understanding the relation between trust and 
environmental uncertainty. It shows how sensitive alliance performance is to the 
environmental uncertainty, and the fact that distrust can actually mitigate the negative 
performance is an important findings. It is clear that industry unpredictability is 
moderating the effect of distrust in this case. Krishnan, et al., (2006) have considered 
trust limitation, which may explain the result. 
This limits the alliance partners’ alertness, and thus their ability to respond to 
environmental uncertainty appropriately (Krishnan, et al., 2006). These environmental 
changes will affect the alliance’s performance if not acted upon (Kogut, 1989).  
The investigation of alliance performance has continued in chapter 7 to explore the 
effects of national culture. National cultural distance has been the centre of much debate 
among researchers, with conflicting results. Further, the perspective of developed 
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Western countries has dominated the literature. The study has contributed to our 
understanding of how cultural distance affects performance in developing economies. 
The study has provided the context of when and how it makes a difference. 
Conceptually and empirically, the study has made a valuable contribution to 
understanding the role of culture on ISAs.  
We argued that cultural distance would have a positive effect on ISA performance 
through its positive influence on knowledge transfer. The knowledge transferred and the 
learning in ISA enhances alliance performance (Pak, et al, 2014). It also affects the 
knowledge acquisition process in ISA. Vasudeva (2013) argued that firms’ institutional 
contexts are decisive on knowledge acquisition outcomes in an ISA. Countries vary 
regarding their knowledge acquisition approach and intentions. 
The results have supported the first and second hypothesis in chapter 7, which can be a 
good contribution to the body of knowledge towards better understanding the cultural 
distance enigma. The conflicting results in the literature have created a gap in the 
understanding of when and where cultural distance has a negative, positive, or no effect 
on ISA performance. 
The findings in this study establish the causal relationship between cultural 
understanding and ISA performance, which can push managers to invest more in 
cultural understanding training.    
In conclusion, the present study investigated some core aspects of the management of 
international joint ventures with parent firms from Saudi Arabia. One contribution of 
the research was the extension of the existing empirical work to a new area of the world. 
The primary purpose of this study was to add to our knowledge on international 
business and to provide new evidence in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
Although this study does not provide a complete test of all the complex variables 
affecting the performance of ISA, it provides a framework for integrating the different 
soft factors which affect ISA performance. 
This study also develops several trust-related constructs (i.e. Personal trust, distrust, and 
competence trust) to thoroughly investigate how these constructs influence ISA 
performance. This was backed up with empirical evidence to support its relationship 
with performance. In so doing, this study contributes to the growing body of ISAs 
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research by combining elements from diverse theories, such as the resource-based view 
of the firm, transaction cost economics, organisational learning, and institutional theory. 
An important part of the study objectives was to expand the understanding of ISA 
cultural distance and trust and to provide a new empirical contribution. This study 
proposes and verifies several variables that moderate and mediate the cultural distance 
and trust constructs. This study developed an empirically testable framework of ISA 
cultural distance and trust and its relationship with performance. 
 
8.6. Managerial Implications of the Study 
The study suggests that foreign firms are motivated by market entry, and that Saudi 
partner provides safe and quick solution to achieve this goal. Saudi firms, however, are 
not motivated by transaction costs theory, but more on accessing resources, expertise, 
skills, and diversification. Saudi firms seek to expand quickly to keep up with the 
demand and the growth of the local economies. However, Saudi firms are relying on 
one competitive advantage their “market knowledge” in attracting foreign partners. 
Foreign firms are gaining local experience; and Saudi government in attempt to 
encourage foreign investment are facilitating market entry, the ease of doing business, 
and modernizing legal system and arbitration courts. Therefore, in the future foreign 
firms might find fewer incentives to collaborate with local firms. Saudi firms should 
start building technical competencies, and not just play an intermediary role. Just 
recently, SAGIA have published its new investment pack, and it included some 
incentives for foreign firms (SAGIA, 2014). One of those is access to low interest loans, 
which means foreign firms will have fewer incentives to collaborate with the Saudi 
partner. There will be more studies on the Saudi market and business, government is 
working to improve the regulatory conditions. This means with time foreign firms will 
find it less risky to enter the market alone. Saudi firms should try to build competencies, 
and not relying on their market knowledge. Building capabilities will allow Saudi firms 
to compete with foreign firms when they enter the market, or motivate foreign firms to 
collaborate with the Saudi firms and share their experience and skills.  
Saudis may be aware of their foreign partners’ goals, and vice versa. The predictability 
of Saudi motives should make it easier for foreign firms to enter the market and form a 
proposal that satisfies their Saudi counterparts. It will make the negotiation costs lower 
and will be a first step towards establishing mutual trust. The results of this study have 
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generally illustrated a great rate of ISA success in Saudi Arabia. According to Choi and 
Beamish (2013), the synergy effects of partners’ complementary resources can drive the 
performance of the ISA. Nakos, et al (2014) indicated that alliances with non-
competitors enjoy more success than alliances with competitors. 
However, the dynamics of this relationship might change in the future. Foreign firms 
with regulation and institutional conditions improving in Saudi Arabia could mean the 
Saudi partners might be dispensable. On the other hand, Saudi firms could improve their 
competencies and directly rival the foreign firms; this may lead to rivalry or the 
protectiveness of core knowledge and competencies.  
The literature suggests that competition can affect the firms ISA performance. In their 
study, Nakos, et al (2014) concluded that competition between firms can have a 
disparate direct and moderating effect on ISA performance. Nakos, et al (2014) 
indicated that alliances with non-competitors enjoy more success than alliances with 
competitors.   
This implies that when the bridge is narrowed and the Saudi market grows in regulation, 
status, and business environment, it will reduce the uncertainty surrounding it. Hence, 
there will be a need for local knowledge. The emerging market will, in time, develop 
senior professionals equipped with in-depth local market knowledge, which might be a 
threat to the Saudi firms. 
In Chapter 5, we discussed how employee motivation is an important element in 
successfully acquiring knowledge. Saudi firms are not reaping the benefits of having 
qualified and experienced expatriates. They depend on expatriate for their superior skills 
and expertise; however, their presence has not proved to be instrumental for the firms’ 
knowledge acquisitions success. The failure to learn from established and well-known 
partner firms can be considered lost opportunities. Managers and owners should seize 
these opportunities and build a strong knowledge base and know-how. Thus, if the 
Saudi firms want to transfer the knowledge to their firm and decrease their dependency 
on foreign skills a change of approach might be required. Firms should either focus on 
training local workforce and build strong organizational culture; or try to address the 
issues of intrinsic motivation of expatriate. Focusing on building indigenous workforce 
and equip them with skills can pay dividends on the long run. Furthermore, Saudi firms 
should address the issues of intrinsic motivation of expatriate. Successful learning 
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requires commitment, and motivation, and companies needs to build that. Hence, firms 
should focus on building strong organizational culture, and sense of loyalty to increase 
their chances of successfully acquiring knowledge.  
In chapters 5, 6 and 7, the study has established the importance of communication on 
knowledge acquisitions and ISA performance. The results have proved that level of 
communication is in instrumental to knowledge acquisition and performance. Hence, 
firms engaging in alliances should ensure the flow of information by keeping the 
communication channels open and engaging in more dialogue formal or informal. 
In chapter 6, trust has proved to be critical to the success of ISAs. It pays to spend some 
time on building trust, eliminating any fear of opportunistic behaviour. Saudis place 
high emphasis on trust when doing business, the absence of trust could lead partners to 
undermine each other. 
Firms have always faced the challenge of building trust and preventing opportunistic 
behaviour in ISAs. Therefore, it is important for parent firms to develop imitative in 
order to build trust with their ISA counterpart, which affects their performance. 
These environmental changes will affect the alliance’s performance if not acted upon 
(Kogut, 1989). The findings have shown that distrust has a positive effect on the 
performance of ISAs in unpredictable industries. The results should alert managers to 
the risks of complacency in unpredictable industries, as it might damage their 
performance. It should also alert managers to a drawback of trust, which is reliance and 
dependency.  
The results in chapter 7 show that cultural distance has proved to be valuable to the 
alliances, differences are seen to be source of knowledge. Saudi Arabia has a unique and 
strong local culture, firms investing in Saudi Arabia should understand the culture and 
prepare accordingly to increase their chances of success.  
In addition, the findings established a causal relationship between cultural 
understanding and ISA performance. Both of these results should encourage managers 
to invest more in cultural understanding training. In the literature, culture adaptation 
was found to have mutual benefits in the international supply relationship (Jia and 
Lamming, 2013). In the literature chapter, Section 2.3.5., we presented some of the 
methods to manage cultural differences. Dong and Glaister (2009) discussed it 
extensively and suggested some forms of cross-cultural training (CCT) to develop 
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manager confidence and “self-interaction skills.” Adopting culture management policies 
can reduce the perception of cultural differences. According to Dong and Glaister 
(2007), firms adopting these policies report a much higher degree of trust in the 
different relationship levels of the ISA. The improved trust will have, in return, a better 
ISA performance.  
 
8.7. Policy Implications 
 
The success of many ISAs in Saudi Arabia could signal that Saudi Arabia is a good 
place to do business. This reality should help the Saudi government attempt to attract 
more foreign investment into the country.  
The high success rate of ISAs in Saudi Arabia might be a positive sign. However, it is 
substantially higher than any rate reported in the literature. This might be an indication 
that Saudi firms are merely playing an intermediary role and not transferring technology 
and know-how to the country. In addition, with the high number of expatriates, Saudi 
Arabia is missing out on a big opportunity to give their workforce the chance to learn 
and acquire knowledge working on government mega-projects. This will result in the 
failure to build a base of local firms that are strong enough to break away from their 
dependence on foreign technology and expertise.  
Thus, Saudi Arabian firms have to better themselves and improve their competitive set. 
The Saudi Arabian economy and institutions are improving steadily, and hence, will 
make them less desirable to partner with. The argument is supported by comments from 
Ahlstrom, et al. (2013), who argued that “Firms operating in an environment with well-
developed formal institutions are less likely to acquire those resources through alliance 
partners and may try to build and more closely control those resources internally”. This 
could support our argument in the previous section regarding the managerial 
implications. The government should address this issue urgently, and create a strategy 
to develop stronger and more competitive local firms, as they cannot protect local firms 
forever.  
In Chapter 5, we discussed how employee motivation is an important element in order 
to acquire knowledge successfully. Saudi firms are not reaping the benefits of having 
qualified and experienced expatriates, due to the absence of intrinsic motivations, which 
are crucial for knowledge transfer (Osterloh and Fery, 2000; Yin and Bao, 2006). They 
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argued that successful knowledge acquisitions require commitment and motivation. 
Hence, expatriates need to be intrinsically motivated.  
Part of the lack in motivation is because expatriates do not link their future with a stay 
in Saudi Arabia, due its residency regulations. As a result, the Saudi economy is missing 
out on big opportunities to retain knowledge and experiences and lose it to other 
countries. In an age that will be dominated by talent hunts and acquisitions, Saudi 
policy-makers should think of ways to address this problem and put forward policies 
that will allow them to attract and keep the best of the talent, and encourage them to 
contribute to the country’s set of skills. 
 
8.8. Limitations of the Study 
The study relied on self-reported questionnaire surveys to collect data, which affected 
the depth of data collected. It could not provide richer contextual information for the 
issues under consideration, although the study attempted to compensate for this by 
engaging in an extensive literature review to build contextual understanding. 
Furthermore, the study was cross-sectional, which resulted in limitations in exploring 
the evolution of factors that affects the success of ISAs.  
In addition, the study relied on a single respondent from each ISA, assuming they were 
aware of all aspects of ISA activities. This limitation could be overcome by collecting 
data from multiple respondents within a firm.  
Another concern relating to the research was connected to sampling methods. The 
problems of obtaining the required data and information faced in this area are not new. 
However, there is the possibility of bias due to the fact that the obtained sample might 
not include all the sample units. The possible loss of some sample unit might have 
created unit non-response bias. This problem will be hard to overcome if no government 
institution or organization builds a comprehensive database.   
One of the limitations is the generalizability of the findings. This study data were 
collected from a single country, Saudi Arabia, and the hypotheses were in general 
context dependent. Hence, the findings might not be generalized to all developing 
economies, replication of the study is highly recommended.  
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8.9. Suggestions for Future Research 
The purpose of this section is to provide general recommendations for future studies. 
The individual chapters have highlighted areas for future research relating to the 
particular research questions.  
Methodologically, future work should consider adopting a longitudinal design to test the 
weight of different social factors on alliance performance. Furthermore, future studies 
could benefit from using questionnaires and interviews, which will add value and depth. 
Furthermore, obtaining data from each of ISA elements the local, foreign and alliance 
management would provide better explanations of how these factors influence all the 
parties. It would also overcome any criticism in the literature of the practice of 
gathering data from one ISA element. 
Future studies could look into how negative or positive reputations can affect firms’ 
ISA selection criteria from the perspective of Saudi firms; non-Saudi Arabian firms can 
also be investigated. Stern, et al (2014) distinguished between the concepts of reputation 
and status; hence, future studies should consider these concepts also.   
The insignificance of personal trust is rather surprising. However, the insignificance of a 
linear relationship between trust and knowledge acquisition does not rule out the 
possibility of the moderating or mediating effect. Future studies should further 
investigate the moderating role of trust, especially in relation to communications. 
Furthermore, future studies could look into the relationship between knowledge 
acquisition and another kind of trust, more specifically, inter-firm trust.  
Buckley et al. (2009) differentiated between complementary knowledge accession and 
supplementary knowledge accession, and between complementary knowledge 
acquisition and supplementary knowledge acquisition. Since Saudis have always 
preferred shortcuts and to buy knowledge (a “turn-key” policy) in major projects 
(Haidar, 2000), this may be an indication that Saudi firms are seeking knowledge 
accessions, not acquisitions; which may justify the insignificance of trust. Hence, future 
studies should consider these differences and investigate how trust affects the transfer of 
both kinds of knowledge in an ISA. The results should encourage more research on the 
role of trust on knowledge acquisition, if any. Trust roles in knowledge might be not 
direct and might be playing a mediating role. 
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The findings of Chapter 6 on the trust performance relationship should encourage 
further investigations. Future studies should look into the indirect effect of trust on 
performance. Moreover, future work should consider adopting a longitudinal design to 
test the weight of these relationships over time.  
Mohr and Puck (2013) argued that the trust and performance influence relationship is 
reversed and argue that good performance fosters the development of trust. Future 
studies may check the validity of these assertions and investigate the direction of the 
relationship, as to whether it is unidirectional or bi-directional. 
In one situation, distrust appears to be a blessing in disguise, and helped firms to 
overcome the challenges of the industry’s environmental uncertainty. The results did 
not support the arguments of Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999), who suggested that 
trust can help to enable partners to respond more positively to any unexpected problems 
or changes in the environment. The findings are interesting; hence, further studies are 
recommended to better understand this relationship. 
In Chapter 7, we attempted to expand our understanding on alliance performance, which 
is one of the most exciting and unexplored areas in the study of ISAs. 
The results of this chapter paved the way for future studies to better understand the 
relationship established in this study; in particular, the nature (and the complexity) of 
knowledge acquired and its relationship to cultural distance. Future studies should link 
partners’ motivation and the culture performance relationship. Longitudinal studies will 
provide a deeper understanding of alliance performance and how cross relationships 
evolve. 
The role of communications deserves more attention in the ISA research. It has received 
little theoretical and empirical attention. In this study, the level of communication 
proved instrumental to the performance of the in-depth analysis of its role; hence, this is 
an area which future research should focus on. 
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Appendices 
A- Questionnaire Cover letter in English and Arabic 
Dear participant 
 
Thanks for taking the time to read this 
letter.  
 
I am currently undertaking doctoral 
research looking into the success factors 
for the managementof the International 
Joint ventures in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine 
some of thefactors such as strategic 
motives, culture, trust and learning and 
their effect on the performance.  
Very little academic research seems to 
have been conducted in this area so I 
expect my findings to be illuminating. It 
will help increase the successes of 
international cooperation taking place in 
Saudi Arabia, and will help venture 
partners to better understand the current 
problems, especially in the Saudi context. 
 
Your co-operation in completing the 
research questionnaire will be greatly 
appreciated. Your will be making a great 
contribution toan important yet under 
researched topic. 
 
I would like to assure you that all of your 
answers will be treated with complete 
confidentiality, and will be used only for 
the academic purposes and research. 
The result will be aggregated in any 
presentation and publication. Neither you 
nor your company would be identified in 
any form of publications of this research. 
A summary of the results will be made 
available to participants if requested.  
 
Given the nature of the information being 
sought, it would be helpful if the 
respondent has some first-hand experience 
in managing or negotiating international 
joint ventures in Saudi Arabia (for 
example; CEO, VP, GM, PM).  
 
يزيزع كراشملا  
 
مكئاطعلإ اركش ولاةءارقل يفاكلا تق ةلاسرلا هذه.  
 
هاروتكد ةلاسرل ريضحتلاب ايلاح موقأ ثحبت نع  لماوع
حاجن ةرادإ عيراشملا ةكرتشملا ةيلودلا  ةكلمملا يف
ةيبرعلا ةيدوعسلا.  
 
نم فدهلا ثحبلا اذه ريثأت ةسارد وه لماوعلا ضعب 
لثم عفاودلا ةيجيتارتسلإا ةفاقثلاو ، باستكاو ةقثلاو
ةفرعملا ىلع أةكارشلا ءاد . ثاحبلأا نم ليلقلا كانه
 ريثكلا جاتنتسا نكمي لاو لاجملا اذهب ةقلعتملا ةيميداكلأا
اهنم ,ةرمثم ثحبلا اذه جئاتن نوكت نأ عقوتأ اذل .
 تاكارشلا حاجن ةدايز يف يباجيا لكشب مهاست فوسو
ةيدوعسلا ةيبرعلا ةكلمملا يف ةيلودلا . دعاستس اهنأ امك
شم مهف ىلع ءاكرشلالضفأ لكشب تاكارشلا لكا ,
يدوعسلا قايسلاب ةقلعتملا اصوصخ.  
  
ريدقت لحم نوكتس نايبتسلأا اذه لامكأ يف مكتدعاسم .
 يف ريبك لكشب متمهاس دق نونوكتس نايبتسلاا مكلامكإب
 عوضومب ةقلعتملا ةساردلا هذه حاجنأ ماه هثحب متي مل
بسانم لكشب.  
 عيمج ةلماعم متيس هنأ مكل دكؤأ نأ دوأ ةيرسب مكتاباجإ
ةمات , ةيميداكلأا ضارغلأل طقف اهمادختسا متيسو
ةيثحبلاو . وأ اهضرع ةلاح يف جئاتنلا عيمجت متي فوس
اهرشن. دنع مكتاكرش ءامسأ وأ مكئامسأ ركذ متي نلو
ثاحبلأا نم يا رشن.  جئاتنلل صخلم ميدقت متي فوسو
لنايبتسلاا يف نيكراشمل اهبلط ةلاح يف.  
 
لا ةعيبطل ارظناهعمجل ىعسن يتلا تامولعم , نم هنأف
 هل نايبتسلاا ةئبعت يف كراشملا نوكي نأ نسحتسملا
 عيراشملا ةرادأ وأ ضوافتلا يف ةرشابم ةربخو ةبرجت
 ةيدوعسلا ةيبرعلا ةكلمملا يف ةكرتشملا ةيلودلا( ىلع
لاثملا ليبس :يذيفنت ريدم ,سيئر بئان ,ماع ريدم ,
عيراشم ريدم.)  
 
يأ ةيدل ناك اذإةلئسأ ة , حيضوتلا نم ديزم ىلإ جاتحت وأ
 يف ناونعلا ىلع يب لاصتلاا يف ددرتلا دع وجرأ
يلاتلا ينورتكللاا ديربلا ربع يتبطاخم وأ لفسلأا :   
m.almasaad@rhul.ac.uk 
ةميقلا مكئارآ و مكمعد ىلع لايزج اركش . ىلإ علطتأ و
مكنم عامتسلاا .  
  
 يناملأا بيطأ 
دعسملا زاوف لعشم 
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If you have any questions, or need further 
clarification please do not hesitate to 
contact me at the following address or e-
mail me at m.almasaad@rhul.ac.uk 
 
Thank you very much for your valuable 
opinion and support.  








How to fill up the questionnaire: 
 
1. Fill in the questionnaire electronically 
from the following website (you will not 
need to resend it) 
Press here to fill the questionnaire 
 
2. You can download the questionnaire 
from the following link: 
Press here to download the questionnaire 
You can fill the questionnaire from your 
PC and when you finish press the 
“Submit” button. 
Or you can print it, fill it, and then re-send 
it using one of the 3 following ways: 
a. Scan the questionnaire the send it to the 
following email: m.almasaad@rhul.ac.uk. 
b. Fax it to this number: 1 
(0()699+) 4781131 
c. Mail it to the following address: 
Mushal Almasaad 
Riyadh11541. P.O.box; 42277. 
 
كنايبتسلاا ةئبعت ةيفي:  
 
1 . ةرشابم يلاتلا عقوملا نم اينورتكلا نايبتسلاا  ةئبعت
هلاسرإ ةداعلإ ةجاح كانه نوكي نلو 
نايبتسلأا ةئبعتل انه طغضأ 
 
2 . نم نايبتسلاا ليزنت كناكمإبيلاتلا طبارلا:  
نايبتسلاا ليزنتل انه طغضأ 
و ةداعاو كزاهج نم نايبنتسلأا ةئبعت كناكمأب
 زر ىلع طقف طغضلاب ةلاسرأ"لاسرأ " وأ  
."Submit" 
  كنكمي وأهتئبعتو هتعابط , هلاسرإ ةداعلإو
لادحأ مادختسأ نكمي3 قرط ةيلاتلا:  
أ . ديربلا ىلإ اينورتكلا هلاسرإو نايبتسلاا خسن
يلاتلا ينورتكللاا:  
m.almasaad@rhul.ac.uk 
ب . سكافلاب هلاسرإليلاتلا مقرل :  
(0()699  +)  14781131 
ج .يلاتلا ناونعلا ىلإ ديربلاب هلاسرإ:  
دعسملا لعشم 
يديربلا زمرلا: ضايرلا11511 . قودنص
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B- Questionnaire in English 
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C- Questionnaire in Arabic 
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D – Tables from chapter 7 
 
Table1 (Pearson Correlation) 
































* P < .1; ** P < .05; *** P < .01  
Table2 (Kendall’s tau_b Correlation) 
































* P < .1; ** P < .05; *** P < .01  
Table 3 (Manufacturing)  
 Group N Mean SD t-
value 
From the perspective of your firm, how is the performance of 
the IJV evaluated? 
EIJVs 36 4.06 .984 -.406 
NEIJVs 10 4.20 1.033 
From the perspective of your partner, how is the performance 
of the IJV evaluated? 
EIJVs 36 4.06 1.068 -.397 
NEIJVs 10 4.20 .789 
Our firm is satisfied with the financial performance of the 
collaboration.  
EIJVs 36 4.14 .931 1.251 
NEIJVs 10 3.70 1.160 
Our partner firm seems to be satisfied with the financial 
performance of the collaboration 
EIJVs 36 4.08 .937 1.306 
NEIJVs 10 3.60 1.350 
Our firm is satisfied with the overall performance of the 
collaboration.  
EIJVs 36 4.14 .833 1.607 
NEIJVs 10 3.60 1.265 
Our partner firm seems to be satisfied with the overall 
performance of the collaboration 
EIJVs 36 4.08 1.052 .998 
NEIJVs 10 3.70 1.160 
To what extent has the IJV created new opportunities for your 
firm? 
EIJVs 36 4.11 1.090 .792 
NEIJVs 10 3.80 1.135 
Our cooperation with this partner has contributed to growth in 
our firm. 
EIJVs 36 3.86 1.018 .430 
NEIJVs 10 3.70 1.160 
This relationship provides our firm with many strategic 
benefits. 
EIJVs 36 4.14 1.018 .103 
NEIJVs 10 4.10 1.197 
The objectives for which the collaboration was established are 
being met. 
EIJVs 36 4.00 1.095 .265 
NEIJVs 10 3.90 .876 
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Table 4 (Service)  
 Group N Mean SD t-
value 
From the perspective of your firm, how is the performance of 
the IJV evaluated? 
EIJVs 37 4.22 .672 -.221 
NEIJVs 28 4.25 .518 
From the perspective of your partner, how is the performance 
of the IJV evaluated? 
EIJVs 37 4.24 .760 .158 
NEIJVs 28 4.21 .686 
Our firm is satisfied with the financial performance of the 
collaboration.  
EIJVs 37 3.84 .986 .239 
NEIJVs 28 3.79 .686 
Our partner firm seems to be satisfied with the financial 
performance of the collaboration 
EIJVs 37 3.89 1.075 .294 
NEIJVs 28 3.82 .722 
Our firm is satisfied with the overall performance of the 
collaboration.  
EIJVs 37 3.86 1.134 .626 
NEIJVs 28 3.71 .659 
Our partner firm seems to be satisfied with the overall 
performance of the collaboration 
EIJVs 37 4.00 1.054 .314 
NEIJVs 28 3.93 .663 
To what extent has the IJV created new opportunities for your 
firm? 
EIJVs 37 4.84 1.118 .752 
NEIJVs 28 3.64 .911 
Our cooperation with this partner has contributed to growth in 
our firm. 
EIJVs 37 3.86 1.032 .675 
NEIJVs 28 3.71 .659 
This relationship provides our firm with many strategic 
benefits. 
EIJVs 37 4.08 1.010 .952 
NEIJVs 28 3.89 .567 
The objectives for which the collaboration was established are 
being met. 
EIJVs 37 3.89 .994 .457 
NEIJVs 28 3.79 .833 
* P < .1; ** P < .05; *** P < .01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
